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The papers in this monograph were prepared for a workshop organised by the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) in partnership with the China
Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS), and held in Beijing
in March 2007. The workshop and, indeed, the establishment of the partnership
with the CFISS was made possible by an ARC Linkage Grant (with the Department
of Defence as the ‘Industry Partner’) awarded to the SDSC in 2005. The ARC
grant has made it possible for the SDSC to network more systematically with
other centres of learning in the Asia-Pacific focused on the strategic ramifications
of China’s rise. It has enabled the Centre to offer additional courses on China in
its Masters program and, more generally, to boost the Centre’s interest and
capacity to conduct research on issues related to China. The Centre is indebted
to both the ARC and the Department of Defence for this support.
The workshop was attended, on the Australian side, by all three ‘Chief
Investigators’ for the ARC-funded project, namely Ron Huisken, Robert Ayson,
and Brendan Taylor. As this was the inaugural collaboration with the CFISS, Yu
Ping, the then Administrator of the Masters program and a Chinese citizen,
participated as our liaison officer, adding valuable ballast to the Australian team.
For its part, the CFISS assembled its director and deputy director of research,
Zhang Tuosheng and Lu Dehong respectively, together with four other scholars
from centres in Beijing and Shanghai: Pan Guang, Yuan Peng, Zhai Kun and Zhu
Feng. Most of the Chinese papers were written in Chinese and translated into
English. We elected, as far as possible, to preserve the flavour of these translations
and limited our editing to the correction of any obvious sources of confusion or
misinterpretation. It is appropriate to make clear at this point that the workshop
participants are responsible only for the content of their papers. Responsibility
for these introductory observations rests solely with the editor.
The theme for the workshop, suggested by the SDSC, was Developing East
Asia’s Security Architecture. The broad intent was to get behind the Chinese
view that the extant architecture, dominated of course by America’s several
bilateral alliance relationships, reflects a Cold War mentality that should now
give way to thinking better suited to the challenges and opportunities of the
contemporary world. China’s official alternative is encapsulated in the slogans
for a revival of multipolarity and the democratisation of international relations,
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and in its New Security Concept which urges adherence to principles like mutual
benefit and mutual respect. We wondered whether China’s academic community
might be toying with ideas that could operationalise this general dissatisfaction
with the status quo.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the workshop papers only came at this issue
tangentially. Dissatisfaction with the status quo was strongly confirmed but,
beyond an unmistakable preference to see a gradual diminution in US
prominence, no concepts for an alternative regional architecture were hinted at.
Both the papers and the discussions at the workshop, apart from proving to be
a rich source of insights on specific issues, also confirmed that China has stepped
away from any direct challenge to existing arrangements in favour of indirect
and longer-term stratagems. Readers will be able to judge for themselves the
degree of progress that China has made, but this observer’s assessment would
be in the ballpark of ‘strong progress’.
One of the more interesting outcomes from the workshop actually came before
it got underway. In March 2007, Australia had just signed the declaration with
Japan on cooperation in the security field and our Chinese hosts were eager to
hear what we had to say about it. Our attempts at an explanation—that it was
a declaration not a treaty, that all of the activities envisaged were at the ‘soft
end’ of the security spectrum, and that it was an incremental step in a relationship
that had matured slowly but steadily over several decades—seemed to fall short
of the mark. The light-hearted observation was made that China had clearly
misread Australia in that the move toward Japan indicated that Australia had
already decided which camp it preferred. This comment not only confirmed that
Japan remains something of a raw nerve for China, but also that at least some
Chinese scholars are already thinking instinctively in terms of rival ‘camps’ in
East Asia, with China at the head of one of them. It also raised the question (but
no opportunity presented itself to explore the answer) of why the specialist
community in China (or parts of it) had come to the conclusion that Australia
could be categorised as wavering between the ‘alternative camps’ in East Asia.
Further discussion reverted to more familiar expressions of understanding for
Australia’s closeness to the United States (and, by extension, Japan), but included
the speculation that Beijing might well seek to get closer to Australia to dilute
any effort to forge an anti-China coalition.
The first theme tackled at the workshop was an evaluation of existing
multilateral processes, particularly those associated with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In chapter 2 Brendan Taylor presents a crisp
assessment of how regard for multilateral processes started hesitantly from a
low base in the aftermath of the Cold War and then literally blossomed from the
late 1990s, arguably to the point of oversupply. Taylor also tackles the tricky
question of effectiveness, concluding that, against yardsticks such as networking,
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socialisation and confidence-building, the processes in East Asia deserve strong
marks. At the same time, none of these processes have displayed much potential
to deliver prompt, practical outcomes in crises and emergencies in the region
like East Timor in 1999, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak
in 2003 or the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. These considerations
feed into Taylor’s judgement that in order to be part of a viable architecture for
regional security, multilateral processes need to become more responsive to great
power politics.
This sentiment dovetails rather nicely with Zhai Kun’s creative endeavour
to account for the most conspicuous dimension of multilateralism in East Asia,
namely the dominance of ASEAN rather than one or more of the major powers.
In chapter 3 Zhai contends that ASEAN’s success is linked to redefining such
notions as power and security to its advantage, and to its recognition that its
ability to continue to shape the manner in which the great powers engage
Southeast Asia is strongly linked to the deepening of ASEAN cohesion so that
this grouping continues to be the standard-setter in the region on this front.
The general idea is that ASEAN leadership of these processes must continue to
look to all the major powers as better than the more costly and riskier approach
of direct competition among them. Zhai further contends that China’s decision
to give unequivocal backing to ASEAN’s aspirations to play this role has provided
both essential strategic support and encouraged the other great powers to play
the game ASEAN’s way. This is an intriguing thesis. China has certainly achieved
a significant status within ASEAN in a remarkably short space of time, despite
the earlier dominance of Japan and, to some extent, at one remove, of the United
States. Equally, however, if the brawl over the shape and role of the East Asia
Summit (EAS) is any guide, great power competition is suspended only to the
extent that it suits those powers.
In chapter 4, also covering East Asia’s current multilateral processes, Pan
Guang addresses the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which emerged
in 1996 but took its present shape in 2001. Pan records the remarkable
development of this China-initiated multilateral forum, including the plausible
claim to have outflanked the United States despite the latter’s dramatic intrusion
into central Asia from October 2001 to prosecute the war against terrorism. In
contrast to its caution in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) during the 1990s,
China has fast-tracked the development of the SCO, both in terms of the
organisation’s mandate and in giving the body concrete institutional form. The
SCO’s mandate has grown beyond its original purpose of defining and stabilising
China’s borders with Russia and the adjacent republics of the former Soviet
Union, branching out into collaboration on counter-terrorism and seeking to be
influential in shaping the development and distribution of the region’s energy
resources. Pan points out that stabilising some 15 000 km of land borders in Asia
constitutes a major contribution of regional security. Similarly, he argues that
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the SCO’s counter-terrorism campaign is of strategic significance for the whole
of Asia, not least because the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia (which are
potentially capable of disrupting energy supplies throughout the Indonesian
archipelago) have close ties with the groups in central and south Asia. Although
pre-eminently a security body, Pan Guang points out that the SCO’s success on
this front will also require a conscious effort to ensure an adequate degree of
balanced economic development amongst all the participants.
In discussions on this paper, it was acknowledged that there seemed to be,
at best, limited compatibility between Chinese and US interests in central Asia.
Chinese participants repeatedly highlighted China’s vulnerability to instability
in Afghanistan and expressed genuine concern that the combined efforts of the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in that country
appeared to be inadequate. There was no suggestion, however, that China might,
or should, consider a substantive military contribution to this campaign (although
it was acknowledged that the United States has pressed for such a commitment
on more than one occasion).
The two presentations on the Six-Party Talks process produced an
enlightening discussion. China’s protestations early in these negotiations—that
its access and influence in North Korea had limits—tended to be regarded as
‘cover’ for a degree of common ground between Beijing and Pyongyang. This
apparent consensus extended to how the nuclear crisis should be resolved,
particularly as regards the timeframe, and how strongly the regime in Pyongyang
should resist pressures on it to begin to change the nature of its governance of
North Korea. The workshop discussions provided a timely reminder that if Japan
and the United States have been North Korea’s principal enemies over the past
60 years, for the preceding 2000 years or longer that position had belonged to
China. It was pointed out that the close China-North Korea relationship of earlier
times—rather famously likened to ‘lips and teeth’—was borne of an era when
China felt threatened and was seeking additional means, not least buffer states
between itself and US forces, to bolster its security. Now it is North Korea that
feels threatened and insecure, not least, perhaps, because both the Soviet
Union/Russia and China distanced themselves from Pyongyang in the early
1990s.
In chapter 5, Zhu Feng provides a frank and fascinating assessment of the
dynamics of the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship in recent years, and of Beijing’s
eventual conclusion that it may have seriously misread Pyongyang’s motives
and intentions. Zhu concludes that, following the missile tests of July 2006 and
the nuclear test of October 2006, Beijing may well have concluded that it had
little choice but to make clear to Pyongyang that it too regarded all options as
being on the table if it reneged on its repeated assurances that it sought
arrangements which would allow it to roll back its nuclear weapons program.
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In chapter 6, Robert Ayson takes an entirely different approach with his
opening observation that the Six-Party Talks process is unlikely to result in the
complete elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. For Ayson,
failure on this front does not mean that the Six-Party Talks process is without
merit. To the contrary, he argues that there is a dimension to these talks that
could more than offset a failure to fully achieve their declared purpose. For
Ayson, the Six-Party Talks provide the one forum in which the region’s three
great powers—the United States, China and Japan—are being required to adapt
and reconcile their approaches to an urgent regional security issue; that is, to
develop the habits, instincts, and techniques of functioning as a ‘concert of
powers’. This positions the Six-Party Talks as the most promising countervailing
force to those other tendencies at work in the region that point to the more
dangerous option of rival blocs.
In the discussion in chapters 5 and 6, it is suggested that South Korea and
North Korea are pursuing similar strategies for the longer term—more balanced
relationships with their powerful neighbours, protectors and protagonists. For
South Korea, this means enhancing its exposure to China and accepting some
greater distance from the United States; while, for North Korea, it means measured
engagement with the United States and Japan so as to lessen its exposure to
China. This is a plausible line of argument and casts new light on the twists and
turns of the Six-Party Talks. It is further supported by intense speculation within
the think-tank community in Beijing (that the author encountered in October
2007) to the effect that the United States and North Korea had come to an
understanding that has yet to be shared with the other Six-Party players. This
speculation centres on a meeting in Berlin in May 2007 involving (then) US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill and the chief North Korean negotiator to the
Six-Party Talks.
These additional facets on the Six-Party Talks suggest that the longer-term
endeavour to build a robustly stable security environment in Northeast Asia
will be a challenging but fascinating exercise, and that expectations that South
Korea and North Korea, whether separately or re-united, must inevitably slip
wholesale into China’s sphere of influence might be misplaced. Chinese
participants in the workshop confirmed other indications that Beijing is
favourably disposed to seeing the Six-Party Talks process transition into a
standing security mechanism for the region. Since the United States is also of
this view, the outlook for such a development must be deemed to be quite
positive provided, of course, that the Six-Party Talks process can achieve the
disablement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in a manner that builds
confidence in North Korea’s intentions.
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One of the themes strongly re-affirmed at the workshop was that China,
alongside acknowledging that the United States was vastly and comprehensively
more powerful, appears to be entirely comfortable with the notion of being a
‘peer competitor’. It seems to be regarded as almost axiomatic (and, it must said,
not without justification) that China will, in due course, become the second
player in America’s league in terms of a pronounced margin of superiority over
all other states in economic weight, political clout, and military power. This
self-image, as effectively the sole challenger to the present unipolar structure of
the international system, naturally inclines some Chinese analysts to view the
United States as by far the most formidable challenge to the full flourishing of
China’s potential. This also suggests, however, that China-US relations, for all
the tranquility of recent years, are prone to be characterised by deep and
powerful competitive instincts, and have a strong inherent potential to become
strategically unstable.
In chapter 7, Ron Huisken provides an essentially familiar ‘Western’ account
of US interests in and aspirations for East Asia, but is a good deal more cautious
on the potential for the United States and China to achieve some form of strategic
accommodation over the near to medium term than Lu Dehong expresses in
chapter 8. Huisken’s analysis supports a view expressed in workshop discussions
that even if Washington gradually concedes that it must compromise on its status
as the unambiguous foremost power globally, in Europe or in the Middle East,
it will be most resistant to relinquishing its status in Asia. This view has inherent
plausibility insofar as the synergies that in the past attached to pre-eminence in
Europe and the Middle East will be more strongly attached to East Asia in the
future simply because ‘the most important bilateral relationship in the world in
this century’ (to borrow Hillary Clinton’s words) is that between the United
States and China.
In chapter 8, Lu Dehong, a retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer,
presents his understanding (based on a careful study of critical and mostly
left-of-centre American literature) of the complex and somewhat dysfunctional
manner in which the United States goes about the business of protecting and
advancing its interests. Lu contrasts this with the clarity and simplicity of
pronouncements from China’s leaders regarding security and defence policy.
He concludes with an eloquent plea for an early and comprehensive program of
strategic engagement between China and the United States in the conviction
that this can expose the essential compatibility of their interests and aspirations.
In chapter 9, Yuan Peng seeks to back up the proposition that the prevailing
stability in US-China relations is tactical rather than strategic. In doing so, he
detects a degree of focus and coherence, and of danger, in US dealings with
China that few Western analysts would relate to, but which dramatises a
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distinctive feature of international relations: just how differently a common set
of events and developments can be perceived by various players.
The workshop took place just as Tokyo and Beijing made a serious effort to
break and melt the ice that had encrusted China-Japan relations since the
mid-1990s. Accordingly, the concluding presentation at the workshop was Zhang
Tuosheng’s account of why and how this effort was engineered and his
assessment of the outlook for this central relationship. In chapter 10 Zhang points
out that this core relationship deteriorated over the years up to 2006—to the
point where it caused serious damage to the strategic interests of both sides,
including the unbalancing of the US–China–Japan triangle. He contends that
the more conspicuous sources of tension—the history issue, Taiwan, and the
territorial disputes in the East China Sea—played out against the background
of a deeper concern: the end of the Cold War exposed the unsettling reality of
two major powers in East Asia. Zhang’s qualified optimism about the quite
comprehensive revival of political engagement since (then) Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2006, including China’s
acceptance in a joint communiqué in April 2007 of a bigger Japanese role in
international affairs, was tested in the discussions that followed his presentation.
This discussion only confirmed the veracity of Zhang’s concluding observation
that, absent a genuine reconciliation between China and Japan, any architecture
of security in East Asia will look worryingly inadequate.
A familiar approach to assessing the reliability of a region’s ‘security
architecture’ is to weigh the strength of potential challenges to security and
stability against the authority of the institutions, mechanisms and processes
available to develop instincts to accommodate national preferences to the
collective interests of regional states, to resolve instances of conflicting
aspirations, and to deter any inclinations to use national power to intimidate or
coerce others into line in a manner that falls outside accepted norms of diplomatic
interaction between states. This architecture is typically seen as composed of
three elements: bilateral relationships, alliances, and multilateral institutions
and processes. Commonsense (and scientific principles) allows the inference that
the most robust architectural form is one that incorporates all three elements
and where all the elements are of equal weight and importance. Of course,
scientific principles are rather difficult to replicate in any structure involving
people. And there is a school of thought that, in this example, two elements are
in fact better than three, because the third, alliances, is by its very nature ‘us
versus them’ institutions and inherently incompatible with the inculcation of
comprehensive, collective and common security mindsets. Equally, it is not very
difficult to develop a compelling argument that alliances are an indispensable
‘contradiction’ on the road to the adoption of genuine and reliable collective or
collegiate approaches to security.
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In East Asia at the end of the Cold War, such a security tripod could be
detected, but its legs were conspicuously uneven in that the multilateral leg was
all but invisible. Over the past 15 years, all three legs of the tripod have
experienced considerable change. The mosaic of bilateral relationships has
generally become thicker and stronger, with the China-Japan relationship being
the most conspicuous exception. Alliance relationships have also been dynamic,
becoming arguably more distant in the case of the US-South Korea relationship
and closer and more comprehensive in the case of the US-Japan relationship.
But the arena of most conspicuous change has been the development of
multilateral processes. From essentially none, we now have ASEAN Plus Ten,
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ARF, the SCO, ASEAN Plus
Three (APT), and the EAS, with expectations that the Six-Party Talks will spawn
a new, standing mechanism. But the question, of course, is whether all these
acronyms add up to a tripod leg of equal strength; that is, that it makes a
contribution to regional security that is commensurate with the other two. I
would venture the view that this is not the case; that there is, in fact, a nagging
sense that States in the region have danced around the issue of building a
multilateral process based on an acceptance that all the major powers now
embedded in the region have a full role to play in shaping its future.
The prominent role that ASEAN has played on the multilateral front is, in
part, a reflection of the continuing ambivalence among the major powers on
who should be accepted as a key sculptor of the region’s security architecture
and on the character of the institution in which this artistic function should be
performed. ASEAN’s claim to leadership of the process rests on the assurance
that it will be a ‘safe driver, proceeding at a pace comfortable to all’. Among
other things, this means gauging major power interests and not testing the limits
of their tolerance. If ASEAN misjudges, or if an initiative runs outside expected
parameters, the major powers will normally make clear that a policy correction
is in order. Something of this kind appears to have occurred, with the EAS
holdings its first session with India, Australia and New Zealand as founding
members and Russia all but promised early admission. China was prepared to
shed its benevolent image and require ASEAN to belittle this new body by
stressing that the real engine-room for community-building in East Asia would
remain the narrower APT forum. The ASEAN processes have by no means been
ineffective, but they are an indirect and therefore slow-acting way forward. In
the meantime, a significant and possibly growing amount of major power energy
is being channelled into multilateral processes that exclude perceived rivals and
which are directly or indirectly competitive with existing processes set up by
these rivals.
We cannot expect in East Asia over the foreseeable future to see the sort of
pooling of sovereignty that has occurred in Europe. We must anticipate that,
for the foreseeable future, the requirement will be for the sensible management
8
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and containment of competitive instincts. The establishment of a multilateral
security body in East Asia that includes all the key players, and which the major
powers invest with the authority to tackle the shaping of the regional security





Developing East Asia’s Security
Architecture: An Australian perspective
on ASEAN processes
Brendan Taylor
Prior to the 1990s, a tangible East Asian security architecture remained elusive.
This was not for want of trying. Several ill-fated efforts were undertaken to
establish regional groupings which, over time, provided the basis for a more
substantial East Asian security architecture. These included the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation (SEATO)—an eight member grouping established in 1955
that began to lose members and was finally dissolved in 1977, and both
Maphilindo and the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).1  Likewise, in Northeast
Asia, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)—a South Korean initiative
established in 1966 and comprising nine member countries—struggled due to
the diverging perceptions and interests of its membership, and finally collapsed
in 1975.2  Flowing from this legacy was the more successful sub-regional
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967 and expanded
via several avenues, including a major security component, the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). But even ASEAN’s initial collaborative functions were essentially
economic, political and cultural.
This paucity in regional security dialogue stands in stark contrast to the
situation today where, according to one recent estimate, over 100 such channels
now exist at the official (Track 1) level and in excess of 200 at the unofficial
(Track 2) level.3 To be sure, this startling growth in regional security cooperation
has been neither steady nor straightforward. The volume of such institutions
and activities plummeted in the immediate aftermath of the 1997–98 Asian
financial crisis, for instance, and temporarily lost the attention of policymakers
in the process. Yet there can be little disputing the fact that regional security
cooperation has since recovered well and, moreover, that the general trend in
such activity across the decade and a half since the beginning of the 1990s has
been an upward one. ASEAN, of course, has been one of the key drivers or
‘architects’ behind this trend. This chapter evaluates the effectiveness and the
shortcomings of the most prominent ASEAN processes. It considers the outlook
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for these, before concluding with an Australian perspective on their desirable
future development.
Evaluating ASEAN processes
Before reflecting upon the effectiveness and shortcomings of ASEAN processes,
it is necessary to firstly acknowledge that this evaluative task is an inevitably
subjective one. As Amitav Acharya has observed:
Despite decades of intense debate, international relations theory provides
no agreed and definitive way of assessing what constitutes ‘success’ and
‘effectiveness’ in regional organizations. Understanding the effects of
Asian institutions on state behavior and regional order depends very
much on the analytical lens used.4
By way of example, many if not most regional players will tend to assess
regional security cooperation not in terms of its immediate outcomes, but rather
as a process through which confidence is built, consensus reached and common
regional understandings or ‘norms’ arrived at.
This issue of analytical subjectivity notwithstanding, it is, I think, possible
to identify a number of areas where ASEAN processes have unequivocally fallen
short. None of these processes, for instance, has proven able to respond
effectively to the major crises that have erupted in East Asia during the past
decade and a half—the North Korean nuclear crises of 1993–94 and today; the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis; the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis; the crisis in East
Timor of 1999; the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis or
the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Partly as a result of the consensual
style approach to decision-making which has emerged as the preferred modus
operandi for most if not all of these processes, they have also tended to move
rather slowly toward implementing their stated aims and objectives. In the case
of the ARF, for instance, it has experienced real difficulties in moving from the
confidence-building to preventive diplomacy phase in its evolution, contributing
toward the perception that it is nothing more than a ‘talk shop’.5
These criticisms notwithstanding—and even if one does not accept the
proposition that dialogue and discussion are useful as ends in and of themselves6
—there are areas where tangible benefits have accrued from the recent growth
in East Asian security cooperation. First and foremost among these
accomplishments, in my view, has been the engagement of China in the regional
security architecture which has taken place since the mid-1990s. This process
has succeeded in significantly dampening regional apprehensions regarding
China’s rise. At the same time, however, it is interesting to note that while a
primary aim of engaging China through East Asian security cooperation was to
‘socialise’ it by exposing it to regional and global norms, Beijing has proven
rather adept at ‘socialising’ many of the institutions to which it is a party. By
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way of example, in the case of the Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)—the official Track 2 analogue of the ARF—China’s
deepening involvement has actually allowed it to shape the direction and outlook
of this leading Track 2 institution, particularly in relation to the issue of Taiwan.
Further, although ASEAN processes have been somewhat ineffective in
responding directly to regional crises, they have periodically served as useful
venues for the discussion of highly sensitive or controversial issues that might
otherwise not have been discussed, or as ‘circuit-breakers’ to stalled diplomatic
relationships. The then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was able to meet
with his North Korean counterpart on the sidelines of the 2004 ARF meeting,
for example, which marked the first high-level contact between the United States
and North Korea since former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit
to Pyongyang in 2000. More recently, the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers
held a productive 20-minute meeting on the sidelines of the 2006 ARF, helping
to alleviate somewhat a deepening rift in China-Japan relations. So, in sum, it
seems fair to conclude that ASEAN processes have served as more than mere
‘talks shops’ and that they have produced some tangible successes, albeit highly
qualified ones and often only at the margins.
Added to this, the very existence and continued evolution of ASEAN can
itself be counted as a success. It is always important to consider counterfactual
scenarios in international politics, and to contemplate what type of Southeast
Asia might exist today were it not for the existence of ASEAN. It is certainly no
small feat that a ‘shooting war’ amongst its members is today all but unthinkable.
As Rodolfo Severino of the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
(ISEAS) recently put it:
The constant interaction and sense of common purpose among the Asean
members have built mutual confidence and dissipated some of the mutual
suspicion that is a legacy of past differences and an outgrowth of current
disagreements. ... Partly through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in South-east Asia and partly through its own practices, Asean has set
regional norms for the peaceful relations among states—respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes,
non-interference in the internal affairs of nations, decisions by consensus,
equality of status, and so on.7
Where to from here?
So having canvassed the effectiveness and shortcomings of ASEAN processes,
what is the future outlook for these mechanisms? The answer to this question
will, in my view, be determined by the influence of at least three key factors.
First, the rapidly changing dynamics of the East Asian strategic environment
will profoundly shape the future activities and, indeed, viability of ASEAN
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processes. Security threats and challenges will influence the demand for regional
security cooperation but, just as importantly, the strategic environment itself
will also largely determine the areas in which progress is most and least viable.
Non-traditional security issues such as infectious disease, terrorism, transnational
crime, and disaster prevention/mitigation will be increasingly critical. In May
2006, for example, the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers meeting in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, identified disaster relief cooperation as a priority issue upon
which to focus its future work. Likewise, as part of its transition from
confidence-building to practical cooperation, the ARF has been asked to adopt
collaborative measures for addressing non-traditional security challenges, if only
to demonstrate its continuing relevance in an increasingly crowded East Asian
security architecture.8  Addressing these kinds of trans-border challenges is
needed not only because they are becoming increasingly pressing and potentially
affect the region as a whole, but also because they will often tend not to raise
the same level of sensitivity (particularly in relation to such strongly partisan
issues as sovereignty and non-intervention) as that generated by more traditional
security issues.
Second, the sheer volume of regional institutions and the growing number
of aspiring regional security ‘architects’ could well have significant implications
for ASEAN processes. In a relatively short space of time, for instance, China has
established itself as a leading regional architect. The United States has been slow
to react, but also looks set to remain an influential player given its unprecedented
military power and considerable economic weight in the region. India too has
become an increasingly involved and accepted member of such leading
mechanisms as the East Asia Summit (EAS). As India’s economic and strategic
weight continues to grow, its willingness and potential ability to further
contribute towards influencing the shape and design of any East Asian security
architecture will also increase in kind. The question remains, however, as to
whether ASEAN can continue to exert the influence it has previously enjoyed
in this increasingly crowded and competitive institutional environment.
Moreover, questions also remain as to whether the associated upward trend in
dialogue activity is even going to be sustainable over the longer term. To employ
an analogy with which interdependence theorists in international relations would
be well acquainted, is there potential for the East Asian security architecture to
fall victim to an over-abundance of such institutions leading to the demise of a
number of them?9  In other words, can there be such a thing as too much security
interaction among the countries of any given region which yields greater density
but insufficient commonality? If so, how much is too much and what are the
policy implications of this?
Third, ASEAN processes will ultimately remain hostage to the fact that
state-centric factors related to both interests and values will need to be faced
and resolved if a successful security architecture is to be achieved in East Asia.
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In this context, great power politics will arguably remain the most crucial
determinant, and the future of the US-China relationship will be especially
pivotal. Would the United States have been excluded from the EAS, for instance,
and would Washington’s recent (re)engagement with regional fora such as the
ARF have occurred were the United States and China not potential strategic
rivals? Likewise, the future of the China-Japan relationship will be critical in
defining East Asian security architecture, as the inaugural EAS demonstrated
all too vividly. How such rivalries can be modified or finessed sufficiently to
cultivate a longer-term sense of ‘community’—the tacit but widely understood
vision underlying the need for a successful security architecture in this region—is
not yet clear. Still, it is reasonable to conclude that such success will remain
elusive if more traditional norms or means of securing state-centric interests
triumph. The most basic challenge posited by the concept of ‘security
architecture’ is how much its alleged proponents genuinely wish to fulfil this
vision and to work collectively to overcome the challenges embodied in realising
it.
Desirable future development—An Australian perspective
Aside from a complete collapse of the East Asian security order (brought about,
for example, by a catastrophic breakdown in China-US or China-Japan relations),
the ‘nightmare scenario’ for Australia in the face of these developments is that
it could become marginalised altogether from the region, or at least from its more
influential and important institutions. The most likely avenue through which
this could happen would be Australia’s exclusion from organisations built on a
burgeoning ‘East Asian’ identity. Australia’s participation in the 2004 ASEAN
Plus Three (APT) meeting and its membership of the EAS have gone some way
toward assuaging these fears. That said, Australia is far from being a key player
in either of these mechanisms. Residual apprehensions remain, with the jury
still out on how far these emergent processes will go in advancing the potentially
powerful notion of an East Asian Community.
It is important to bear in mind here that, at least in its relations with the East
Asian region, Australia sees itself as a deeply vulnerable and insecure nation.
In his classic 1979 book The frightened country, the former head of the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs, Alan Renouf, describes Australia as a country
that literally lives in fear of its own neighbourhood. It is therefore, in Renouf’s
view, a country that is unable to see the opportunities in the Asian region clearly
and one that also exhibits a strong penchant for seeking out a ‘great and powerful
friend’ to compensate for its perceived strategic insecurities.10  First it was Britain
in the period up until the Second World War; then the United States through
the post-war period and up until the present day. Further complicating this
innate sense of insecurity, the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington
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has described Australia as a ‘torn country’, a society divided over whether or
not it belongs to Asia.11  In his terms
the lucky country will be a permanently torn country, both the ‘branch
office of empire’, which [the former Australian Prime Minister] Paul
Keating decried, and the ‘new white trash of Asia’, which Lee Kuan Yew
contemptuously termed it.12
Through its favoured ‘exclusivist’ approach towards East Asian security
architecture, China has inadvertently reinforced Australia’s sense of isolation
and vulnerability. This was most evident in the run up to the inaugural EAS,
when Beijing reportedly preferred a gathering limited to APT members and did
not actively support Australia’s attendance.13  Similar concern has been expressed
in relation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which also excludes
Australia, but whose members and observers represent half of the world’s
population. Antipodean anxiety is even mirrored at the Track 2 level, where
recent initiatives such as the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) are
regarded by some as a (Chinese-led) challenge to more established processes in
which Australia is already a key player, such as CSCAP.14
Canberra has responded to these dilemmas by continuing to engage with
those processes through which the powerful idea of a distinctly East Asian
Community appears most likely to materialise—namely APT and the EAS—even
while conceding that Australia is unlikely to become a particularly influential
or integral member of such groupings. At the same time, however, Canberra has
indirectly balanced against the prospect of a more exclusive East Asian
Community by throwing its weight behind competing mechanisms that exhibit
a more inclusive communal ethos. Less than two months before the inaugural
EAS in December 2005 (and against the backdrop of Australian euphoria at
having been included in this fledgling mechanism), the then Australian Prime
Minister, John Howard, described APEC as ‘undeniably the most important
international meeting with which Australia is associated’.15  Subsequently,
Howard pledged his support to a Japanese initiative to establish a free trade
zone comprising of 16 Asia-Pacific nations.16  Simultaneously, Australia has
supported initiatives comprising of those countries traditionally regarded as
regional ‘outsiders’—namely the United States, Japan and India—who potentially
have the most to lose from any realisation of the East Asian Community ideal.
Australian support for US-led multilateral mechanisms with a regional focus,
such as the controversial Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the
Ministerial-level Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) involving the United States,
Japan, Australia (and potentially India), could be interpreted as a form of indirect
balancing or ‘insurance’ against the prospect of its institutional marginalisation
from the region. Indeed, so too can the March 2007 Australian security agreement
with Japan.17
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From Beijing’s perspective, however, such initiatives can easily be interpreted
as reflecting Australian support for a US (and possibly Japanese)-led campaign
to constrain, if not completely contain, China’s burgeoning regional influence.
To be fair, there is some basis to this perception, given the existence of a small,
yet relatively influential, anti-China lobby within Australia.18  By and large,
however, it is important to recognise that Australian views of China, and
specifically its (re)emergence, are generally very different from those held in
the United States and Japan. Of the three, Canberra is clearly the most sanguine
on this issue. For Australia, China’s rise is seen as nothing short of an economic
blessing. Canberra has come out consistently with statements such as that issued
at the beginning of 2006 by the then Australian Ambassador to the United States,
Dennis Richardson, suggesting that ‘the question for Australia is not whether
China’s growth is innately good or bad; Australia made up its mind long ago
that it was a good thing. China’s growth is unambiguously good for Asia and
the United States’.19  In relation to the issue of China’s growing military
capabilities, senior Australian officials are on record as describing ‘China’s
expanding military expenditure as a process of modernisation, not
destabilisation’.20  Even with regard to human rights issues, Howard publicly
stated in July 2005 that the China-Australia relationship was ‘mature enough’
to ride through ‘temporary arguments’ in this area and that he remain[ed]
‘unashamed’ in developing Australia’s relations with China.21
Yet perceptions often matter most in international politics. To an extent that
has yet to be fully appreciated, the analysis contained in this section suggests
that competing approaches to order-building in East Asia have the potential to
create serious tensions in this blossoming China-Australia relationship. From
Canberra’s perspective, Beijing’s apparent preference for a more exclusive
regional architecture has exacerbated Australia’s longstanding vulnerability—to
borrow from a former Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating,—as ‘the odd
man out’ in Asia.22  For Beijing, equally, the strategy that Canberra has adopted
to ‘insure’ against its possible regional marginalisation has been (mis)construed
as signifying support for a containment of China that would ultimately not be
in Australia’s best interests. In the final analysis, therefore, because of the
potential threat they pose to China-Australia ties, finding ways to allay these
concerns will constitute an important task for the future sustainability of the
Australia-China bilateral relationship more generally.
So what can be done? For Australia, greater attention clearly needs to be
given to the ‘packaging’ or presentational aspects of its indirect balancing
approach. The diplomacy surrounding the March 2007 announcement of the
Australia-Japan security declaration and suggestions by Howard that this
arrangement might evolve into a formal security treaty appear to have been
largely targeted at an Australian domestic audience. Yet this is certainly not how
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they were read in Beijing. Greater transparency from Canberra in such instances
would certainly not go amiss. Australia could also consider what scope there
might be to lobby for the inclusion of China as an observer in some of the more
exclusive arrangements to which Australia is a party, such as the TSD. Likewise,
Beijing in return might be willing to consider some of the benefits of seeking
Australian involvement in some of the more exclusive processes to which it is
a party, working from the assumption that Canberra views a rising China very
differently from Washington and Tokyo.
As Japan changes its international personality and seeks a greater degree of
regional autonomy, and as ASEAN begins to question its own medium-to-longer
term capacity to remain in the driver’s seat of regional architecture-building,
might there also be merit in developing a Trilateral Security (as opposed to
Strategic) Dialogue between China, Japan and Australia? Despite the recent
thawing which appears to be occurring in China-Japan ties—as epitomised by
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s short but highly successful April 2007 visit to
Tokyo—the extraordinarily deep societal and historical tensions between these
two countries cannot be underestimated. Issues of energy security also appear
inevitable to complicate the China-Japan relationship in the years ahead, while
(as the two historical great powers of East Asia) both countries have much at
stake—and potentially much over which to disagree—in seeking to refine and
then implement the notion of an East Asian Community. Not least because China
and Japan are Australia’s leading trading partners, the prospect of spiraling
tensions between them is of genuine concern to Canberra. To the extent that a
new trilateral mechanism involving Beijing, Canberra and Tokyo could serve to
avoid, alleviate or at the very least manage these tensions in the China-Japan
relationship, it would be most welcome.
In theory at least, all of this should become more straightforward for Australia
under the Rudd Government. Kevin Rudd is a mandarin speaker with a strong
interest in China and in Asia-Pacific multilateralism. That said, the difficulties
associated with executing a genuine and comprehensive process of
China-Australia engagement should never be under-estimated. While the depth
of Australia’s economic engagement with China can hardly be called into
question, its engagement at other levels remains relatively shallow and
under-developed. Engagement, of course, is a multi-layered, multi-dimensional
process that also encompasses a wide spectrum of people-to-people contacts and
personal linkages. Yet, in many respects, Australia and China remain very
different societies: we speak a different language, our cultures are diametrically
opposed, and our values are often in conflict. Trying to develop the same level
of trust and intimacy that currently exists in the Australia-US relationship is
therefore likely to be a long-term project, and one that will almost certainly
encounter a good deal more trials and tribulations than has thus far been
acknowledged in either Beijing or Canberra. Developing a sounder understanding
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of our respective priorities and perceptions in the realm of Asia-Pacific
multilateralism therefore represents a relatively innocuous yet important way
to begin that process in earnest.
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It is taken for granted that the major countries have dominant status in the
international community, while the minor ones have little influence. It is certainly
assumed that they have more power than the minor countries. But this assumption
often blinds us to the fact that small countries also seek to acquire and exploit
power. In what kind of situations can such countries give the impression of
playing on the same stage as the major powers? One answer is that they can
acquire disproportionate power when they create a new kind of power resource
and demonstrate that they can use this resource consistently to facilitate the
emergence of a new world order.
This chapter analyses this contention by using the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) after the Cold War as a case study.
ASEAN power
ASEAN suffered the strike of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, and it
experienced a low tide in the final years of the last century. But in the new
century, along with the revival of the ASEAN member states’ economies,
ASEAN’s regional status and function advanced incessantly. It has made great
progress in the fields of its integration process, the East Asia cooperation process
and the strategy of balance of powers, which have made the world view it with
new eyes, with some scholars even contending that ASEAN is becoming the
centre of power in East Asia.1 There are four concrete representations of this
burgeoning power.
First, ASEAN is changing the traditional cognition towards the ownership
of power. As we still keep to the old idea that the Southeast Asia region is the
arena where the big powers struggle to acquire a sphere of influence, ASEAN’s
strategy of balancing big powers has been in operation, with Singapore and
Vietnam as the most conspicuous examples. The United States and Japan are
‘jealous’ that China’s influence is increasing in the Southeast Asia region, so they
constantly offer more ‘carrots’ to ASEAN member countries. For example, if a
big power wants to join the East Asia Summit (EAS), a regional cooperation
network created by ASEAN to avoid becoming a marginal player in the
competition to shape community-building in the region, it has to achieve the
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qualifications set by ASEAN; for example, it has to join the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC). Because the United States is reluctant to join the TAC, it
cannot become a member of the EAS.2  Russia, on the other hand, has joined the
TAC, but has also been refused entry into the EAS on the grounds that trade
relations between the two sides remain relatively modest. ASEAN has achieved
dominant status in the collective game with big powers.
Second, ASEAN is changing the traditional understanding about how
countries seek to advance their interests. Generally speaking, the economic
cooperation theory considers that when a large state and a small state are in the
process of establishing a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the larger one
usually exerts its power to protect its economic interests, while the smaller one
opens its market passively. The larger one becomes the axle country and gains
more benefit by establishing FTAs with several small ones, which become the
spoke countries and benefit less. For example, the United States intends to expand
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the whole American
continent, and its aim is to realise its institutional hegemony in the American
continent. While people still keep to the old idea of these countries seeking to
protect and advance their interests, ASEAN actually bypassed the China-Japan
nexus a decade ago, and created the East Asia cooperation framework including
China, Japan and South Korea. These three nations recognise and support
ASEAN’s dominant and leading role and they are willing to accept ASEAN as
the foundation of the future East Asia Economic Community through three
ASEAN Plus One groupings (ASEAN plus China, ASEAN plus Japan and ASEAN
plus South Korea), all with their respective FTAs. So, in the aspect of mechanism
design, ASEAN becomes the axle country which gets more benefit, while the
big countries become the spoke countries. ASEAN gets the dominant power as
it seeks to protect and advance its interests.
Third, ASEAN is changing the traditional understanding about a country
that seeks security. In the Cold War era, there were ceaseless wars in the
Indochina peninsula which were not caused by ASEAN member countries.
However, the old members of ASEAN, while there was no conflict between
them, often had very strained relations. Since the Cold War, the steady expansion
of ASEAN has finally extended peace to the whole of Southeast Asia. The ASEAN
member states think that the traditional security threats come from the Korean
Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. This ASEAN perception
is the biggest motivating source pushing ASEAN’s implementation of the strategy
of balancing big powers. And this idea of ASEAN is also the main reason that
ASEAN hopes that the Asia-Pacific big powers will, one by one, join the TAC,
whose tenet is to resolve conflicts through peaceful means. In the past, larger
powers always forced the small countries to sign peace treaties, while today
larger powers join the TAC on their own initiative to give security assurances
to the smaller nations.
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Furthermore, ASEAN has demonstrated that it is receptive to the concept of
‘human security’ and of the need to think as a community of states in advancing
this dimension of security. In the face of the transnational non-traditional security
threats, these states are more fragile, their own national capacity is more
obviously insufficient, and they urgently need regional and international
cooperation. But they also worry more about the erosion of their national
sovereignty. So the ASEAN states are making great efforts to seek the
balancing-point among the national, regional and international community.
ASEAN’s preparedness to think more boldly about the absolutist conception of
sovereignty and to take some initiatives that challenge it have also been a source
of respect and, thus, power.
Fourth, ASEAN is changing the understanding of international norms. If we
were to select the most engaging international norms in history, two strong
candidates would be the ‘peaceful co-existence’ idea formulated during the Cold
War era and the ‘win–win’ idea in the globalisation era. ASEAN members have
realised peaceful co-existence among themselves, and now they are making a
great effort to achieve ‘win–win’ outcomes with external powers. In their own
region, ASEAN countries have found it impossible not to let the major powers
win, which is the maximal reality in international politics and is also the original
intention of its foreign strategy design. The tenet of ASEAN states is to realise
a regional win: the small countries must seek independence, survival,
development and might among big powers, which is the maximal reality of
regional politics. From this point of view, ASEAN (whose leitmotiv is to seek to
avoid conflicts and to seek common understanding) can gradually foster regional
consciousness internally and also cautiously deal with the major powers
externally. When ASEAN establishes the regional norms, it also creates the
international norms, and the major powers are willing to abide by these
international norms.
So, ASEAN is a power emerging in the region of East Asia.
Origins of ASEAN power
Where does ASEAN’s new kind of power come from? And how has it been
created? Its power mainly comes from the ASEAN organisation, its dominant
role in the process of East Asia Cooperation, the balancing role it has played
among big powers, and the norms it has helped to entrench.
The organisational power
The leaders of ASEAN states profoundly realise that only by pushing their
integration rapidly and effectively can they strengthen their own competitive
ability. For the 40-year history of ASEAN, its integration has generally been
perceived by people as being rapid but not very effective. Four restricting factors
are: (1) the new generation of leaders’ relative lack of personal prestige and
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fascination compared to the old leaders such as Suharto, Lee Kuan Yew, and
Mahathir. Most of the current leaders are locked into domestic affairs and
relatively lack the enterprise and rallying point of pushing the integration;
(2) ASEAN members have not yet formed a better coordinating mechanism—they
still lack the common understanding and implementing ability in important
strategic and security issues due, for example, to the Myanmar issue, increases
in their own domestic divergences, and increases in the centrifugal trend;
(3) ASEAN’s economic integration might seem to have more benefits on paper,
but this may not necessarily be more effective. Some ASEAN members are
engaged in signing bilateral FTAs with outside regional powers, which may be
causing Southeast Asia’s economic integration process to slow; and (4) the society
and civilians of every country lack a sufficient degree of identity towards
ASEAN. The leaders of ASEAN member countries realise that the concept of
ASEAN needs to be in the deep part of people’s hearts, not simply just in the
hearts of the bureaucracy and the elite classes. Civilians should be infused with
a sense of belonging to ASEAN, so that a feeling of unification and related
attitudes can take root.
So, at the end of 2003, at a milestone meeting, the leaders of ASEAN member
states decided that they would build ASEAN as three communities: economic,
security, and social and cultural. At the January 2007 ASEAN Cebu Summit,
they decided to build the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015, ahead of
schedule by five years and, at the same time, they passed the ASEAN Charter
Report and started the constituting process of an ASEAN Charter. The above
measures relate to the long-term blueprint, the institution-building, and
cooperation in concrete fields respectively, in which there are four layers of
deep meaning.
The first meaning is to ensure the development of Southeast Asia. If the
ASEAN member states want to dominate this region, where major powers have
struggled for dominance in the past, they have to realise ‘united self-mightiness’
based on national ‘self-mightiness’. Every country keeps its own traditional
characters at the same time it accelerates modernisation—this is ‘self-mightiness’.
Then every country makes use of ASEAN to develop collective power—this is
‘united self-mightiness’. These two ways move forward together and support
each other. This process was identified after the Second World War. Since the
1990s, ASEAN has begun to accelerate the integration process incessantly. At
first it accelerated the process of ASEAN FTAs, and now it is beginning to
accelerate the process of ASEAN community building.
The second meaning is to consolidate the power foundation of ASEAN.
ASEAN has made great efforts to develop this foundation since the end of the
Cold War in 1991. It has developed and implemented the strategy of balancing
big powers and it has dominated the regional cooperation process in East Asia.
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No single country of ASEAN could play such a role. It follows, of course, that
the degree of ASEAN integration directly influences the sustainable development
of its power.
The third meaning is to deal with the new challenges internally and
externally. The 40-year process of ASEAN development has been a process of
adjustment to deal with emerging challenges arising from internal and external
transformations. Today, Asian structural changes caused by the rise of China
and India, the non-traditional and transnational security problems such as
terrorism, the Myanmar issue and other internal indigestion problems are
evidence that ASEAN needs to further coordinate its internal relations and
develop ways to resolve all these problems. Some out-moded principles and
ways may be abandoned, while some new principles and ways that fit the new
situations need affirmation and implementation. The advice given by the ASEAN
Celebrity Group to the ASEAN Charter reflects this trend. The purpose of
constituting the ASEAN Charter is to transform ASEAN from a loose organisation
to one that is founded on certain legal mechanisms.
The fourth meaning is to strengthen the building of ASEAN’s capacity to
lead. In recent years, voices doubting and blaming ASEAN’s leadership ability
have been heard continually. If ASEAN wants to be a long-term leader, it needs
to improve its ability to resolve its own problems (such as Myanmar); its
coordinating ability to handle the relations of ASEAN, ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN
Plus Three (APT), and ASEAN Plus Six groupings adeptly; and its ability to
make long-term strategy, keep strategic initiative and creativity, continue to
play a greater role among major powers, and avoid being marginalised.
From this point of view, it would be better to say that ASEAN is enduring
the feeling of crisis caused by power, rather than to say it is enjoying the glory
of power. This is the original driving force of the ASEAN integration process.
This process shoulders so many missions that it directly relates to the destiny
and future of East Asia cooperation. So it remains the right choice for China,
Japan, South Korea and other East Asia big powers to continue to support the
building of ASEAN integration, and to continue to support ASEAN as the driver
of East Asia cooperation.
The dominant power
The question of who will be the dominant power in the process of East Asia
cooperation is the perennial focus of debate. A dominant power means some
country or organisation which plays the dominant role and has the ability to
design the direction, manage the process, and coordinate the relations for East
Asian cooperation. According to this standard, the dominant power of East Asian
cooperation could take four possible forms.
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The first possibility is that China and Japan will dominate together. According
to the experience whereby France and Germany played the dominant role in the
European Union, some scholars suppose that, in the future, only China and Japan
will have the ability to dominate the process of East Asia cooperation. If these
two countries could go forward hand-in-hand, it would be East Asia’s good
fortune. But, since 1997, this possibility has not appeared; and as long as
China-Japan relations cannot be improved, the chance of the two giants
proceeding hand-in-hand is slim.
The second possibility is that China and Japan will struggle to be the dominant
power. The developing trends of the two countries are very clear: China is rising
to become a strong comprehensive power in East Asia, while Japan is developing
to become a normal power in East Asia. Some experts think that the two regional
powers both want to be the ‘big brother’ in East Asia and that the future will
be characterised by structural confrontation and competition between the two
sides. In regional cooperation, their competing relations are to struggle for the
dominant power of East Asia cooperation. Such a possibility can do nothing but
exacerbate the China-Japan conflicts and the strained atmosphere in East Asia,
which could cause unease among Southeast Asian countries. Nor is it likely to
attract US support, even if America’s bigger worry is that its own hegemony in
East Asia will be supplanted by Japan and China together.
The third possibility is that China and Japan will infiltrate the region to
dominate it. Some scholars think that, on the issue of the dominant power
concerning East Asia, China and Japan may change open strife to in-fighting.
In this scenario, the two sides would seek to influence the East Asia cooperation
process respectively through the Southeast Asian countries by having close
relations with these countries separately. But this mode is complex and ineffective
because of ASEAN’s consensus principle.
The fourth possibility is that all East Asian countries publicly (together) push
ASEAN to be the dominant power. If either China or Japan sought this role, it
would encounter resistance from the other. So, ASEAN could be anointed as the
best available entity acceptable to China, Japan and the United States, to drive
East Asia cooperation.
ASEAN is always playing the roles of designer, pusher and organiser in the
process of East Asian cooperation. It implements the strategy of balancing big
powers and tries hard to be impartial among big powers. According to George
Yeo, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, ‘we are not the potential competitor of big
powers either’. The strength of ASEAN is inferior to the strength of China or
Japan, so it is difficult to reach common understanding and become the regional
leader. But ASEAN insists on pushing the cadence of East Asian cooperation
according to the comfortable degree principle, and this is a fit for the diversity
of East Asia. Even the United States, which wanders outside the East Asia
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cooperation, also (according to former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice)
thinks that ASEAN should be the leader of the East Asia Cooperation. Finally,
India, Australia and New Zealand (all new members of the EAS) need ASEAN
to coordinate relations.
The balancing power
After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN became aware that the
one-power-dominant structure would not lead to regional stability and
prosperity. Instead, in order to maintain these, ASEAN needed to develop a
strategy to draw all the major powers into the region while it manoeuvred among
them. The big powers would strengthen their strategic presence in the region,
while simultaneously acting as a check and balance on each other. Obviously,
ASEAN would be the biggest winner under this structure. For a long time,
ASEAN has developed its bilateral relations with the major powers under the
mechanism of Comprehensive Dialogue Partnerships, leading to the formation
of several ASEAN Plus One groupings. So far, ASEAN has laid the strategic
structure of balancing big powers by and large, with itself as the ‘core’. ASEAN
has built ASEAN Plus One cooperative mechanisms with China, Japan, South
Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Russia, and the United
States. Also, ASEAN has negotiated or is negotiating with these powers the
establishment of FTAs. Moreover, ASEAN has persuaded all Asia-Pacific powers
except the United States to sign the TAC. So, we can conclude that ASEAN has
created a relationship structure in the Asia-Pacific region that resembles a Chinese
folding-fan, with ASEAN as the joint point of the ribs of the fan, while those
ASEAN Plus One mechanisms are the supportive ribs. That is the basic structure
under which ASEAN can carry out its strategy of balancing big powers.
The functional logic of ASEAN’s strategy of balancing big powers is as
follows. While ASEAN is building the strategic folding-fan, it is also providing
channels for regional powers to realise their interests in the Southeast Asia region.
In the past, big powers scrambled for spheres of influence in the region and
tended to contest with hard or realist means. Now, ASEAN members hope to
maintain equal, peaceful and co-existent relations with big powers in the region.
As a result, through a series of new regional mechanisms, ASEAN leaders are
trying to admit big powers into the Southeast Asian region in a peaceful, friendly
and ‘win–win’ way, endowing the idealistic folding-fan with realistic effects.
The main mechanistic measures are that: (1) ASEAN develops partnerships with
big powers so as to strengthen political mutual trust and friendship; (2) big
powers sign the TAC at ASEAN’s urging, thereby making them legally committed
to not using armed force in the region; and (3) ASEAN builds FTAs with big
powers respectively, leading to profound interdependent relationships. Due to
the fact that ASEAN is the initiator and participator of all those various
mechanisms, it will be more informed than other powers and it will develop the
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mechanisms with different powers as need and opportunity arise. So, ASEAN
can fully make use of the two advantages to carry out strategies for its own
benefit. For example, it is carrying out FTA negotiations with China, India, South
Korea, Australia and New Zealand respectively. Because there is no coordination
among these powers and they are negotiating different timetables with ASEAN,
ASEAN can take advantage of all relevant information in the negotiations and
make optimal evaluations, either to raise its negotiating price or to raise its status
in international relations.
The normative power
At first, some former leaders of Asian countries (such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan
Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir) advocated the concept of ‘Asian Values’. Then
there emerged the ‘ASEAN Way’, which promoted the development of regional
cooperation in East Asia. In any event, all these affect the regional trend of
thought. In particular, the ‘ASEAN Way’ and East Asian Regionalism appear
more consistent with the complexity and diversity in East Asia and more
acceptable to international society. The ‘ASEAN Way’ emphasises the principles
of negotiation, consensus and comfort, while East Asian Regionalism is open.
In her famous book titled The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in
the World Economy, Susan Strange argued that, in the era of economic
globalisation, power derives from the interaction of the following four structures:
security, production, finance and knowledge. Strange’s theory of structural
interaction reinforces the argument advanced above on how ASEAN countries
may obtain power.3  ASEAN members shape a new regional security structure
through regional cooperation and a strategy of balancing powers; they build a
new regional production structure based on ASEAN’s role as ‘wheel and axle’;
they create a regional finance structure to protect the financial security of small
countries through East Asia cooperation; and they establish a new regional norm
structure through perfecting and practising the ‘ASEAN Way’. In essence,
structure leads to power, though the solidity (consistence) of this kind of power
remains an open question.
ASEAN has obtained the following four strategic benefits: (1) the impression
of a poor and backward Southeast Asia which was the target of sphere of
influence competition among the big powers has been replaced by a new ASEAN
that impresses with its equal and peaceful coexistence with the big countries in
the region; (2) economic interdependence has been deepened and regional
economic cooperation has been guided by building FTAs with the big powers;
(3) a commitment by the big powers on the solution of conflicts without resorting
to armed force has been introduced, by the signing of the TAC by all major
Asia-Pacific countries except the United States (France (from the European Union)
joined the TAC in January 2007); and (4) manoeuvring, checking and balancing
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among the big countries stimulates them to attach greater importance to Southeast
Asian states and, hence, to increase their respective strategic inputs.
All of these benefits for ASEAN are, in turn, conducive to the stability and
prosperity of the region and to establishing the new model of international
relationships.
ASEAN power and China
For the ASEAN countries, being surrounded by the big powers is an unalterable
geographical reality. At the same time, ASEAN can change or shape its strategic
environment. ASEAN can co-dance harmoniously with the big powers by relying
on the concerted efforts from within together with the international situation,
as well as via creating and implementing both the strategy of ‘check and balance’
among those powers and the strategy of East Asia cooperation. As a result, a
regional new order can be established that features peace and prosperity. Along
this course, China can offer help and support to ASEAN to fulfil its goals and
resolve its problems, so as to achieve a ‘win–win’ outcome in the region.
Put another way, the success of ASEAN in forging a new security framework
to a large extent relies on strategic support from China, which is a firm supporter
of ASEAN integration. While some countries seek to dominate the process of
East Asian cooperation, China is actively maintaining the leadership status of
ASEAN. China was the first big power to negotiate the establishment of FTAs
with ASEAN, to join TAC, to establish a strategic partnership with ASEAN, and
to bring ‘smile diplomacy’ to Southeast Asia. It also hopes to become the first
to sign the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The positive
role of China has drawn other counterparts to show their goodwill to ASEAN,
which has enabled the proper performance of the balance strategy and the
regional cooperation strategy of ASEAN. With the joint efforts of China and
ASEAN, other powers have begun to approach Southeast Asia in a similar manner,
so as to achieve cooperation, a ‘win–win’ outcome, and equality, which is
objectively conducive to multipolarity in the region. To help others and to
achieve this ‘win–win’ outcome at the same time, the China-ASEAN relationship
has become a good example of how to develop and handle international
relationships.
Over the past 15 years, having helped ASEAN tide over the 1997–98 Asian
financial crisis and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak,
China then attempted to control the H5N1 influenza through joint efforts with
ASEAN. Over the next 15 years, the risks confronting ASEAN from modernisation
and globalisation will not diminish. For China, the next 15 years will also be a
period in which strategic opportunities and protruding contradictions abound.
The deepening strategic partnership between China and ASEAN calls for sharing
the risks as well as the gains. In the future, the joint mission for the two sides
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will be how to avoid strategic risks and take economic and social risks under
control. In essence, as China helps extricate ASEAN from risks and worries, a
‘win–win’ outcome for the region can also be achieved.
Judged from the development of bilateral relations between ASEAN and
China since the end of the Cold War, China and ASEAN have achieved a
‘win–win’ relationship. China’s relations with ASEAN and with ASEAN’s
members respectively have all reached the most positive point in history. The
two sides witnessed positive developments simultaneously in many aspects: the
coincidence of China’s rise and ASEAN’s ascendant status in the international
community; and the coincidence of China’s greater influence and ASEAN’s more
dominant role in the region. In a word, ASEAN and China go forward in tandem.
The phrase ‘Strategic Partnership Relationship’ indicates that China’s relations
with ASEAN as a whole have risen to an unprecedented height, which will not
be surpassed by China’s relations with other regions.
The progress of China-ASEAN relations brings the feelings of stability,
sureness and accomplishment to China’s neighbour policy. This is the first time
that such feelings have characterised China’s relations with Southeast Asia. The
benefits from this good relationship are wide-ranging: China can deal with the
North Korean problem, China-Japan relations and the Taiwan issue attentively;
it can, together with ASEAN, promote the development of East Asia regional
cooperation, or even pan-Asian cooperation including Central Asia and South
Asia; and it can associate itself with ASEAN’s strategy of balancing powers in
a natural way, and thus reduce the worrisome attitudes of other powers (such
as the United States and Japan) toward China. Meanwhile, ASEAN has gained
weight and influence from its good relationship with China. For example, China
supports the process of integration within ASEAN and its dominant role in the
development of East Asian cooperation on the basis that this does not harm the
interests of other regions. This kind of relationship is a comparatively stable
situation, resulting from complex interactions in a global context. As a result,
there is great rationality and vitality within this relationship.
In view of the above, China’s future strategy should include the following
points. First, China should continue to support ASEAN’s process of integration,
and seek to link it with the three communities within ASEAN, which are still
in the construction phase. Second, China should advocate ASEAN’s dominant
role in the development of the East Asia Cooperation, and realise China’s own
strategic interests while helping ASEAN to achieve the ideal regional structure.
Third, China should be fully aware that it is only one part of ASEAN’s strategy
of balancing major powers. In future, big powers, such as the United States,
Japan, India and Australia will definitely increase their strategic presence in
this region. In this circumstance, China should not treat other regional powers
30
The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific
as enemies or exclude other big power interests from the region. Rather, China
should share its interests with the other big powers in the region.
ENDNOTES
1  Pang Zhongying article available at <http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2005-12-12/10248559207.shtml>,
accessed 5 May 2008.
2 This chapter was written before mid-2009. On 22 July 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
signed the United States’ ‘Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia’. The 10 ASEAN Foreign Ministers then signed an ‘Instrument of Extension of the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, completing US accession to TAC.
3  See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge





The SCO’s Success in Security
Architecture
Pan Guang
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is now showing a more active
posture in safeguarding security and promoting economic-cultural development
in the region, being cognisant of the situation in areas around Central Asia like
East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, and demonstrating that the SCO,
barely eight years old, has embarked on a new course of pragmatic development.
Achievements in maintaining security in the heart of Eurasia
Since 1996, the process of the ‘Shanghai Five—SCO’ has registered some
remarkable achievements in security cooperation. Its major accomplishments
include three outcomes.
First, confidence-building measures have been put in place, leading finally
to the resolution of the border problems left over from history. Within the
frameworks of the ‘Shanghai Five’—SCO, and due to the joint efforts of China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all the disputes regarding the
Western section of the former China-Soviet border of more than 3000 km—a
border that had bred instability and conflict for centuries—were completely
solved in six years. This was a rare accomplishment in the history of international
relations.
Second, there has been close cooperation in the struggle against destabilising
trans-border elements. After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, extremist and terrorist forces started acting
rampantly in the Central Asia, causing big trouble for countries in this region.
The ‘Shanghai Five’ was the first international organisation to call for cooperative
action against terrorism in Central Asia. On 15 June 2001, less than three months
before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, leaders of
the six founding states of the SCO signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. This Convention, as the first international
treaty on anti-terrorism in the twenty-first century, spelt out the legal framework
for SCO members to fight terrorism and other evil forces, and for their
coordination with other countries. Within the framework of the Convention,
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SCO member states cooperated and established the Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure (RATS) to combat and contain extremism and terrorism in the region.
Third, the SCO has been able to restrain conflicts from spreading and to
maintain regional security and stability. The ethnic and religious conflicts and
issues that history left to Central Asia are as intricate and complex as those in
the Balkans and the Middle East. Fortunately, the establishment of the SCO
mechanism proved to be the defining difference for Central Asia, providing this
region with a more positive outlook than either the Balkans or the Middle East.
Within its framework, Central Asia managed to restrain malignant conflicts like
the civil war in Afghanistan from spreading in the region as has happened in
the Balkans and the Middle East. The SCO established a successful model for the
troubled international scene after the end of the Cold War. One can say without
exaggeration that, in the absence of the ‘Shanghai Five–SCO’, the Taliban may
have continued marching northwards, and the conflict in Afghanistan could
have possibly spread to neighbouring countries as well. In this regard, one can
say that the SCO is playing an essential role in maintaining regional security and
stability.
Taking a wider view, all these abovementioned successes, achieved within
the ‘Shanghai Five–SCO’ framework, have been of strategic significance not only
for the member states and for the security and development of Central Asia
overall, but also for the peace and development in areas around Central Asia
such as East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia and, indeed, even globally.
Economic and cultural development: a solid basis for
security cooperation
The SCO leadership has placed emphasis on promoting economic and cultural
cooperation, believing that such cooperation constitutes not only the basis of
political and security cooperation, but serves directly the long-term development
and broader interests of future generations in the region. The SCO summit
meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, pointed out that
maintaining a sustained economic growth in Central Asia and the
countries in its periphery and meeting the urgent needs of their peoples
serves as a major guarantee for ensuring the stability and security of the
region and the countries in its periphery.1
The SCO summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, made it clear that the main
priority for the near future was to put into practice the Action Plan on Fulfillment
of the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation between SCO
member states, thus embarking on a pragmatic course of cooperation in, for
example, trade, transportation, environmental protection, disaster relief, and
the rational use of natural resources. At the 2006 SCO summit meeting in
Shanghai, China, members decided to choose energy, information technology,
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and transportation as the priority areas for economic cooperation,2  stressing
particularly the importance for proceeding with the implementation of certain
demonstration programs in these areas. The SCO Mechanism of Inter-bank
Cooperation—the first step to the SCO Development Bank to be formally
inaugurated before the Shanghai summit—was expected to provide a financing
platform for major projects in the region. The official launch of the SCO Business
Council during the Shanghai summit will provide a new source for facilitating
greater economic cooperation within the SCO framework.3
In respect of cultural cooperation, SCO member states have actively cooperated
in the SCO framework on education, culture, sports, tourism, and other cultural
endeavours. Chinese President Hu Jintao has always stressed the need for
humanistic cooperation. As he pointed out at the SCO Tashkent summit:
SCO members all have their distinctive humanistic resources that make
up good potentials for cooperation. Cooperation should be actively
promoted in fields of culture, education, science and technology, tourism,
mass media, etc. so as to enhance the mutual understanding and
friendship among the SCO peoples, and consolidate the social basis of
growth of SCO.4
Especially noteworthy is the point mentioned at the Astana summit:
‘Formulation of coordinated methods and recommendations on conducting
prophylactic activities and respective explanatory work among the public in
order to confront attempts at exerting a destructive influence on public opinion
is a vital task.’5 The Shanghai summit emphasised again the need to promote
substantially both people-to-people and cultural cooperation. In the short run,
the focus of such cooperation is to highlight the spirit of the Silk Road by
enhancing the mutual communication and understanding among different
civilisations and nations in the region, so as to strengthen the emotional ties
among the Chinese, Central Asians and Russians, and also to pave the way for
the unfolding comprehensive cooperation within the SCO. The document on
educational cooperation signed at the Shanghai summit is another SCO initiative
to broaden both its people-to-people and cultural cooperation, while the formal
launch of the SCO Forum—an academic mechanism of research and discussion
before the Shanghai summit—will provide intellectual support to the further
development of the organisation.6 The first and second SCO Cultural and Art
Festival held during the Astana and Shanghai summits have also shown
themselves as specific achievements in this field.
Response to new challenges
Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a wave of ‘election-related turmoil’
or so-called ‘Colour Revolution’ in Central Asia, with terrorist and extremist
forces fishing in troubled waters. In Afghanistan, a new wave of Iraq-style
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terrorist attacks has signalled the resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. More
ominously, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Party of Liberation) and other extreme
groups are fast gaining support in Central Asia, particularly in the
poverty-stricken Fergana countryside, bespeaking a re-emerging grim security
situation in the region that poses new challenges for the SCO.
Facing such a serious situation, the SCO Astana summit in 2005 took the
initiative in shouldering chief responsibility for safeguarding security in Central
Asia. The heads of the states decided to increase significantly the security
cooperation on the basis of the achievements made so far, including particularly
the following measures:
a. promoting close cooperation among the diplomatic, foreign economic,
law-enforcing, national defence and special-mission authorities of the member
states;
b. working out effective measures and institutions to respond collectively to
those developments that threaten regional peace, security and stability;
c. coordinating the security-ensuring laws and regulations in the member states;
d. cooperating in researching and developing new technologies and equipment
for coping with new challenges and threats;
e. establishing new effective structures in the mass media arena to deal with
new challenges and threats;
f. combating the smuggling of weapons, ammunitions, explosives as well as
drugs, and fighting organised transnational crime, illegal immigration and
mercenary troops activities;
g. giving special attention to the prevention of terrorists using weapons of mass
destruction and their launching vehicles;
h. taking precautionary measures against cyber-terrorism; and
i. drafting uniform approaches and standards for monitoring financial flows to
individuals and organisations suspected of terrorist sympathies.
It was also believed that cooperation on drug trafficking should become a
focus as defined by the previous SCO agreement on fighting the illegal trafficking
in narcotics and their precursors. It was resolved that the SCO should specifically
step up its participation in the international efforts on the formation of an
‘anti-drug belt’ around Afghanistan, and in formulating special programs to
assist Afghan authorities to stabilise the country’s social, economic and
humanitarian situation.
Especially conspicuous has been the following words quoted from the
Declaration of the SCO Astana summit:
Today we are noticing the positive dynamics of stabilizing the internal
political situation in Afghanistan. A number of the SCO member states
provided their ground infrastructure for temporary stationing of military
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contingents of some states, members of the coalition, as well as their
territory and air space for military transit in the interest of anti-terrorist
cooperation. Considering the completion of the active military stage of
anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization consider it necessary that respective members
of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use
of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military
contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.7
Three points should be emphasised. First, these remarks are not specifically
targeted at the United States, but more broadly at ‘respective members of the
anti-terrorist coalition’; in other words, at all those countries and international
organisations that use the infrastructure facilities of SCO countries or station
their troops in SCO countries. Second, the SCO has voiced its views and
suggestions, while any final arrangements still have to be worked out through
multilateral or bilateral consultations between SCO states and those relevant
parties. Third, as the situation in Afghanistan remains severe, this is not the
right time to formulate a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Central Asia. Indeed, it is necessary to step up anti-terror activities in Central
Asia and strengthen the anti-terror ties among the SCO, the United States, the
European Union and other parties.
It was decided at the 2006 SCO Shanghai summit to deepen cooperation in
security affairs. It stressed: ‘To comprehensively deepen cooperation in combating
terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking is a priority area for SCO.’8
It was therefore deemed imperative to continue the construction of RATS, to
launch anti-terror joint exercises, and to establish an anti-drugs mechanism.
This summit pointed out for the first time that SCO members prohibit any
individual or group from conducting on their territories any kind of activity
that would undermine the interests of other members. Following the proposition
made at the Astana summit to ‘establish effective mechanisms in the mass media
for coping with new challenges and new threats’, the summit witnessed the
signing of ‘the Statement of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation On International Information Security’ and the decision to establish
a commission of information security experts to lay the groundwork for the
drafting and implementation of related action plans. In Shanghai, the leaders
also instructed the Council of National Coordinators to conduct consultations
on concluding a multilateral legal document on long-term neighbourly and
amicable cooperation within the SCO framework.9
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Strategic significance of the SCO for the security
architecture of Asia
The SCO, as an open organisation, is achieving the development of fruitful
multilateral cooperation with all the states and international organisations on
the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit. The ‘Regulation on
the Status of Observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’, accepted
during the June 2004 Tashkent summit, is the first document concerning contacts
between the SCO and the outside world, which has important significance for
the promotion of international cooperation, as well as the development of the
Organisation itself. In December 2004 the SCO was granted observer status in
the General Assembly of the United Nations. In April 2005 the SCO signed the
Memorandum of Understanding with ASEAN and the Commonwealth of
Independent States, establishing a relationship of cooperation and partnership.
In September 2005 SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang was invited to address
the UN Summit, dedicated to the sixtieth anniversary of its establishment. This
was an important sign of the maturity and international prestige of the SCO. It
is important to note that the SCO granted observer status to Mongolia, Pakistan,
Iran and India, which increased the potential opportunities of cooperation and
broadened the prospects for SCO development.
The strategic significance of the SCO’s success for the security architecture
in Asia has a number of dimensions.
First, the SCO has contributed to confidence-building and stability in Asia.
It has increased confidence-building and mutual trust among its members and
observers—especially between China and her nine close neighbours, including
Uzbekistan and Iran with whom China shares no borders. The borders that China
shares with seven SCO members and observers takes up about three quarters of
China’s total land border—14 799 km. When peace and security is maintained
in such massive border areas, the peoples in the region no longer feel exposed
to direct military threats. Meanwhile, when it boasts over half of the world’s
population with such large members and observers like Russia, China and India,
the SCO exerts a much larger influence over a major part of the Eurasian
landmass.
Second, the SCO has provided a very positive example to the rest of Asia in
solving complicated issues left over by history. By resolving in a matter of several
years the century-old border problems between China and the states of the
former Soviet Union, the approach adopted by the SCO (of mutual trust,
disarmament and cooperative security) may provide a model that can be adapted
to other outstanding border problems such as those between China and India,
between India and Pakistan, among Central Asian states, and with respect to
the South China Sea dispute and the China-Japan dispute over the Diaoyutai
Islands and part of the East China Sea.
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Third, the SCO’s anti-terror campaign is strategically important for anti-terror
cooperation in Asia. In the new surge of terrorist attacks sweeping the world
following the 2003 Iraq War, the formation of an ‘arc of terrorism’—a ‘belt’
stretching from the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia to Southeast
Asia—is a most disturbing development. What is particularly worrying is that
Southeast Asia, sitting at the eastern end of this ‘belt’, has become a high-risk
area of frequent terrorist attacks in recent years. Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor
in the Singapore Cabinet, has remarked that it is very disturbing to see that,
although the 230 million Muslims in Southeast Asia have long been ‘tolerant
and easy to live with’, recent changes indicate that extremism and terrorism are
seeking their opportunities among them. Certain terrorist groups closely
connected to al-Qaeda (like Jemaah Islamiyah, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia,
and Abu Sayyaf) have plotted a series of terrorist activities. If the maritime
terrorist activities in Southeast Asia affect the security of the Strait of Malacca,
which is indeed a very realistic possibility, East Asia’s energy security will be
threatened, as 60–70 percent of East Asia’s imported oil goes through the Strait.
It is clear that the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia are closely connected with
terrorist organisations in Central Asia and South Asia, particularly so in terms
of intellectual connections, organisational networks, and approaches to activities,
and by all functioning within one international terrorist network. For this reason,
the SCO’s success and its protracted efforts in combating terrorism are
strategically important for the anti-terror campaign in Asia as a whole.
Fourth, the SCO’s energy cooperation has strategic significance for energy
security in Asia. After several years of construction, the oil pipeline from
Kazakhstan to China became operational in 2006. This new pipeline will develop
into the SCO’s multilateral energy cooperation project involving Russia and
other Central Asian countries. The designed handling capacity of the pipeline
is 20 million tonnes per year, which will be a big jump over the annual amount
of 500 thousand tonnes currently handled on railways. Gas pipelines from Central
Asia and Siberia to China will also be constructed. If connected with the
Xinjiang–Shanghai Gas Pipeline, the Central Asia–China lines will also help the
implementation of the Energy Eastward Transportation Program. Japan and
South Korea, which can also take part in this project, will be entitled to part of
the gas transported by the lines. This will open a new chapter in energy
cooperation between East Asia and Central Asia. It should be pointed out that
Central Asia and Siberia, as distinct from the Middle East, Africa and Latin
America, are sources of energy supply that demand no protection from any
blue-water navy. As East Asian countries are still unable, for the foreseeable
future, to develop the naval power necessary to protect long oil shipping lines,
this sole alternative to maritime transportation is of crucial strategic significance
for East Asia’s energy security and overall development. Likewise, for the first
time in history, Central Asian countries obtained an eastward energy pipeline,
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which is not going through Russia, or the Caucasus or the Middle East, but
crossing China, and finally reaching the Pacific Ocean. Obviously, this pipeline
is strategically important for the future development of Asia.
In any case, making the fight against drug trafficking and cross-border crimes
its top priority, signing a joint declaration on maintaining the international
information security, giving full attention to environmental protection and the
protective development of water resources, and other endeavours, all highlight
the broad perspective that the SCO adopts when viewing and implementing
security cooperation. Keeping an open mind on the various non-conventional
security issues as well as the conventional ones in the framework of the SCO
makes not only Central Asia and South Asia but also East Asia and Southeast
Asia better positioned to play a growing role in global comprehensive security
cooperation.
Looking ahead: big tasks and a long journey
In June 2006, the heads of the SCO member states and observer states gathered
in Shanghai to celebrate and review the 5-year process following the
establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the 10-year process
following the initiation of the ‘Shanghai Five’. The leaders discussed the new
developments in the international arena and in Central Asia, and its impact on
the SCO. As mentioned above, they have put forward the strategic goal to
construct a ‘harmonious Central Asia’ and proposed an ambitious plan for the
next stage of SCO development.
In looking to the future, it is necessary to highlight the fact that the SCO still
faces several major issues which merit urgent attention.
It is essential to accelerate the process of economic cooperation within the
SCO. Three factors are extremely important to realise this aim. The first is to be
pragmatic in designing cooperation goals and in implementing the cooperation
measures. Empty talk and a lack of specific goals and effective measures will
never result in success, particularly when it comes to economic issues. The
second point is to persist in following such market rules as a level playing field,
equality and reciprocity, mutual opening, and a combination of both bilateral
and multilateral approaches. Caring only about one’s own interests is a mistake,
while detaching cooperation from the market base is even more so. Additionally,
bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation can be mutually
enhancing—the oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and China, for example, is now
giving rise to a triangular energy cooperation involving Russia as well. The third
point is to move ahead with coordination and priorities for each stage. Up-front
investment is certainly necessary, yet participants must guard against excessive
expansion and repetitive construction.
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There is an obvious need to deepen security cooperation. A joint advantage
of the SCO in the near future will still be in the security area. Yet, there must
be a deepening of the cooperation in this aspect if the organisation is to make
headway on the basis of past achievements. Several practical steps suggest
themselves: (1) RATS should be quickly consolidated to work efficiently, and
specific cooperation should be stepped up in drafting an SCO list of wanted
terrorists and terrorist groups, and in regularising joint anti-terror exercises;
(2) a proposed Central Asian Nuclear-Free Zone (CANFZ) program should be
taken forward, so that the region can avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the associated risk of an arms race; and (3) further campaigns
should be launched to crack down on drug trafficking and, as mentioned before,
achieve active participation in the UN action to establish an anti-drug ‘belt’
around Afghanistan for the peaceful reconstruction of the country. Only once
practical steps are taken to consolidate established initiatives can the SCO play
an indispensable role in maintaining security in the whole Central Asian region
as well as in its member states.
It should be pointed out that there is great potential for anti-terror cooperation
between the SCO and other Asian countries and organisations. They can be
specifically described as follows: a joint research program on anti-terror; a joint
training program on anti-terror; joint anti-terror exercises (search, rescue, quick
response); the promotion of reconstruction in post-war Afghanistan; an exchange
of information on terrorism in East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central
Asia; and counter transnational criminal programs focusing on thwarting
activities such as weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal immigration.
Cultural cooperation should be pushed forward steadily. The existing bilateral
cultural cooperation among the SCO member states should be expanded into
multilateral cultural cooperation within the SCO framework, which certainly
calls for organisational coordination, financial support, and professional
programming. In the near future, the cooperation will specifically unfold on
many fronts, including exchanging mutual visits by cultural, artistic and sporting
groups; hosting joint art festivals and exhibitions; dispatching and accepting
more exchange students; promoting visits by high-level experts and scholars;
mutually assisting in training talents in various fields; increasing cultural
exchanges among young people; and facilitating culture-oriented tourism along
the Silk Road.
External exchange and augmentation of the organisation should be handled
judiciously. After Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran and India were accepted as SCO
observers, more and more countries have expressed their wish to become SCO
observers, join the SCO or cooperate with the SCO. In light of these growing
requests, the Shanghai summit has commissioned the SCO Secretariat to monitor
the implementation of the documents on cooperation between the SCO and other
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organisations, and to facilitate the actual work of cooperation between the SCO
and its observer states. The heads of state have also entrusted the SCO Council
of Member State Coordinators to make suggestions regarding the procedures for
accepting new members.10  It remains a major challenge for the SCO to sort out
its relationship with such important players as the United States, the European
Union, and Japan which, although unlikely to be interested in becoming members
or observers of the SCO, nonetheless offer great potential as partners. One way
is to establish, aside from the formal members and observers, the category of
partner states, modelled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s
Partnership for Peace. One country, for example, might become an SCO partner
for anti-terror or an SCO partner for anti-drug cooperation. Indeed, Afghanistan
has already become a fully active partner of the SCO. Whether immediately
feasible or not, these moves are worthy of careful consideration when broadening
the external exchange and attempting cautious enlargement of the SCO.
Conclusion
In reviewing the successful journey that the SCO has undertaken and examining
its future development, the following points merit special attention. First, regional
cooperation must be steadily institutionalised, and be guaranteed by relevant
international or regional laws and regulations. At the same time, the discrepancy
in rules and regulations between the domestic and the regional should be sorted
out in a careful manner. Second, regional security cooperation must be based
on ‘comprehensive security’, and, particularly, the handling of conventional
security threats should be combined closely with the handling of
non-conventional security threats. And finally, it must be remembered that the
maintenance of regional security and stability and regional economic and cultural
cooperation are closely interdependent. Each facilitates the other.
ENDNOTES
1 The Tashkent Declaration from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
17 June 2004.
2 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, Shanghai, 15 June 2006, available at
<http://china.org.cn/english/features/meeting/171590.htm>, accessed 17 June 2009. The 2007 meeting
of the Council of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation took place on 16 August
2007 at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Joint Communiqué is available at
<http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=1721&LanguageID=2>, accessed 5 May 2008.
3 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, Shanghai, 15 June 2006.
4  President Hu Jintao’s speech at the Tashkent Summit, Uzbekistan, 17 June 2004.
5 Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Astana, Kazakhstan,
6 July 2005.
6 The SCO Secretariat, The SCO Bulletin, Beijing, 2006, p. 57.
7 Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Astana, 6 July 2005.
42
The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific
8 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Shanghai, 15 June 2006,
available at <http://english.scosummit2006.org/en_zxbb/2006-06/15/content_755.htm>, accessed
17 June 2009.
9 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, Shanghai, 15 June 2006.
10 Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, Shanghai, 15 June 2006.
43
The SCO’s Success in Security Architecture

Chapter 5
Shifting Tides: China and North Korea
Zhu Feng
The decision by Kim Jong-il’s regime to test-launch missiles in July 2006 and to
test a nuclear device on 9 October 2006, dramatically impacted China’s foreign
policy toward North Korea.1 These incidents served to undermine the Six-Party
Talks hosted by China, and threatened to further exacerbate the forces
destabilising regional security in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang’s defiance of China’s
stern warnings regarding these tests finally signalled to Beijing that the ‘North
Korea crisis’ was deteriorating catastrophically.
Following both the missile and nuclear tests, China voted in favour of United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1695, 1705 and 1718, clearly
indicating that Beijing was seeking new policies to deal with North Korea. Today,
there remains a degree of internal discussion on what that policy direction should
be and the nature of China’s relations with North Korea. For a variety of reasons,
a residual sympathy for North Korea remains in China which is preventing a
showdown between Beijing and Pyongyang. Yet China is decisively working to
expand its cooperation with the international community to force North Korea
to discontinue its pursuit of nuclear weapons and lower the threat arising from
its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Furthermore, if China’s own complex
domestic and international cost-benefit calculus can be untangled, a significant
shift in Beijing’s policy—entailing abandonment of its patron relationship with
North Korea and coercion to roll back North Korea’s nuclear capabilities—may
be just around the corner.
Missile tests: A turning point
North Korea’s last three missile tests conducted since the outbreak of the North
Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002 had limited diplomatic impact, mainly
because the test launches involved only short-range or shore-based anti-ship
missiles.2  Since North Korea already possessed such missile capabilities, there
was no evidence that North Korean missile technology had improved
substantively since the Taepodong-1 was test-fired in 1998. However, when
intelligence confirmed that North Korea was going to test-fire long-range missiles
in June 2006—missiles capable of reaching the west coast of the United
States—reactions by the United States and Japan fundamentally changed. These
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tests were also significant because they damaged China’s credibility as an
impartial mediator and decreased its presumed influence on North Korea.
Following the long-range missile tests on 5 July 2006, an intense debate arose
in the United States regarding the possibility of using a preemptive strike
capability on North Korean missile facilities. Although such a strike was
ultimately ruled out by the White House, the United States announced that the
missile defence system in Alaska would enter a higher alert level. In addition,
the United States and Japan decided to deploy missile defences in Japan, and
the United States sent its only Aegis cruiser equipped with a marine missile
defence system into the offshore waters of North Korea. All these moves point
to a marked escalation of the military confrontation revolving around the North
Korean missile launch—a situation China had been working to avoid with its
mediation efforts in the North Korean nuclear crisis and by hosting the Six-Party
Talks.
The possibility of North Korea’s long-range missile tests did not at first draw
a particularly swift or strong response from China, as it has grown accustomed
to such threatening tactics from North Korea whenever the Six-Party Talks
stagnate and China’s opinions are brushed aside. It was difficult to tell whether
this particular test-launch of missiles by North Korea was yet another bluff in
order to pressure the United States to lift the financial sanctions against it.
China’s reaction began to change, however, with the continuous string of
reports published in June 2006 regarding the imminent tests. For the first time,
the Chinese premier openly demanded that North Korea halt its erroneous action.
On 28 June 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao openly called on North Korea to
stop the test-launch in an attempt to avoid Chinese domestic alarm at growing
tensions in the China-North Korea relationship.3 This reaction was unprecedented
as China’s senior leaders had never officially demanded anything of North Korea,
even when the latter withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
reopened its 5-megawatt graphite reactor or when it declared possession of
nuclear weapons in February 2005.
The reasons for China’s change of position are numerous. First, it is important
to note that the Chinese leadership’s direct call for a halt on the missile testing
came after South Korea’s explicit request to China through official channels to
prevent North Korea from carrying out the test launch. Since the second round
of Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue in February 2004, China
and South Korea have been moving ever closer in their approach and coordination
of policies. Considering South Korea’s deep concern over the test launch, its
direct request for Beijing to take action against this provocative move by North
Korea was a request that China could not decline.
Second, China had become painfully aware of the significance of North Korea’s
test of a long-range missile (the Taepodong-2). This would be an open provocation
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by North Korea, after which China would have little reason to further cushion
North Korea from the United States and Japan. Prior to this, China had been
hoping to ‘comfort’ North Korea through softening the ‘pressure and isolation’
policy adopted by the United States and Japan and to protect North Korea from
any further setback and harm. With Japan’s extreme sensitivity to North Korea’s
missile test-launch, the firing of the new Taepodong-2 missile would only give
the United States and Japan a pretext for Japan to accelerate its cooperation with
Washington in developing a ballistic missile defence capability, enhancing the
US-Japan military alliance and promoting Japan’s plan to intensify its military
development plan. These developments would in turn complicate China’s Japan
policy considerably. Due to the current tension in China-Japan relations, any
moves by Japan’s military have the potential of stirring domestic nationalism
in China that runs high with anti-Japanese sentiment. These changes in China’s
security environment would provide a basis for the Chinese military to demand
a bigger budget and scale up its military forces. The Chinese leadership headed
by Hu Jintao (China’s President) does not want to see the escalation of military
confrontation between China and other big powers in the region; nor does it
want China’s defence strategy to be manipulated by internal nationalist passions.
North Korea’s missile tests have diverse implications for China. First, they
show that North Korea has little regard for China’s own security interests. China
is deeply frustrated by North Korea’s intransigent behaviour and thinking,
despite five rounds of Six-Party Talks and the signing of the Joint Statement in
September 2005. China had hoped that it could influence North Korea through
a multilateral mechanism to create—and make routine—an exchange acceptable
both to North Korea and the other parties. China’s strategy in attaining these
goals can be characterised as a ‘soft approach’, aimed at arriving at a diplomatic
solution, and gradually but concretely affecting North Korea’s actions. Time
and again, China sternly rejected calls by the United States to increase pressure
on North Korea and even took various actions to protect North Korea from further
isolation. At the same time, China teamed up with South Korea, continuously
providing North Korea with substantial aid, supporting South Korea’s ‘peace
and prosperity policy’ toward North Korea and respecting the requirements of
Kim Jong-il for a ‘security assurance’ and ‘fair treatment’. The quid pro quo of
such an approach, however, was the willingness by North Korea to fully
cooperate with China and South Korea, to give up its brinksmanship behaviour
and to respect China’s role as host of the Six-Party Talks. The launching of the
missiles shows undeniably that North Korea not only lacks a basic appreciation
of China’s painstaking efforts on its behalf, but is showing contempt for China’s
security interests in Northeast Asia.
The missile tests also deeply shook the Chinese leadership’s belief in the
North Korean regime’s ability to carry out reform and opening-up in emulation
of China’s model. The Chinese people also hold highly negative views of the
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North Korean regime. A February 2006 public opinion poll showed that 44 per
cent of Chinese people dislike North Korea more than any other country (closely
following Japan, which 56 per cent of people polled most dislike). Conversely,
among the three East Asian nations, South Korea is considered by the Chinese
public as the country with which China most needs to deepen bilateral relations
(48 per cent), followed by Japan (40 per cent), with North Korea a distant last
(12 per cent).4
The Chinese leadership now understands it may have deluded itself about
the North Korean Government. China has pursued a neighbourly policy with
North Korea, thinking that it would gradually be won over by China’s approach.
However, the missile tests have finally revealed to the leadership in Beijing the
true nature of the North Korean Government. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions
stem in large part from the need to safeguard its own security and interests
rather than its country and people. It has also shown itself to be highly skilled
in its resistance to internal reform.5  North Korea has refused to accept China’s
advice and continues to take measures that intensify confrontation and defy the
international community. This can only mean that the current mentality of its
leaders is simplistic and arrogant. In the end, North Korea will not give serious
consideration or cater to the interests of China, or take decisive steps on the road
to reform and opening-up. China now objectively concedes that it is a delusion
to expect the North Korean Government to make wise decisions and restart the
process of merging into the world community.
Soon after the missile tests of 15 July 2006, China voted in favour of UNSC
Resolution 1695 (which condemned North Korea’s missile launches and imposed
limited sanctions on North Korea), clearly indicating the most significant change
of China’s policy toward North Korea in recent years. It signifies China’s growing
resentment toward North Korea and implies an end to China’s ‘umbrella’ policy
for North Korea—a policy that has been in effect since the end of the Cold War
and is meant to prevent the UNSC from getting entangled in North Korean affairs,
and to protect North Korea from UN sanctions. With North Korea’s deep
dependence on China’s economic and diplomatic assistance, anything that causes
China to distance itself from North Korea will no doubt have implications for
the survival of the Kim Government in North Korea. From the latter’s perspective,
China’s support of the Resolution was an act of treachery by its socialist big
brother. China’s refusal to continue as North Korea’s ‘protector’ in the UNSC
opens the door for the possibility of new, tougher UN sanctions.
The nuclear equation: A new era
China’s ire over North Korea’s missile test had not yet subsided when North
Korea decided to test a nuclear bomb on 9 October 2006. In Beijing, ire turned
into fury. North Korea’s nuclear test was a reckless violation of the September
2005 Joint Statement and squandered China’s goodwill policy to accommodate
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North Korea in its legitimate pursuit of security guarantees and national interest
demands. The test shows that North Korea has been indifferent to China’s
continuous opposition and warnings against its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
There is little doubt that North Korea considers its nuclear capability more
important than its friendship with its only patron state, China. Without question,
China has become fully disillusioned about the nature of the North Korean
regime, and has come to recognise that its previous nuclear appeasement policy
for North Korea must come to an end.
There is a range of speculation as to why the North Korean regime risked
jettisoning China’s long-term support in favour of going nuclear. Some in China
argue that Kim did not believe that China would truly punish him by cutting
off oil and other provisions. Certainly, North Korea is convinced that an
anti-American North Korea has been a valuable strategic buffer for China vis-à-vis
the US military presence in East Asia. Kim likely calculated that China would
never abandon him for this reason. Others contend that Kim and his diplomats
frequently hint to China that North Korea will do an ‘about-face’ and embrace
the United States if China pushes too hard. In this way, North Korea probably
believes that it holds a ‘trump card’ over China by playing such ‘cat and mouse’
tricks. However, following the nuclear test, the traditionally defined ‘friendship’
between the two countries evaporated. Even though China did not fully flex its
muscles against North Korea, the reality is that China’s resolve to dismantle the
North Korean nuclear program has intensified. Its harsh words of protest over
the nuclear test fully reinforce this. China called North Korea’s action ‘flagrant’
(‘han ran’ in Chinese)—a word that is normally employed only for criticising
actions by an adversary—and represents a clear break from past language by
the Chinese leadership and a lucid expression of dissatisfaction and even
resentment toward Kim Jong-il.
China’s interest in preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons
is fundamentally no different than the interests of both Japan and the United
States. Although it is unwilling to speak with one voice alongside Tokyo and
Washington in public statements, and therefore its opposition and threats toward
North Korea are watered down to some extent, a North Korea with nuclear
weapons is unacceptable to China.
Of primary concern, in China’s judgement, is that the North Korean nuclear
test has decisively shifted the nature of the problem from the ‘North Korean
nuclear issue’, which has revolved around concerns over nuclear proliferation,
to the far more dangerous and broader ‘North Korean issue’. China has long tried
to limit its approach with North Korea to the nuclear issue rather than the
comprehensive problems—regime legitimacy, its refusal to end the Cold War
on the Korean Peninsula and integrating itself into the regional community, and
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the unpredictability of its behaviour—fearing negative influence on China-North
Korea relations and a destabilisation of the North Korean regime itself.
If North Korea fully develops and possesses nuclear weapons, fissures in the
geopolitical landscape of East Asia will emerge. In the long run, this will
negatively affect China’s strategic interests. Since the brunt of dealing with a
nuclear North Korea in the region will primarily fall to China and South Korea,
they will have to strengthen their coordination efforts to this end. China simply
cannot shoulder the burden alone. Closer China-South Korea cooperation could
alert Japan and further drive the US-Japan military alliance. North Korea’s
nuclear tests might also cause Japan to accelerate its conventional military
build-up and to reopen the debate in Japan on its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
This will instigate a backlash in China and South Korea, further aligning the two
countries while driving a bigger wedge between them and Japan. A Japan
rearmed with nuclear weapons is entirely unacceptable to China, but may be
welcome to the United States. This divergence of interests will lead to increased
divisions between China and South Korea on one side and the United States and
Japan on the other—a separation of continent states versus sea powers.
A nuclear North Korea will have its greatest direct impact on the relationship
between Japan and China, and each country’s domestic reactions to
developments. The problem of North Korea is a double-edged sword and has
the potential of either promoting or seriously harming China-Japan relations.
Naturally, China’s hope is that the North Korea problem will become the lubricant
for better communication between the two countries. It could be a catalyst for
greater discourse over regional security and cooperation. This environment
probably will not lead to breakthroughs on the historical issues, but it may be
a beginning in bringing the two closer. However, there is a real danger for a
worsening of China-Japan ties if a spirit of cooperation is lacking and Japan’s
tough stand toward North Korea unsettles China. Japan also has strong nationalist
sentiments against China, which will inevitably instigate a similar nationalist
response from China, further engendering hostility toward one another.
As for China and the United States, while recent events are an important
factor between them, their relationship also has a dynamic substantially
independent of the North Korean issue. There is no question that US policy
towards North Korea has been a failure and conservatives and moderates in the
United States continue to be divided over China’s role in the North Korean
nuclear issue. As serious as it is, the side effects in solving this problem will not
hugely impact the China-US relationship in the near and medium term.
Nevertheless, in this context, there are many uncertainties for China’s national
security if force is used to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. One great
uncertainty is the future orientation of North Korea. In the past 40 years,
resistance against the United States formed the basis of the China-North Korea
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relationship. But in 1992, by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea,
China sent a clear message that it would not support North Korea’s extreme
anti-US stance. This action by China was regarded by North Korea as a betrayal
and its distrust still factors in the latter regime’s thoughts. If China uses force
to dissuade North Korean nuclear aspirations it is possible that China would not
only ‘lose’ North Korea, but that North Korea could become anti-Chinese in
nature. Most Chinese policymakers are loath to see this happen. Another
uncertainty comes from America’s future military presence in the Korean
Peninsula. Will it decrease or increase its presence? If China and the United
States can come to a consensus on North Korea, a future North Korean regime
would at least not be hostile to China, alleviating one of China’s concerns.
Most critical from China’s perspective is to confirm whether and to what
extent the United States will commit to collaborating with it in firmly yet
constructively rolling back North Korea’s nuclear program. Until now, Beijing
has not received sufficiently clear signals from Washington on its real intention
to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear capability. That confirmation and trust
notably revolves around issues from America’s resolve to settle the issue as well
as sharing in the costs and responsibilities between Beijing and Washington in
any solution. One of China’s greatest fears is that if China was at the forefront
of any confrontation with North Korea, the United States would back down and
China would be caught flatfooted and be forced to deal with North Korea on its
own. China and the United States may be trapped in a dilemma where each side
is unwilling to get too close to one another and act together decisively to deal
with North Korea due to the logic of great power politics.6
Perhaps the greatest casualty of North Korea’s nuclear tests has been the
Six-Party Talks. Some in the United States have wanted to kick-start such a
mechanism with China at the helm. However, this was always a false hope. It
was never going to be realised in the medium-term or near-term without strong
buttressing by others, especially the United States. As a regional security
coordination mechanism, China has been carefully examining the Six-Party Talks
and their potential. However, the reality is that a regional security structure
evolving from the Talks is not something China can do by relying on its own
strength; nor is it a mechanism in China’s interests. It is not practical and is
therefore no longer a policy priority for China.
Former US President George W. Bush has said that the Six-Party Talks are
the best way to resolve the North Korea problem, to which Japan and South
Korea have agreed as well. All are talking about a multilateral security mechanism
in East Asia; however, neither the United States nor Japan nor South Korea has
a feasible blueprint. Therefore, such a regional security mechanism has lost
substantial attraction to China.
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The current status is that the Six-Party Talks cannot reach any agreement
and cannot solve the problem effectively. The Talks will not disappear in practice,
though they will be in a temporary shock or paralysis. No matter where the
situation goes, as long as there is any agreement in terms of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons, it has to be the result of a Six-Party agreement.
Internal dynamics
The question of how China’s policies toward North Korea are determined is not
straightforward. First of all, the current policies adopted by China are not
dominated by military authorities. North Korea is now considered far less of a
vital strategic ‘buffer zone’ than in the past. Any ultimate decision regarding
China’s policy toward North Korea is directly subject to judgement and selection
at the highest level. Yet, the influence over that policy has always oscillated
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which focuses on coordination with
the international community), and the International Department of the Chinese
Communist Party’s Central Committee (CCPCC) (which stresses the relationship
between China and North Korea). While the former camp can hardly be called
a ‘pro-West’ group, it does advocate coordination with the West. The latter
camp, on the other hand, can be called ‘pro-Pyongyang’ and advocates strongly
for cooperation with North Korea.
The CCPCC’s International Department oversees exchanges with other political
parties and is generally sympathetic to North Korea, often calling for a
strengthened relationship between the Chinese and the North Korean political
parties and governments and advocating full ‘political trust’ in Pyongyang. This
pro-Pyongyang element also believes that, in the end, North Korea will accept
China’s advice to reform and open up and that China has great influence over
North Korea.
Beginning with North Korea’s decision to launch the missile tests, and now
the nuclear tests, the International Department has had a declining influence on
the formulation of Chinese policy toward North Korea. This is evidenced by a
meeting held by the Central Committee on Foreign Affairs in late August 2006
which said that China would adhere to its new concept for diplomacy, including
‘taking the road of peaceful development’, ‘opening up and mutual benefit’,
‘building of a harmonious world’, and a ‘focus on the individual’.7  Most
importantly, the conference proceedings proclaimed that a nuclear North Korea
is a formidable challenge to China’s ‘core interests’. In Beijing’s discourse, only
Taiwan’s independence movement has been previously interpreted in that way.
The gist of these principles is that China will strengthen coordination of its own
diplomacy with that of the mainstream of the international community.
The policies currently being adopted by North Korea strongly conflict with
China’s diplomatic goals and have greatly narrowed its space for diplomatic
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manoeuvring in the Six-Party Talks. It has impaired China’s ability to influence
the United States, Japan and others to compromise with North Korea. These
difficulties, plaguing China’s mediation efforts on the North Korean nuclear
issue, are generating unprecedented political pressure within the Chinese
Government. However, the reassessment of its North Korea policy does not
automatically lead to more decisive and harsher actions against Pyongyang. It
is not so easy for the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao team (President and Premier of
China respectively) to stand up to the threat imposed by a nuclear North Korea.
China is still weighing all its options and considering the most workable
‘roadmap’ to proceed with its policy objective of denuclearisation. Considering
the delicacy and complexity of its options, Beijing will not make up its mind
quickly. It is clear that a nuclear North Korea holds bleak and adverse
implications for China and threatens to undermine almost all the elements of Hu
Jintao’s foreign policy strategy of a ‘harmonious world’, in which he has invested
so much.8
The decision by the Chinese Government in May 2003 to mediate the North
Korean nuclear crisis was a defining moment for Chinese diplomacy. It signalled
that China would become more proactive and self-confident in its diplomatic
efforts and strive to make innovative use of China’s rising international influence
toward playing a positive role in maintaining the country’s important peripheral
diplomacy. This has proven successful with the five rounds of Six-Party Talks
on the North Korean nuclear issue. This is why China’s participation in the Talks
received extensive support in domestic mainstream public opinion. However,
some academic and policy circles in China have opposed the nation’s role as
mediator, suggesting that China’s hosting of the Six-Party Talks is tantamount
to ‘a small horse pulling a large cart’—that China’s diplomatic clout is insufficient
for the task.
In a similar vein, Hu’s proactive and rational international policy approach
is facing new challenges. Some in China have expressed sympathy for North
Korea, believing that its actions are still a kind of support to China’s strategic
position and even a counter-balance to the United States and Japan.9  Such voices
grew louder following the North Korean missile launch and did not fade even
after its nuclear test. Some arguments, characterised as ‘conspiracy theory’ (that
the United States deliberately delayed the resolution on the nuclear issue with
North Korea in order to reactivate Japan’s rearming process) and ‘transference
theory’ (that US intentions were to transfer more strategic pressure on China by
broadening hostilities among East Asian regional members) arose to contradict
the Bush Administration’s moderate response and non-military intimidation
against North Korea.10  For the ossified forces within the conservative camp that
were originally discontent with Hu and Wen and their new-style government,
the missile launches and nuclear test only provided them with new fodder for
attacking the Hu–Wen team. Chinese politics entered a sensitive period in the
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run up to the 17th Party Congress. North Korea’s actions had, on balance,
damaged the diplomatic prestige of the Chinese reformists represented by Hu
and Wen. If China’s policy toward North Korea is dragged into the domestic
struggle over political power, the future orientation of China’s diplomatic policies
towards North Korea will become even more complicated.
Re-orienting China’s North Korean policy
The test launch of missiles by North Korea shook Beijing’s confidence in its past
policy toward North Korea. The nuclear test conducted by North Korea was the
last straw to substantively spur Beijing to rethink its relationship with the North.
China has implemented a range of measures in response to North Korea’s
defiant attitude, its missile test firing and to the negative consequences that may
arise in North Korea’s internal situation as a result of its actions. In terms of its
overall approach, following the missile test and before the nuclear test, China
began to initiate coercive diplomatic measures toward Pyongyang. This can be
seen by a number of changes in China’s actions toward North Korea. To begin,
total trade volume between China and North Korea was reduced, especially on
key products such as iron, steel, chemical and plant products. China temporarily
froze an existing agreement for a large-scale development project for border
trade between the two countries. An important outcome of Kim Jong-il’s visit
to China in January 2006 was to increase economic and trade cooperation between
the border cities and regions. A large-scale border trade summit, originally
scheduled for September 2006 and to be attended by high-ranking officials from
both sides, was cancelled.
Meanwhile, China delayed large-scale aid measures for North Korea following
the flood disaster in July 2006 and only initially provided some symbolic aid
through the Red Cross. Although South Korea announced large-scale aid worth
200 billion Korean won, China stated subsequently on 30 August that ‘the Chinese
government is very concerned about the disaster in North Korea, and has decided
to give humanitarian assistance, including grain, food, diesel and medicine’,
although China had yet to decide on the specific amount of goods.11 China later
decided to provide 50 000 tonnes of aid—the equivalent of half of South Korea’s
aid. It is a rare occurrence that China lags behind South Korea in providing
disaster relief for North Korea, and it is a bellwether of China’s new tendency
to use economic leverage to punish the North Korean regime. As shown in Table 1
and Table 2, China-North Korea trade between July 2005 and January 2006
basically remained stagnant.
54
The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific
Table 1: China’s Imports from North Korea from January–July 2005 to
January–July 2006 ($ in US millions)












Table 2: China’s Exports to North Korea from January–July 2005 to
January–July 2006 ($ in US millions)
















(Source: January–July 2006 statistics from China Customs. Its website is at
<http://english.customs.gov.cn/default.aspx>, accessed 17 June 2009.)
Besides economic and aid measures, China has sent more troops to the
China-North Korea border region. Although the Chinese media reported that
China was sending reinforcements to the border and carrying out missile drills
in the Changbai Mountains in mid-July 2006 as part of a ‘routine military
exercise’, the fact is that China wants to enhance its ability to react in case of a
contingency involving North Korea.12 This does not represent the position of
the military; rather, it indicates that China’s senior leadership is very concerned
about the possibility of an emergency in North Korea and has to intensify any
preparation for it in the near future.
China has also tightened visa management for North Koreans entering China
in an attempt to prevent North Korea from making further use of China as a
conduit for illegal activities, such as smuggling and the lynching of its own
citizens who try to seek sanctuary in China.
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In addition, China is participating in multilateral sanctions for the first time.
Furthermore, it is carrying out bilateral sanctions against North Korea. China
will not obstruct strict economic sanctions and may temporarily suspend oil
supplies to North Korea via the UNSC, though it would likely stop short of
allowing military action against North Korea.
Yet, despite the tremendous diplomatic and political pressure exerted on
China by North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, China’s leaders will continue
to explore the boundaries of influencing its southern neighbour. They will
continue to maintain the principle of a soft approach to head off the North Korean
nuclear issue. Before the North Korean nuclear test, Beijing would not have
pushed its close neighbour and ‘brother’ into a corner, because this would not
only have contravened China’s own interests but also departed from the broadly
accepted thinking of the Chinese people. However, if sanctions cannot move
North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, the possibility that China will
employ other means to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is real.
If this is the only alternative, China will use a variety of methods to accomplish
that goal, including coercive diplomacy. The crucial issue here is that China will
have to make a decision on how best to proceed.
How China addresses the problem of a nuclear North Korea has more to do
with its resolve and less to do with its policy. Prior to the nuclear test, China
saw no imperative to act decisively against North Korea: now the situation has
changed dramatically. China has no alternative but to employ any and all means
to get North Korea to return to its commitments to abandon nuclear weapons
(exemplified in the September 2005 Joint Statement) and to map out with other
parties a feasible plan to trade its nuclear capabilities for economic compensation
and diplomatic normalisation. Thus, as Ambassador Wang Guangya said at the
United Nations, ‘no one is going to protect North Korea if it continues with its
bad behaviour’.13  China has lost its patience and its will to allow this issue to
stagnate in multilateral talks. Hu Jintao presently looks to have more resolve
than ever before to safeguard China against any diversion from the country’s
economic construction. Firmly addressing a nuclear North Korea is a big test for
Hu and for China. It will add significantly to his capability and power within
China and also bolster China’s prestige internationally.
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Chapter 6
‘The Six-Party Talks Process: Towards
an Asian Concert?’
Robert Ayson
The Six-Party Talks achieved an important milestone in February 2007—an
agreement which required North Korea to freeze its Yongbyon reactor in
exchange for some initial energy assistance and discussions on more normalised
relations with the United States. North Korea was also required to come clean
on all of its nuclear facilities and research by providing a complete and
unabridged list.1  But this important step was to come later rather than right at
the outset. This bargain represents an important shift in the US position.
Washington had earlier insisted that North Korea really had to relinquish its
entire nuclear program before any concessions were granted.
Experience might suggest that North Korea got what it wanted—particularly
more time when the Bush Administration was in its lame duck season—and that
it has no real intention of undertaking complete nuclear disarmament. If the
pessimists (or perhaps the realists) are correct, the Bush Administration took a
big risk. The maximum that might be expected from North Korea could consist
of the freeze, disablement and possibly removal of North Korea’s facilities for
producing additional weapons, but not necessarily the surrender of all elements
of the existing arsenal. This suggests a de facto admission that the best that can
be hoped for is the management of a reduced problem.
This risks slipping into the perspective that one simply has to learn to live
with a minimally nuclear North Korea. Of the six parties, it is possible that China,
Russia and South Korea are relatively comfortable with that prospect (and some
in Washington may even be willing to do so as well). Perhaps disarmament is
simply not a pragmatic option—as long as North Korea acts within reasonable
bounds and is not an embarrassment for its neighbours, is some sort of nuclear
capability tolerable? But this would still be quite a sacrifice for China. It means
giving up on being the only North Asian state with nuclear weapons. Moreover,
even a very small yet frozen North Korea nuclear arsenal would prove an all too
easy basis on which Japan could justify its missile defence programs, and indeed
perhaps take even more adventurous steps. These are not outcomes which China
would want to see encouraged.
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The Six-Party Talks process will continue to be challenging. Early steps were
stalled by painstaking negotiations to release North Korean funds deposited into
a Macau-based financial house. Lingering concerns about North Korea’s interest
in uranium enrichment (as well as its traditional route of plutonium extraction)
will haunt future developments. Any list that North Korea produces is unlikely
to gain universal confidence. The process has been very demanding on the
patience of its main participants. This includes China, which is not only the host
of the talks but is also commonly viewed as the country with the greatest leverage
over North Korea—a supposed advantage which also encourages unrealistic
expectations about what Beijing may be able to get Pyongyang to do. It also
includes the United States whose former envoy, Christopher Hill, showed the
patience of Job.
Measuring the Six-Party Talks properly
North Korea may be willing to have the vast majority of its production capacities
removed for the right price. But giving up all semblance of nuclear weapons
status is a different prospect. It remains unlikely that the Six-Party Talks will
result in the complete removal of all traces of North Korea’s nuclear weapons,
but it is not clear that this is the benchmark against which the success of the
Talks should be judged. When assessed against more modest objectives for the
North Korean situation and wider objectives North Asia, the Six-Party Talks
process offers some distinct advantages.
First, the Talks have provided a mechanism short of the use of force for
dealing with North Korea. The response to North Korea’s nuclear test in late
2006 was not a military attack. It was sustained pressure (including the coercive
power of an attack option left on the table and intensive encouragement from
China) which led to a resumption of the Six-Party Talks in early 2007 and the
February agreement mentioned at the start of this chapter. Like all multilateral
processes involving exhaustive discussions which for years can go nowhere,
the Six-Party Talks process has had plenty of critics. But few, if any, of its
detractors have come up with a better approach to addressing North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program. The Six-Party Talks is one of those processes (like
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the early 1990s) that would
need to be invented if it was not already available. In other words, it is better
to judge the efficacy of the Six-Party Talks against the uncertain and incomplete
outcomes which non-existent or non-effective alternatives might provide rather
than against some absolutist but fantastical goal of complete North Korean nuclear
disarmament. In dealing with North Korea, as the author has argued elsewhere,
the least ugly option is king.2
Second, through the Six-Party Talks process North Korea has been held in a
loose but multilateral embrace of five significant regional powers. Differences
certainly remain between them in their positions. Japan is the unhappiest. Its
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refusal to provide financial assistance to North Korea until Pyongyang addresses
the outstanding abductee issue is rather like asking for a 30-minute start in the
Olympic marathon: it simply will not happen. But Japan genuinely feels that a
nuclear North Korea—its near neighbour under whose missile shadow it falls—is
getting too good a deal.3 This has opened up some tensions between Japan and
the United States, which views North Korea as a proliferation risk on the other
side of the Pacific Ocean. And China continues to see North Korea as a domestic
instability risk across the border. There is no doubt that different motivations
are in play here.
Yet, through the Six-Party Talks process, these three largest powers in East
Asian security affairs—the United States, China and Japan—have been required
to explore and negotiate the differences in their policies towards an urgent
regional security issue. Their policy convergence is certainly incomplete. They
do not always agree and the Six-Party Talks process may end up with a result
that none of them are entirely satisfied with. But they have found enough
common interests to remain part of the process despite the difficulty of dealing
with North Korea. If the Six-Party Talks can be a modest way of encouraging
great power cooperation in Asia, it will have been worth the effort. This means
that even if the final impact of the Talks process on the North Korean nuclear
weapons program is less than decisive, it may have done something even more
important for Asia. What is special about the Six-Party Talks is not that it is
focused on the North Korean nuclear situation per se. The Talks process is special
because all of the major powers in East Asia are sitting around the table working
on an important security issue.4
Inclusive and exclusive alternatives
This incipient but focused collaboration between Asia’s major powers is rare.
This is not to suggest that the Six-Party Talks process is the only forum in the
Asia-Pacific that includes ‘the big three’. APEC offers the potential for great
power get-togethers on its sidelines among the region’s leaders, but seems
generally more sympathetic to US and Western views than to those of East Asia.
It has a very broad membership which means that, while it includes the great
powers, it also has to incorporate the small ones whose roles in the Asian power
equation are always going to be modest. It is probably not the ideal forum for
managing the security challenges of North Asia over the long-term. Its agenda,
official or informal, does not seem likely to be easily harnessed or available for
direct work on the issues that affect direct relations between the big powers in
North Asia. APEC’s main security outcomes so far—as a platform for the East
Timor intervention in 1999 and more recently in encouraging regional
counter-terrorism and counter-pandemic cooperation—are side issues to the
great power balance.
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The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is also too inclusive and is hamstrung by
its lowest common denominator ethos. Smaller powers, including its hosts, are
inclined to advance their interests in being recognised as the official drivers of
Asian multilateralism and their own sub-regional preoccupations, ahead of deep
and meaningful contact directly between the great powers of North Asia. Some
years ago the founding members of ASEAN created something very close to a
Southeast Asian security community based on the norm that states in the
community should avoid conflict with one another. This stands as a remarkable
achievement. But the idea of spreading this sometimes patchy normative
framework to the rest of Asia through ASEAN-centred processes looks much
better in theory than in practice.
APEC and the ARF are two of the more established regional fora and have
been supplemented by new ones. But the newer kids on the block—ASEAN
Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS)—are unlikely to be concerts
in the making because both exclude the United States. And, rather than serving
as locations for cooperation between their two great power members from East
Asia (China and Japan), they have become venues for their competition for
influence over the rest of the region. For now, at least, Japan’s favourite, the
EAS (which includes the balancing presence of Australia, New Zealand and
India), is running second to the more important—and ironically more East
Asian—APT, which is China’s favoured mechanism. This may seem beneficial
for China’s interests in the short term, but an approach which keeps the United
States out and Japan down is not likely to be good for the great power stability
in Asia on which China also depends.
An embryonic concert?
By comparison, while the Six-Party Talks process is by no means a perfect
arrangement, it may offer the best chance as a bridge to an Asian ‘concert of
powers’. This concert would not be a permanent, formal, institution.5  Instead,
it would be a process of great power collaboration which creates such stabilising
and convergent expectations that, when major problems arise, the major powers
can sit down together and seek to manage their differences. If it is anything like
the European concert of the early nineteenth century, an Asian concert would
be highly discriminatory. Only the biggest powers would need to apply for
membership (in fact they would appoint themselves in a process of self-selection).
The interests of the smaller powers (the non-members of the concert) could get
overlooked. But if the small and medium powers of the region (like Australia,
New Zealand and the ASEAN countries) also depend on stable relations between
the great powers for the future of Asian security, and if those stable relations
are only really achievable if the great powers can sit down and work out their
differences with one another, then some sacrifice of the one-state, one-vote
principle may be in order.
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Of course, not all the members of the Six-Party Talks process may themselves
belong in that concert. Neither South Korea nor North Korea really qualifies as
a great power. Six parties minus two leaves four. Russia’s hydrocarbon-induced
return to bully power status under Vladimir Putin might not have been as deeply
established as some feared, and was aimed much more at European than Asian
influence. Four parties minus one leaves three. Most certainly the United States
and China belong to the concert. After all, it is their relationship that Asia’s
future security order depends on most of all. Japan’s place is a little less certain.
It is not a great power in terms of possessing a permanent seat at the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), in terms of possessing nuclear weapons, or in
terms of the constitutional restrictions on the deployment of Japan’s military.
But Japan needs to be part of the concert simply because China-Japan and
US-Japan relations are the other legs of that vital tripod in North Asia. There is
also a need, at least eventually, to include a fourth great power in the concert.
This is India—Asia’s second rising great power. This confirms that, while the
Talks may contribute to the Concert, the Concert is not the Six-Party Talks.
A concert of Asia-Pacific powers—which seeks to extend the limited
cooperation that has been seen at the Six-Party Talks—might well prove
ineffective because of the difference in strategic interests between its members.
It would include the three leading relationships of strategic competition in Asia:
in the near-term between China and Japan; in the medium-term between China
and the United States; and in the long-term between China and India. But even
an ineffective great power concert could be preferable to the strengthening of
rival and mutually exclusive groupings in Asia which might split the region
into conflicting blocs.
A clash of alliances
One of these blocs could emerge as an alliance of maritime democracies under
US leadership. The clearest form of this idea has actually been presented by
Japan: the Asian democratic quad favoured during Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe’s brief premiership, which would add Australia and India to the
mix. This is not to say that all elements of closer cooperation between any of
these four powers form a necessary pathway to that quad. But they could do so.
The debate over Australia’s new security declaration with Japan is a case in
point. Championed by Abe and Australia’s former Prime Minister, John Howard,
the declaration received only cautious support from Howard’s political rival
Kevin Rudd (now Australian Prime Minister), who warned against any moves
to take the relationship down the alliance path.6  Likewise Rudd argued that his
support for the increasingly close Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between the
United States, Japan and Australia did not mean an endorsement of any attempts
to encircle China. This is an important point because, for some observers, the
emergence of a de facto (if not de jure) trilateral alliance between the United
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States and its two leading alliance partners in Asia—Japan and Australia—may
be an idea whose time has come.
Many of the arguments against a full quad of Asian democracies are practical
ones. Quite simply, India wishes to retain its foreign policy autonomy. While
New Delhi welcomes the chance to enjoy closer security relations with the United
States, Japan and Australia, its preference is for a series of bilateral relationships.
It wants to stay out of the quad. Australia is also reluctant. But representatives
from the four countries did meet together in early 2007 on the sidelines of an
ARF meeting in the Philippines, and China revealed its discomfort by sending
a diplomatic note of concern to each of the four capitals.7
China has access to a potential response to this maritime alliance in the form
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which could be the basis for
an alliance of continental autocracies in which Russia also plays a leading role,
and to which countries like Iran and North Korea might well be attracted. Large
scale ‘anti-terrorism’ exercises conducted under SCO auspices may well be an
early sign of competition with the recent emergence of trilateral and quadrilateral
exercises involving the maritime powers in Asia.
There is a small amount of overlap between the groupings. For example, India
is an observer of the SCO—a clear sign of its position as a swing state in Asia.
Yet, for the most part, the groupings are mutually exclusive. For example, the
alliance of democracies would be based on many shared interests and values
between its members. But it would, by definition, automatically exclude China.
These two blocs would each be stronger than the more diverse and unwieldy
great power concert. The blocs would be more effective in pursuing their own
objectives. But they could divide the region so that the Asia of 2014 would look
too much like the Europe of 1914 and we all know what happens next. Against
this prospect, the Six-Party Talks process carries the hint of a more promising
future. Not a perfect Asia where all differences between the great powers are
resolved. Not a complete answer to the security problems that the concert would
undoubtedly struggle with. But a partially successful alternative to the dangerous
two-horse race which could emerge between blocs led by China and the United
States.
Conclusion
A great power concert in Asia, however ineffective, is preferable to an Asia
dangerously divided between two rival blocs, however internally effective these
blocs may be. But for a flawed but still valuable concert to operate, almost all
of the participating countries would have to give up something. In other words,
in order to win, one would have to lose. Let us look first at the great powers.
The United States has to give up the idea that it can maintain primacy in Asia.
A great power concert means that the United States will have to share hegemony,
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including with China. It will need to soften its emphasis on a network of military
alliances with other maritime democracies in the region.
China probably has rather less to lose, but it still has to relinquish something.
It will need to abandon any ideas that it will be the single leader of Asia. Unlike
the SCO, of which Beijing is the natural leader, a great power concert means that
China will need to share power, and not just with the United States but with
India, and, hardest of all, with Japan as well. This means recognising Tokyo’s
right to a seat at the big table.
But Japan may itself have a lot to lose in a concert. An alliance of democracies
would be a big win for Japan, providing Tokyo with significant status and an
unprecedented chance to boost its role in regional security affairs and to work
alongside other democracies which want to see Japan play that bigger role. But,
in the concert, Japan will have continually to regulate its diplomacy with China
sitting across the table. This will help manage the development of its new
international personality in a way that Japan will sometimes find uncomfortable.
Some of the smaller and medium powers in the region may have even more
to lose from a concert—at least in the short term. Australia is simply not big
enough to qualify for a seat at the really big table that a great power concert
would involve. By some calculations of Australia’s short-term diplomatic interests,
this can make the alliance of democracies attractive as a way of boosting
Australia’s profile. But, in the long-term, that alliance would encourage a hostile
division between the United States and China and between Japan and China.
This would run counter to Australia’s interests in making sure that the China-US
balance does not turn ugly, and that a major conflict between China and Japan
is also avoided. For that reason, a concert which includes all three of these giants,
as well as India, is in Australia’s long-term strategic interests. But this would
probably mean a less prominent role for Australia in some of the important
diplomacy of the region.
Australia still has an important role to play, often behind the scenes. China
regards Australia as a strategic economic partner. The United States regards
Australia as one of the closest allies it has anywhere in the world. And Japan
regards Australia as an emerging security partner. With those sorts of linkages,
Australia can encourage these three powers to seek the Asian concert which
involves them all, however shaky and ineffective this may turn out to be. And
this means continuing to support the Six-Party Talks process, even if it does not
lead to a completely denuclearised North Korea. (Had the Talks dealt with North
Korea’s nuclear weapons issue quickly, its full potential as a bridge to an Asian
concert might well have been overlooked.) Canberra regards the freezing and
disablement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as important outcomes
to work towards. But the possibility of great power collaboration over the longer
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term in Asia, with the Six-Party Talks acting an important step along the way,
is, in this author’s opinion, the more important prize.
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Chapter 7
The US Role in the Future Security
Architecture for East Asia
Ron Huisken
Although the US role in East Asia over the period 1900–45 was by no means
inconsequential, this investigation will take up the story from 1945. Washington
approached the questions of post-war arrangements in Europe and East Asia
with one big lesson from the First World War in mind: that staying engaged
and shaping the course of events directly was smarter than walking away and
trusting the local powers to preclude history repeating itself. In Europe, even
though the United States had a decisive voice after the defeat of Nazi Germany,
the winners’ side of the table was pretty crowded with the likes of the United
Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. In East Asia, the United States had a
freer hand, and the success of the Manhattan Project allowed the defeat of Japan
to be accelerated sufficiently to make the bargains struck at Potsdam in June
1945 regarding Soviet participation in ending the war in the Pacific all but
redundant.
At the same time, East Asia did not compare with Europe as a region that had
and should continue to engage US interests comprehensively. Japan was both
an enemy (vanquished, but to be kept down) and the only state in a vast region
that had any pedigree as an advanced, industrial power and thus the potential
to be a profitable economic and, imaginably, political partner for the United
States. Moreover, despite an abundance of signs that relations with the Soviet
Union were going to be a defining difficulty of the post-war period, the United
States de-mobilised quite extravagantly in the years 1945–49 and resisted the
notion that a new ‘war’ was already underway which would require it to maintain
substantial armed forces on a permanent basis. These inhibitions were abandoned
with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April
1949. The Soviet nuclear test in August 1949 and US President Harry S. Truman’s
decision to develop the hydrogen bomb a few months later confirmed that there
would be no re-consideration or turning back. Truman also commissioned the
preparation of a study of what a Cold War with, and containment of, the Soviet
Union would imply for the military capabilities the United States would have
to regard as ‘normal’ even in peacetime. This study, United States Objectives and
Programs for National Security (NSC-68), was completed in April 1950 and
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recommended full-scale development of the nuclear forces alongside the
comprehensive re-development of US conventional forces. But, in the absence
of a clear political trigger to justify re-armament, NSC-68 languished.
East Asia, of course, ranked a poor second to Europe. The communist victory
in China’s civil war appears to have been regarded in Washington, at least
initially, more as a disappointment than a strategic reversal. Similarly, China’s
early occupation of Taiwan to complete the process was anticipated and accepted.
The United States was disillusioned with its local partners in the southern half
of Korea and began withdrawing its forces in 1949. These several straws came
together in a now-famous speech by US Secretary of State Allen Dulles in January
1950 which implied only too clearly that the United States saw its vital interests
in Northeast Asia as limited to the Japanese islands. A few months later, in June
1950, the United States nonetheless promptly decided to contest North Korea’s
Soviet-enabled invasion of South Korea, to endorse NSC-68 as an initial blueprint
for a characteristically spectacular re-armament program (the Pentagon budget
went up more than three-fold in real terms between 1950 and 1953), and, on the
second day of the war, 26 June 1950, to view China’s expected invasion of
Taiwan as an unhelpful complication that should be deterred by deploying the
7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. At the time, China had no known association with
the invasion, and disguised its infiltration of volunteers during October and
November 1950 until the last possible moment. This prompt sealing-off of Taiwan
suggests that, in the early months of 1950, the United States had become at least
ambivalent about what it would do if China moved against the island.
The United States had toyed with a Pacific counterpart to NATO, but this
only made sense to the United States if Japan was included while Japan’s
inclusion deterred every other interested party. America’s appetite for additional
‘entangling alliances’, especially in theatres of secondary importance, faded until
the Korean War revived the imperatives needed to overcome these domestic
hesitations. America’s military footprint in East Asia can therefore be said to
have been supported in a rather general sense by the drift toward the Cold War
and the resolve to posture itself to ‘contain’ Soviet expansion during the late
1940s, but with the specifics driven by the imperatives of the Korean War: larger
forces permanently deployed in Japan, the new commitments to the defence of
South Korea and Taiwan and codified bilateral security arrangements with the
Philippines, Thailand and Australia/New Zealand—the so-called ‘hubs and
spokes’ pattern of alliances rather than a single collective security pact along
the lines of NATO. Apart from the changed arrangements with Taiwan, including
the withdrawal of all US forces, following US-China re-engagement in 1972, this
US military presence in East Asia remained unchanged for 50 years.
The American purpose in committing itself to the indefinite
forward-deployment of significant military capabilities was to preclude the use
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or threat of use of force to change boundaries, to as far as possible deny the
Soviet Union and China any soft options for the spread of communism, and to
reassure itself and the wider region that Japanese militarism was a thing of the
past. An additional driver, prominent in the preceding century but much less
so in the early years after the Second World War, was that a generally stable
region would be hospitable to US trade and investment. Over time, as the
Japanese economic miracle of 1955–70 sparked comparable phases of dramatic
growth in South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and other ASEAN states,
most elites in Asia subscribed to the view that there was a powerful association
between the US military presence and East Asia’s strategic tranquility on the
one hand and the region’s transforming economic dynamism on the other hand.
Not even the trauma of the Vietnam War seemed to dent this view. Indeed, most
seem to subscribe to former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s
assessment that the Vietnam War bought an additional decade for the new
non-communist states of Asia to build their economic and political resilience.
Unsurprisingly, official US justifications for sustaining their forward presence
in Asia, directed equally at domestic and foreign audiences, began to refer more
prominently to this presence as the ‘oxygen’ that sustained growth and
development.
The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 naturally rocked the foundations of this
US-dominated security system in East Asia. Washington reacted first (but under
strident public pressure), moving unilaterally to declare that the new
circumstances allowed the US Administration to initiate a significant drawdown
in US forces stationed abroad in Europe and Asia, but without stepping back
from the security obligations that these forces were intended to meet. In other
words, the United States wanted to (and thought it safely could) thin-out its
forward-deployed forces without signalling any basic transformation of its global
security posture. East Asians apparently thought otherwise, viewing the
drawdown alongside America’s withdrawal from its large bases in the Philippines
as potentially destabilising. The signals of discomfort and concern received in
the United States were such that the drawdown was terminated well short of
the target, and the United States Government set out to reassure Asian audiences
that it would keep 100 000 US military personnel forward-deployed in Asia into
the indefinite future. Even so, Washington found that fully repairing the loss
of confidence in its resolve to underwrite regional security took several years.
Less visibly, an entirely different policy response to the end of the Cold War
was taking shape in the Pentagon. The then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney,
was in the market for a new grand strategy—some coherent set of ideas that
could replace the Soviet Union as guidance for US foreign and security policy
settings in place of what he saw as a rather aimless and potentially dangerous
dissipation of US power.
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It is important to note, first of all, that the central thesis of the Pentagon
strategy was not the literal adoption of a particular strand of obscure academic
thinking. It would seem that the foundations for the strategy were built up
rather pragmatically—‘discovered’ as Cheney put it—by officials of the
neo-conservative persuasion in response to the challenge of defending the
Pentagon’s budget from the pressures for a post Cold War peace dividend. An
influential consideration in crafting this strategy was that the United States had
endured some major scares during the Cold War and should at all costs avoid
the emergence of another ‘peer competitor’. Given the opportunity to build a
new order, the first requirement was to avoid getting back into a glass jar with
another scorpion (the classic depiction of the United States and the Soviet Union
in circumstances of mutual assured destruction). The obvious precursor to a
global rival was the emergence of a regional hegemon where the resources of
the hegemon and its immediate region provided the strategic muscle to challenge
the United States globally. This, too, had to be prevented. Regions like Africa
and Latin America could be ruled out with reasonable confidence as a springboard
for global rivalry with the United States, but Europe, the Middle East and East
Asia were another matter.
The neo-conservative prescription differed significantly from that of the
Realists—the mainstream school of thought about these matters. Realists
contended that the US propensity toward idealism and messianism had to be
held in check by a rigorous focus on ‘national interests’. The policy prescription
from this school was to guard against the risk that winning the Cold War would
encourage the view that the United States—the state that was the exception to
all other hegemonic powers the world had ever experienced—was now free to
reshape the world to its advantage, and that doing so would be recognised by
all (or nearly all) as to their benefit as well. Realists favoured the discipline of
recognising the limits of US power and confining the nation’s foreign policy
ambitions to the protection and advancement of rigorously defined national
interests.1
The draft Pentagon strategy called for the United States to be the dominant
outside power in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions to protect access to
oil. In Europe and Asia, the United States would seek to prevent any of the
resident major powers from dominating the region and perhaps using the
consolidated resources of the region as a springboard to global power status. On
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the draft noted that ‘the United States
could be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent
the development or use of weapons of mass destruction’—a rather clear indication
that pre-emption could emerge as the preferred or necessary option.
The draft went a crucial step further: it suggested that the United States
should actively discourage the emergence of potentially competitive powers,
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and pointed to several policy settings that would contribute to this objective.
Specifically:
First, the United States must show the leadership necessary to establish
and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential
competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more
aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the
non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the
advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our
leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic
order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. An
effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies that
a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant
military position in the world.2
These thoughts went to the heart of the brief. They mandated a militarily
dominant United States capable of acting independently when collective action
could not be orchestrated and visibly positioned to increase its military power
faster than any potential competitor. Cheney considered these strands of thinking
to be a promising step toward a strategy that would be politically viable and
would protect US military superiority.
This strategy would commit the United States to a very demanding and costly
international role into the indefinite future, something that the American public
was seeking to get away from. Strangely, however, no other groups in the foreign
and security policy community in Washington had yet even been exposed to
it, let alone persuaded of its merits. In other words, there had been no
whole-of-government assessment and review. In fact, the Pentagon strategy ran
counter to sentiments elsewhere in the US Administration, particularly in the
White House, and may even have been intended to contest these sentiments.
For example, US President George H.W. Bush’s National Security Strategy of
August 1991 said:
If the end of the Cold War lives up to its promise and liberates U.S. policy
from many of its earlier concerns, we should be able to concentrate more
on enhancing security—in the developing world, particularly through
means that are more political, social and economic than military.
…
In the face of competing fiscal demands and a changing but still
dangerous world, we have developed a new defense strategy that
provides the conceptual framework for our future forces. This new
strategy will guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces
we need to defend our interests and meet our global responsibilities.3
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When a copy of the Pentagon document was leaked to the New York Times
in March 1992, its thesis was savaged from all sides, and it was disowned by
Bush. A new draft, appropriately softer in tone and giving new prominence to
the importance of allies and the United Nations, was also ‘leaked’ (in May 1992)
without reviving the controversy. After this, as the Presidential election campaign
of 1992 intensified, the issue seemed to disappear.
We now know, however, that Cheney tasked Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby (then
assistant to the then US Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz) to further
develop the basic ideas of the strategy.4  Libby endorsed the core proposition
that US military superiority should be so stark and overwhelming that no other
state would even consider setting out on the long road to challenge it, but he
added that this superiority should be extant rather than dependent on a
reconstitution capability. In this way, unipolarity, at least in the military
dimension, would remain a permanent feature of the international landscape.
In the last days of the George H.W. Bush Administration (that is, in January
1993), Cheney issued a document called Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The
Regional Defense Strategy.5  Journalists learned later that this was in fact a
sanitised version of the Pentagon strategy. It is instructive, therefore, to take a
closer look at this statement.
Cheney’s defence strategy was an eminently marketable product, presenting
a relatively optimistic view of the security outlook and highlighting allies
(frequently) as a critical strategic asset for the United States. Its network of
alliances constituted a ‘zone of peace’ and a ‘framework for security not through
competitive rivalry in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective
security institutions’.6
Several interesting themes permeated the document. One was the notion that
the end of the Cold War had given the United States greater ‘strategic depth’.
This outcome, which took as given the fact that the United States was militarily
dominant in every region that mattered, resulted from two factors. First, the
Soviet Union was no longer there to boost the military potential of regional actors
threatening US interests. Second, absent the pervasive ideological contest with
the Soviet Union and the Cold War concern that even peripheral Soviet gains
could begin to tip the central balance, the United States no longer had to spread
its resources to cover every front. It now had greater choice about where it
should focus its energy. A third factor might be regarded as implicit in these
two, but is worth drawing out. The demise of the Soviet Union not only greatly
enhanced America’s relative power; it also made it much safer for the United
States to exercise that power. During the Cold War, any clash of US and Soviet
armed forces carried an irreducible risk of escalation to strategic nuclear war.
This inhibiting risk was now gone. Cheney’s document stressed that this
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relatively luxurious position had been won at great cost and should therefore
not be ‘squandered’.
A second theme Cheney stressed was that allied support was most effectively
assured if it was clear that the United States had the ability, and the will, to win
by itself if necessary. History, the document plausibly argued, ‘suggests that
effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to US
leadership, not as an alternative to it’.7  Preserving the ability to act
independently was essential insurance, and responded to the lessons of history.
Later, and with considerable prescience, the document addressed possible
domestic impediments to the role it recommended the United States play.
Specifically, Cheney’s document argued that the security challenges of the future
would not be the major, global, relatively ‘black and white’ contests that the
American public could be relied upon to support. On the contrary, US interests
in regional conflicts ‘may seem less apparent’ and US involvement rather more
optional. To counter the risk that future administrations may find it difficult to
generate or sustain public support for military ventures in distant places, the
United States needed the capacity to respond decisively to regional crises, ‘to
win quickly and with minimum casualties’.
The document did not repeat the proposal that the United States should
actively discourage the emergence of rival powers, but it came close:
It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to
earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced against one
another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even
global peace hung in the balance.
…
Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other
nations confidence that our significant military power threatens no one’s
aspirations for peaceful democratic progress.8
Other language in the document betrayed a deep appreciation of the political
options that flowed from America’s emergence from the Cold War as a military
colossus. The notion of shaping security environments is a very old one. It refers
to activities, including military activities, designed to discourage and deter
developments deemed injurious to the national interest. Cheney’s document,
however, goes a significant step further to suggest, throughout, that the US
objective should be to preclude (that is, make impossible) regional threats and
challenges, or hostile non-democratic powers from dominating regions of
importance to the United States. This posture, the document states, ‘is not simply
within our means: it is critical to our future security’.9  Many analysts would
see in this observation evidence of the propensity in hegemonic states toward
strategic over-reach; that is, toward the adoption of postures that almost ensure
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the eventual exhaustion of the capacity or the collapse of the political will needed
to sustain them.
The Pentagon strategy essentially disappeared from view for nearly a decade;
that is, for the two terms of the Clinton Administration, for the Bush/Gore election
campaign in 2000, and, so it seemed, for the first 18 months of the George
W. Bush Administration. Eventually, in June 2002, Bush quite abruptly declared
the Pentagon strategy to be the policy of the United States, using the starkest
formulations of its key premises. Speaking at the West Point military academy
on 1 June 2002, Bush said:
As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve
the peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in
the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in
peace instead of prepare for war. The history of the last century, in
particular, was dominated by a series of destructive national rivalries
that left battlefields and graveyards across the Earth. Germany fought
France, the Axis fought the Allies, and then the East fought the West,
in proxy wars and tense standoffs, against a backdrop of nuclear
Armageddon.
Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in
our world is not. More and more, civilized nations find ourselves on the
same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.
America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge,
thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and
limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.10
Several facets of the Pentagon strategy are of particular interest. First, in
advocating that the US step forward and declare its intention to take charge,
and to ensure that its leadership could not be challenged, the strategy departed
from a posture that US Administrations had consistently preferred for over a
century. Second, the strategy had been wholly crafted within the Pentagon and
had never been subjected to the usual inter-agency review and assessment.
Third, the strategy never formed the basis of anyone’s political platform and
was therefore never tested electorally. In mid-2002, with the enduring shock of
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the ‘axis of evil’,
the doctrine of pre-emption and the political manoeuvring over regime change
in Iraq, the announcement made little impact. In the circumstances, it seemed
all but redundant. Still, enough of the senior leadership in the Bush
Administration attached importance to seeing it adopted as a formal policy
setting. It is true, of course, that Bush won a second term in 2004 (what he has
described as an ‘accountability moment’ for his policies), but it seems fair to say
that the Pentagon’s ‘grand strategy’ was so completely sidelined by Iraq and
the global ‘war on terror’ that it had no visibility with the electorate.
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The Clinton Administration, as could be inferred from its election slogan ‘It’s
the economy, stupid’, shared the instincts of its predecessor and opted for caution
in the realm of foreign and security policy. Its ‘bottom up’ review of the US
defence posture identified the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf as the two
most testing security challenges that could arise, particularly if they erupted at
about the same time. Thus, coping with two medium regional conflicts (2MRC)
occurring in overlapping timeframes became the benchmark against which the
Pentagon measured the adequacy of its capabilities. Other challenges, especially
terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and the characteristic of asymmetry inherent
in these phenomena received a prominent mention, but were basically subsumed
in the more traditional 2MRC mission. Moreover, this mission basically validated
the forward-deployments that had emerged from the Cold War.
The eight years of Bill Clinton’s presidency witnessed an increasingly heated
debate about the scope for the information revolution and capacities for
long-range precision strike, in particular, to transform the conduct of
conventional warfare, especially if there was the courage to not only acquire
the technologies but to explore the capacity of radically different military
formations, command and control arrangements, and arrangements for the
collection and dissemination of intelligence to capture the full synergistic
potential of these new technologies. Although the pile of major studies pointing
to the possibility that the United States could ‘transform’ conventional war and
place itself far ahead of all potential rivals grew higher throughout the 1990s,
the Clinton Administration saw no compelling reason to rush into this new era.
The Pentagon’s 1998 East Asian Strategy Report observed that while
this transformation involves harnessing new technologies, operational
concepts and organizational structures to give U.S. forces greater
mobility, flexibility and military capabilities so that they can dominate
any future battlefield, the administration judged that the improvements
in military hardware and support systems are not yet at the stage of
fundamentally altering our strategic perceptions or force structure in
the region, or elsewhere around the world.11
The stridency of the debate, and the progressive breakdown of bipartisanship
even on national security, was reflected in the decision of the US Congress to
establish a National Defense Panel (NDP) to critique the Administration’s
Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997. The NDP castigated the 2MRC as precluding
the acquisition of capabilities within reach and important to coping with the
different security challenges taking shape: mobility, stealth, speed, increased
range, precision strike, and a smaller logistical footprint. Part of the US
Administration’s caution stemmed from the view that the US military had to
remain ready at all times to defeat large-scale trans-border aggression by a
significant military power or coalition. For many, however, including the authors
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of the NDP, available technologies had already transformed the nature of war
such that the United States no longer had to think in terms of massive,
force-on-force engagements even for the largest imaginable military threats.
The Clinton Administration, in opting to defer full-scale exploration of these
possibilities, also refined its thinking about how America’s extant military
posture, particularly in Asia, effectively advanced US interests. The United States
Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998, is worth quoting in full
on this score:
U.S. military presence in Asia has long provided critical and symbolic
contributions to regional security. Our forces stationed in Japan and
Korea, as well as those rotated throughout the region, promote security
and stability, deter conflict, give substance to our security commitments
and ensure our continued access to the region.
Our military presence in Asia serves as an important deterrent to
aggression, often lessening the need for a more substantial and costly
U.S. response later. Today deterrent capability remains critical in areas
such as the Korean Peninsula. A visible U.S. force presence in Asia
demonstrates firm determination to defend U.S., allied and friendly
interests in this critical region.
In addition to its deterrent function, U.S. military presence in Asia serves
to shape the security environment to prevent challenges from emerging
at all. U.S. force presence mitigates the impact of historical regional
tensions and allows the United States to anticipate problems, manage
potential threats and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes. Only
through active engagement can the United States contribute to
constructive political, economic and military development within Asia’s
diverse environment. Forward presence allows the United States to
continue playing a role in broadening regional confidence, promoting
democratic values and enhancing common security.
Overseas military presence also provides political leaders and commanders
the ability to respond rapidly to crises with a flexible array of options.
Such missions may include regional and extra-regional contingencies,
from humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation and peacekeeping
operations to meeting active threats as in the Arabian Gulf. During the
Arabian Gulf crisis in early 1998, for example, USS Independence deployed
to the Gulf and was an important element of our deterrent force posture
that alleviated the crisis. Military presence also enhances coalition
operations by promoting joint, bilateral and combined training, and
encouraging responsibility sharing on the part of friends and allies.12
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In a speech in February 2001, former US President George W. Bush declared
that the United States would aspire to keep the peace by redefining war on its
terms. He did so in the context of announcing that he had given the then US
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, carte blanche to transform the US armed
forces and take full advantage of new technological capacities. This authority
fed into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR2001)—released on 30 September
2001.13  Although released shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks,
and presented as a document that absorbed the lessons of that dreadful event,
QDR2001 was arguably the only strategy document crafted by the Bush
Administration in a pre-11 September 2001 mindset. And a strong case could
be made that, in addition to projecting what the new technologies, operational
concepts and organisational structures would mean for force structure and
military strategies, QDR2001 also reflected the philosophy that underpinned the
‘grand strategy’ developed in the Pentagon in 1992–93.
The QDR2001 essentially declared that the United States would seek to shape
the security environment more directly and across a broader front than it had
aspired to do in the past. A key judgement shaping the report was that the
security outlook was so fluid that it would be dangerous for the United States
to focus on who or where threats to its interests might arise. Instead, it would
focus on how capabilities to harm US interests could develop over time and
prepare to deal with such challenges wherever they might appear.
The report also made clear that the focus of US attention in strategic and
security terms had shifted emphatically to Asia. This region is described as the
most susceptible to military competition, containing a volatile mix of rising and
declining powers, and as the possible source of a real military competitor to the
United States. To reinforce this new strategic focus, and to distinguish it from
the historical preoccupation with the Korean Peninsula, the QDR introduced a
new region—the East Asian Littoral, defined as the region stretching from south
of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal.
A further key judgement was to require that the capabilities of US forces
deployed or stationed abroad be transformed so that they became lighter, more
responsive and easier to sustain logistically, but also more lethal. The QDR2001
conveyed the impression of a Pentagon that now looked out upon the entire
world as a battlespace and aspired to forces that could be surged quickly within
or between regions to create, along with long-range precision strike forces,
decisive and persistent military effects at any location. For the Asian theatre,
with its vast distances and with the US forward presence heavily concentrated
in North Asia, this requirement was also seen to put a premium on developing
a wider network of austere bases and support facilities. At the same time, to
avoid undue dependence on such bases and support facilities, QDR2001 called
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for the capability to conduct sustained operations at great distances with minimal
support from within the theatre.
The fallout from the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
meant that Washington’s intent to give priority to Asia (the first time in at least
30 years that Asia had displaced Europe and the Middle East) never materialised.
One consequence of this, it would seem, was that it strengthened the hand of
those in Chinese policy circles who argued that the window of opportunity to
give maximum priority to economic development, and gathering the political
influence that flowed from success on this front without having to consider
focused American counter-strategems, had been extended.
Despite the almost complete diversion of US political and military energies
into Iraq since 2002, the Quadrennial Defense Review released in 2006 (QDR2006)
basically developed and fine-tuned its predecessor.14 The Pentagon remains
committed to shifting away from large garrisons at fixed bases toward
expeditionary forces operating out of austere forward bases. QDR2006 speaks
undramatically of the need to conduct multiple, overlapping wars15 —an
indicator of how far the Pentagon has moved intellectually from the 2MRC era.
Another QDR2001 theme, the need to tailor deterrent and defence strategies to
a trilogy of distinctive threats—rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-peer
competitors—is reiterated. The Iraq experience produced an important concession
in that QDR2006 notes16  that military force alone cannot succeed against
dispersed non-state networks and that the real key lies in creating a global
environment inhospitable to terrorism.17
QDR2006 also revived the question of China, and directly so rather than
elliptically as in QDR2001. Despite China’s strenuous claims to military weakness
and technological backwardness, QDR2006 considered that ‘China has the greatest
potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military
technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages
absent U.S. counter strategies’.18 The report goes on to itemise the capabilities
that China is giving priority to before observing that ‘these capabilities, the vast
distances of the Asian theater, China’s continental depth, and the challenge of
en route and in-theater U.S. basing place a premium on forces capable of sustained
operations at great distances into denied areas’.19 The US Navy objective is to
place 50 per cent of its aircraft carriers (six ships) and 60 per cent of its
submarines (over 30 boats) in the Pacific to support engagement, presence, and
deterrence.20
The Pentagon’s high tempo of operations, the emphasis on expeditionary
forces surging to achieve synergistic effects and the blurring of regional
boundaries has seen the end of the consolidated statement on the rewards of
forward-deployment such as that quoted above from 1998. All the functions
and objectives remain, but there is now a stronger disposition to blend these
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purposes into more operationalised characterisations of US military missions:
irregular challenges (defeating terrorist networks); catastrophic challenges
(preventing rogue regimes from acquiring or using WMD); and disruptive
challenges (shaping the choices of states at strategic crossroads).
Taking stock
With Europe as the reference point, and setting aside the forces injected to
prosecute the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the fixed elements of the US security
posture in Asia have always appeared relatively thin—a limited spider web of
bilateral ‘spokes’ radiating out from Washington. Still, it is likely that most
political and foreign/security policy elites in the region would judge that this
posture has been adequate to the task; that it has provided a sufficiency of
confidence in the integrity of a basic regional order to underpin the region’s
impressive economic development.
It might also be agreed that the US posture has not been about
micro-management of the region’s affairs but instead directed at the big
picture—the deterrence of the use or threat of use of force to secure fundamental
change in the region’s political and security order. Finally, it would probably
be agreed that, with significant variations over the years in terms of intensity
and directness, China has always ranked among the important targets whose
thinking and actions the United States has endeavoured to influence. Since the
demise of the Soviet Union, China has unquestionably been the most important
target.
The long cycles in China-US relations over the past 50 years have been
elegantly explored by James Mann in About Face: A History of America’s Curious
Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton.21  China has never been
enamoured of the US alliances with Asian states and the forward-deployed forces
that attended these arrangements. But China’s tolerance of these arrangements
fluctuated pragmatically in response to factors like the state of China-Soviet
relations, and whether the alliances continued to deliver outcomes of value to
China, particularly effective constraints on Japanese military power but also a
reliable stalemate on the Korean Peninsula. A more subtle consideration is that
confidence in the US-backed security framework has permitted the smaller states
in East Asia, especially those in Southeast Asia, to engage China unreservedly
as a rewarding economic partner—a posture that has proved to be extremely
beneficial for China.
There is speculation however that, from about the time of the
near-confrontation with the United States over Taiwan in 1996, China’s
assessment has been that the direct and prominent US role in the security
equation in East Asia was no longer in China’s interests. Some point to China’s
relentless marketing of its new security concept, and the associated strong
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criticism of existing arrangements as hegemonic, anachronistic and reflective of
a ‘Cold War mentality’, as evidence of this. Others suggest that while China may
now be of this view, its political judgement remains that China must be patient
and endure the status quo on the security front so that it can continue to give
first priority to rebuilding its economic capacity.
Assuming that some such re-evaluation has occurred, the issue of interest
becomes the main points of divergence in Chinese and American security interests
and why these might now outweigh the benefits that once flowed from the US
security presence and, to some extent, presumably continue to do so.
Taiwan is undoubtedly the most prominent and consequential of these points
of divergence. This issue has bedevilled the China-US relationship since 1950
and has been at the heart of several major confrontations, including a couple of
incidents in the 1950s that involved serious consideration by the United States
of its nuclear options. China has made it clear that it would have no choice but
to use force if Taiwan, as a perceived integral part of China, attempted to achieve
formal independence. The United States is equally locked into the position that
it cannot allow the status quo to be altered by force. There has been adequate
‘wriggle room’ between these positions to allow the issue to be continually
finessed. Neither the United States nor China wants a war over Taiwan, and
China has all but acknowledged that it would probably lose a military contest
if the issue blew up in the medium-term future and the United States elected to
get involved quickly and unreservedly. This prospect may have motivated the
occasional warning from senior Chinese figures that China would not exclude
escalation to the level of strategic nuclear threats against the United States.
In recent years, the concern has become that Beijing views a Taiwanese push
for independence as an irreducible risk that necessitates, within the overall
priority attached to ‘peaceful development’, the acquisition of military capabilities
that will more reliably deter Taiwan even if it assumes US involvement. This
has been the Pentagon’s judgement for some time. QDR2006 reaffirmed this
judgement, asserting that ‘Chinese military modernization has accelerated since
the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop
military options against Taiwan scenarios’.22
The second specific issue arising from US military engagement in East Asia
and involving a significant clash of important Chinese and US interests probably
concerns Japan. Specifically, it would appear that the US-Japan alliance, once
viewed by China as a constraint on Japan’s acquisition of comprehensive
conventional military capabilities and the ‘normalisation’ of Japanese attitudes
toward the use of its armed forces to protect and advance the national interest,
is now seen as a springboard for these developments. When the former was the
case, it constituted a major consideration in China’s reluctance to oppose the US
alliance system. But while it is a weighty issue, it is diffuse in the sense that,
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unlike Taiwan, it does not contain a clear potential trigger for conflict with the
United States. China-Japan territorial disputes, particularly with regards to the
Diaoyutai Islands, clearly have the potential to involve Japan’s alliance partner,
but it still lacks the gravity of the Taiwan issue.
We should bear in mind, of course, that we do not require more than one
clash of vital interests to produce a worst-case outcome for the security outlook
in East Asia. Still, in examining how the prevailing US security posture toward
East Asia might shape the China-US relationship in the future, it seems
worthwhile to look beyond the specific and the concrete and to consider some
of the more subjective or intangible dimensions of this issue. The United States
has, over the post-war period, become comfortable and familiar with
pre-eminence, not least in East Asia. Even under the Clinton Administration, it
was rather clear that the United States also became increasingly comfortable
with unipolarity and the expanded opportunities for leadership and influence
associated with it. This was true even though the United States was aware that
unipolarity also expanded its already formidable obligations and responsibilities
and made the United States the target of choice for some gathering challenges
that focused on irregular or asymmetric capabilities so as to bypass America’s
overwhelming conventional military power.
US rhetoric on the role it perceived itself playing arguably became more
formulaic, more presumptive of its unique status as a natural state of affairs and,
together with its support for (democratic) change in the nature of the regime in
Beijing, was offensive to states like China that aspired to a greater role in shaping
events, particularly in its immediate region. Many Chinese, it seems, anticipate
and look forward to the progressive democratisation of governance in China,
but this does not preclude resenting any suggestion that acceptance of a strong
and influential China is in any way conditional on such a development. The
inescapable corollary to US views on the role it is playing in East Asia is that
there is no local player with the resources and the national qualities to perform
this role as reliably as the United States—again an implicit message that China
probably finds vaguely offensive.
This is not the first time that the United States has been accused of slipping
onto ‘auto-pilot’ with respect to its engagement with East Asia. In the early
1990s, Winston Lord, then US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs in the Clinton Administration’s first term, said in an internal
memo (that was subsequently leaked) that the United States was seen in the
region as something of a ‘nanny’ and that this was diminishing its standing and
influence.
In addition, events like the Kosovo campaign in 1999, conducted with NATO
over the objections (in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)) of China
and Russia, the 1995–96 clash over Taiwan, and awareness of the grand strategy
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articulated by the Pentagon in 1992–93, would have made China (and a number
of other states) more uncertain that the United States would remain a ‘benign
hegemon’—a state that was ominously powerful without being an ominous
power.
Under the Bush Administration, of course, this relatively subtle, to some
extent unconscious and incremental, evolution in America’s appreciation of the
potential of its ‘unipolar moment’ was cast aside in favour of overt exploitation
and determined defence of this status. Equally, this (neo-conservative) posture
of deliberate dominance and of the forceful and proactive promotion of US
interests and values (especially liberal democracy) has been thoroughly
discredited.
That said, the United States will not soon, or readily, relinquish its position
in East Asia. It has expended a great deal of treasure and not a little blood to
establish and consolidate this position. Moreover, the impulses of power and
prestige, not to mention the economic rewards from a region that is stable,
progressively more democratic, and economically dynamic (including an
increasingly open trading regime), will endure. The United States not only has
the power to project itself into East Asia if it must; many if not most states in
the region can be expected to continue to welcome a prominent US role into the
indefinite future.
There are unmistakable signs that the United States is casting about for a less
taxing mode of leadership and that it will exhibit greater acceptance of the
inevitable but gradual erosion of its status as the unipolar power. Coral Bell of
the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) has speculated that the prevailing
and emerging circumstances may be relatively conducive to global governance
by a concert of powers rather than the balance of powers, implicit in the expectation
that the global system will trend back to multipolarity.23  A concert of powers,
clearly, is a more collegiate arrangement and more accommodating of significant
power differentials among participating states.
The most conspicuous sign from Washington was the speech in September
2005 by the then US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B. Zoellick, advocating
that China think in terms of being a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international
system, to accept responsibility to strengthen the system that has contributed
so much to its success, and to look to working with the United States to ‘shape
the future international system’.24  Other signs include a preparedness to engage
North Korea and Iran on their nuclear ambitions rather than simply demand that
they change their ways.
The United States and China cannot escape a long process of adjustment to
the gradual transformation in their relative strategic weight. The twilight of the
unipolar era will be measured in decades. A great deal of statesmanship and
diplomacy will be called for to prevent the inevitable frictions that will attend
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this process from degenerating and hardening into deeper animosities. If this is
a broadly reasonable prognosis, the earlier these two countries commit to a
process of determined engagement and to building robust channels of
communication and dialogue, the greater the likelihood of success over the longer
term. To the extent that we have a real choice as to whether unipolarity fades
gradually into a multipolar balance of power or a concert, that choice rests
primarily with the United States. Yet there is much that the other major powers
can do to shape US thinking.
At various times over the past 30 years or so, the United States has assigned
carriage of the US-China relationship to very senior people: Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Alexander Haig come to mind, although I have no knowledge of who their
Chinese counterparts may have been. What is striking, however, is that there
has been nothing comparable to the intellectual engagement that Henry Kissinger
and Zhou Enlai managed to build during 1971–75. The danger, perhaps, is that
both countries will remain reluctant for some time to give such ‘determined
engagement’ a real chance. In Washington, which often finds it difficult to think
long-term, China may continue to be viewed as too distant an issue to be placed
at the top of the agenda. Beijing, equally, may view any fundamental engagement
with the United States in the near term as too risky, because it will be seen as
engaging on the modalities of a US-designed world with a United States that is
still comprehensively more powerful than China.
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Chapter 8
The Role of the United States in the
Future Security Architecture for East
Asia—from the Perspective of
China-US Military-to-Military Interaction
Lu Dehong
What remains unchanged transcending all changes is benevolence.
Knowing only what is changing without knowing what remains
unchanged, the humankind will never enjoy peace.
—Xong Shili (1884–1968), Chinese philosopher
The East Asian region is in a grand transitional period. Its economic
importance to world prosperity and its potential contribution to global peace
are increasing. Nevertheless, the region, especially Northeast Asia, is not only
the most militarised region in the world, but is also a region to date lacking any
single regional organisation through which conflicts can be handled.1  Economic
cooperation and military hedging between major powers enhances
simultaneously. The deviation of economy and security is not in the interest of
lasting peace and prosperity and the fundamental interests of all concerned
countries.
Whether it is in accord with the expectation of East Asian countries and their
internal political groups or not, the United States will be the cornerstone of any
meaningful and feasible future security architecture for East Asia. What is not
certain is whether the United States will fulfil this role in a hegemonic security
architecture or a harmonious one. There are sets of factors, internal and external
to the United States, together with interactions between the major powers, which
will shape the role of the United States in the future security architecture of East
Asia. The direction, pace and structure of such an architecture will depend on
the synergistic effects of these factors and interactions.
China is the strategic focus of the US East Asia security policy. In a major
bi-partisan effort to devise a new national security strategy in 2005, the final
report of a Princeton University study pointed out that the rise of China is one
of the most important events in the early twenty-first century, and viewed China
as one example of a major threat and challenge.2 The US security community
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is watchful of China’s military development. The Pentagon’s annual report on
the topic is but the tip of the iceberg. China-US military relations are pivotal for
East Asian security. They will determine the outlook and nature of the future
security architecture in the region. Unfortunately, because of asymmetric US
information and influence, the term and logic for an East Asian security
architecture has been largely defined in an American way, shaping international
perceptions on Chinese military issues and on the China-US military-to-military
relationship.3  It is in the interest of all concerned parties and of future
generations in the Asia-Pacific region to understand the root dynamics of this
relationship and its impact on any future regional security architecture.
Internal factors: The sources of US conduct
As the extension of the US national will, interest, power and strategy, its security
policy and posture toward East Asia and China is inevitably influenced directly
or indirectly by the same internal factors that shape its overall power and policy.
To make sense of the US role in East Asia security, we have to consider these
internal factors. Graham Allison’s framework of rational actor model,
organisational behaviour model, and governmental politics model is an elegant
conceptual guide for an explanation and prediction of US foreign policy.4  In
addition to Graham Allison’s models, the author would argue that a
military–economy synergy model should be considered for a comprehensive
understanding on the root cause of US behaviour.
Rational actor model
The starting point for all rational actors is their political objective. Since the end
of the Cold War, the US strategic community has been seeking a new grand
design or architecture to guide the planning of future forces; that is, a successor
to ‘containment’ of the Soviet Union. In essence, this process seeks to reconfirm
US strategic objectives. The distinctive character of current US strategic objectives
can be summarised as the following three points.
The first aspect is freedom of action. In former US President George W. Bush’s
words, ‘the U.S. needs no permission slip from the United Nations or anybody
else to act’.5 This view of its options, including military objectives, is the most
important difference between the United States and almost all other countries.
Freedom of action is the organising thread of the US national security, defence,
and military strategy, as well as its national space policy. Freedom of action in
reality is the capability to create events, make rules—‘the authority to set the
global agenda’.6
The second aspect is peerless military advantages. Freedom of action is
impossible without ‘military supremacy’. ‘At their core, both liberty and law
must be backed up by force.’7 The United States takes military supremacy as
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the core pillar of its world status, and wants to keep it permanently. Thus,
redefining war on American terms (as Bush described it in February 2001),8  to
dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities,
has become the objective itself.
The final aspect is to prevent any other country from dominating Eurasia.
This point will be discussed later in the chapter.
To help define these objectives, the worst-case scenario is widely used, indeed
over used, in US strategic planning. As the classical military planning method,
worst-case scenario is not without merit. However, if the history of the Cold
War told us anything, it should be that the so-called realistic mindset plus
worst-case scenario led to an unnecessary and dangerous arms race between the
United States and the former Soviet Union. The benefit of worst-case scenario
cannot make up for its inherent cost and risk. Closer observation suggests that
worst-case scenario and threat exaggeration is a means to mobilise internal
resources rather than a rational assessment of the external environment. As the
leading military power today, if the United States can find reasons to use a
worst-case scenario, other countries have far more reason to do so. In fact, in
the author’s opinion, since the end of the Second World War, the United States
has taken the lead in both the use of worst-case scenario, and in creating security
dilemmas.
Governmental politics model and organisational behaviour
model
David R. Obey, former chairman of the US Congress House Appropriations
Committee, has said that the way Congress reviews the Pentagon ‘has certainly
become dysfunctional. Congress, instead of being the watchdog, is the dog that
has to be watched. … The Congress committees entrusted to oversee the Pentagon
budgets act like “a pork machine”’. He termed it ‘outrageous’ for the US Air
Force to assert that
the reason we have to build the F-22 in the first place is because we sold
so many F-16s around the world that we have to keep a qualitative edge
over them. So when we say we will put a limit on your ability to sell the
F-16s abroad, they say, You can’t do that because it costs jobs.9
Obey’s words illustrate the impact of US Congress ‘pork-barrel politics’ on
military policy. Internal political consideration, military service parochialism,
and interest-seeking defence industries combine to form a
Political–Military–Industrial Complex, which plays ‘the art of the possible’ in
respect of the defence budget. Former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger
said that it was not easy to ‘keep the DOD a relatively harmonious whole’. He
went on to say that ‘many possible decisions, which would seem logically sound,
will nonetheless be avoided, simply for the purpose of maintaining peace within
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the family. … The net result is the creation of side payments for almost
everybody’.10  RAND Corporation-based expert Kevin N. Lewis pointed out
that
as a result of political influences, externally generated demands, and
organizational inertia, even if we had an agreed long-range defense
program, the odds of seeing it through to fruition would be poor. This
effect, which I called discipline gap in planning, can have serious
consequences.11
These ‘serious consequences’ were and are not merely within the United
States. In fact, US scholar Gordon R. Mitchell believes that the Cold War arms
race came from an internal American arms race: ‘The Soviet Union was less an
instigator of the arms race and more the straggling follower of a massive unilateral
American military buildup.’12
The net results of ‘rational actor, governmental politics and organisational
behaviour’ are grave and dangerous, which include but are not limited to the
habit of threat exaggeration and huge defence expenditure. The United States
had ‘a tendency throughout the Cold War to exaggerate the threat’; and this
tendency persists into the post Cold War era. On the myth of the ‘missile gap’
in the early 1960s, one US scholar has observed that ‘Soviet force levels were a
factor in the Pentagon’s calculations, but were not the most important by any
manner of means. In other words, U.S. deployment followed its own logic, and
that implied a prior strategy’.13  Meanwhile, Robert H. Johnson has said that
‘the interaction between psychology, politics, and changes in the international
environment are the keys to the explanation of U.S. conceptions of the threat
and of the tendency of those conceptions to overstate the threat’.14  As Columbia
University history professor Carol Gluck pointed out, ‘without some way to
transcend our differences we are doomed to reenact the hostilities toward others
that seem to lodge so deeply in our political unconscious’. The Working Group
on Relative Threat Assessment of the Princeton Project on National Security
noted that, ‘in practice, bureaucratic and commercial incentives have a strong
influence on the threats that are considered and treated seriously by the U.S.’15
The habit and skills of threat exaggeration, internal political process, and armed
services’ inertia, have serious implications for the future security architecture
for East Asia.
Military–Economy synergy model
How to explain the uniqueness of US strategic objectives? In almost all other
countries, military policy and defence experts take the following three points
as basic presumptions: the aim of the military is to defend; the military is the
tool of foreign policy; and military expenditure is a burden to economy. Even
though many US experts share this perspective, US national policy can be
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described as its obverse: the aim of the military is freedom of action; foreign
policy can be the tool of the military; and military expenditure can be the catalyst
for the economy and an important source of core economic competence for the
next generation. Richard R. Nelson, a US expert on national innovation, points
out that defence expenditure is one of the two most important factors in
understanding the US national innovation system.16
According to US scholar Diane Kunz, ‘the US built its Cold War hegemony
on the base created by the World War II production miracle. Washington then
converted the bipolar geopolitical confrontation into fuel that powered its
domestic economy. This synergy proved crucial’.17  A RAND Corporation report
echoes Kunz’s observation by saying that
national power is ultimately a product of the interaction of two
components: a country’s ability to dominate the cycles of economic
innovation at a given point in time and, thereafter, to utilize the fruits
of this domination to produce effective military capabilities that, in turn,
reinforce existing economic advantages while producing a stable political
order.18
The military–economy synergy manifests itself as a chain of cause and effect
relations:
Whoever controls space, therefore, will control the world’s oceans.
Whoever controls the oceans will control the patterns of global commerce.
Whoever controls the patterns of global commerce will be the wealthiest
power in the world. Whoever is the wealthiest power in the world will
be able to control space.19
Put another way, it is a military–market nexus:
(1) Look for resources and ye shall find, but … (2) no stability, no market;
(3) no growth, no stability; (4) no resources, no growth; (5) no
infrastructure, no resources; (6) no money, no infrastructure; (7) no rules,
no money; (8) no security, no rules; (9) no Leviathan, no security; (10)
no (American) will, no Leviathan. Understanding the military–market
link is not just good business, it is good national security strategy.20
All empires enjoyed strong linkages between their military and the other
sources of national power. The link could be military–land, military–commerce,
military–industry, or military–finance. The United States is no exception. The
only difference in its case is that it has compresses all these links into some
230 years rather than thousands of years. Kunz accurately points out that, in
1946, George Kennan explained in his ‘long telegram’ that, for domestic reasons,
‘the Soviet Union needed a permanent enemy’:
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Soviet leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present
position to put forth a dogma which depicts the outside world as evil,
hostile and menacing. … [Kennan] was right—not only about the Soviet
Union but about the United States as well.21
External Factors
China
Since the mid-1990s, US military strategic focus has shifted to East Asia, with
China being one of the main driving factors, if not the only one in the
longer-term.22 The recent Iraq conflict and the global ‘war on terror’ have
disrupted the process to some extent, but have not changed its direction. China
is still the country at the ‘strategic crossroads’, needing to be hedged.23  It is
not a surprise to learn that, ‘China is in the central place in U.S. strategic
planning’ and that ‘for more than a decade the main efforts of Pentagon force
planning have been preparing to fight with the big one (China)’.24  In view of
the tension over the Taiwan Strait and the ‘uncertainty of future China choices’,
China will be the most significant factor in US military strategy. The Pentagon
takes a China-US military conflict as the standard scenario on which to focus its
force planning, military and war gaming exercises, and its transformation related
activities.25
How much is rational or irrational in the above American judgements and
measures towards China is discussed below. At this point, it is helpful to know
the US side of the story. Thomas Barnett pointed out that the
China threat has a close relation with the interest of the U.S. military
services. After the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the U.S. military
services do not want to lose their status in American national security.
They use the China threat as a convenient justification for budget
requirements.26
US arms sales to Taiwan, which have a fatal influence on China-US
military-to-military relations, can also be explained partly by the US internal
political behaviour model.27
US alliances
Military alliances are the pillars of America’s military posture in East Asia. The
adjustment and enhancement of bilateral military alliances, as well as building
networks of alliances and various security partners, constitute the core of US
security policy toward this region. Nonetheless, Aaron Friedberg, then deputy
national security adviser of former US Vice President Dick Cheney, pointed out
that
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alliances are not, or should not be, ends in themselves; they are means
for the attainment of larger strategic objectives. The collapse of the Soviet
Union leaves China as the only country that could conceivably be capable,
over the next several decades, of establishing itself as the preponderant
power in Asia. It follows that the fundamental aim of American strategy
in Asia must be not merely to promote stability, but rather to prevent
Chinese hegemony.28
In fact, to prevent any other country from dominating Eurasia is a lasting US
strategic objective. It is the precondition for America’s ability to preserve its
global dominance and freedom of action. This view of the United States as the
‘supreme power’ was outlined in the draft Defense Planning Guidance, drawn up
in 1992 under the supervision of the then US Undersecretary for Defense Policy
Paul Wolfowitz:
Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival. This is
the dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy
and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from
dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control,
be sufficient to generate global power. There are three additional aspects
to this objective. First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to
establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing
potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue
an aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the
non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the
advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our
leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic
order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.29
For this strategic objective, it is necessary for the United States to sustain
measured tension within Eurasia. Without tension, the US military presence and
the quality of military alliances will be difficult to maintain. French scholar Tod
Foley pointed out that ‘Europeans do not understand why the US refuses to
resolve the Israel-Palestinian issue, although it can make a difference. They even
wonder if the Americans want to keep this issue as a permanent hot point’.
According to Foley, ‘America is willing to create an atmosphere of tension, some
kind of limited but dangerous war state’.30 The fundamental principle of US
grand strategy over the past century has been to manipulate the Eurasian balance
of power to prevent the emergence of any hegemonic powers that are capable
of harnessing Eurasia’s vast resources and challenging US naval supremacy. The
implementation of this strategy turned on the twin principles of economy of
force and indirect action. Economy of force was realised by using allies to bear
the strategic burden and the brunt of combat. Indirect action involved never
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attacking an enemy frontally. Weakening an opponent through internal or
external opposition, and relying on economic power to produce the
pre-conditions of victory, was preferred to any premature test of military
strength.31
As to multilateral security mechanisms, the United States assigns them to a
supplement role. Former US President Bill Clinton put forward that ‘the ARF
[ASEAN Regional Forum] and other multilateral security initiatives are a way
to supplement our alliances and forward military presence, not supplant them’.32
It seems quite logical that the Bush Administration should do its best to
marginalise the role of the United Nations—the most important global multilateral
security mechanism.
China-US military-to-military interactions
China-US military-to-military relations are the weakest link in the overall bilateral
relationship. We know from past experience that whenever disturbance or crisis
has occurred in China-US relations, military-to-military relations have suffered
first; and that these have been the last to be restored—well after the resumption
of bilateral relations. This pattern is not in the interests of China, the United
States, or the Asia-Pacific region.
At present, both countries have the intention to improve bilateral military
relations. Nonetheless, before any durable progress can be made, we need to
think more deeply about the essence of the problem. From the discussion above,
we know that China is at the heart of US strategic thinking about East Asia. In
the near-term, the US military has detailed operational plans to fight China
during the course of any crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In the longer-term, the US
military is taking various measures to hedge future uncertainties regarding
China. Worse still, the near-term and longer-term considerations are mutually
enforcing, which could potentially lead China-US military-to-military interactions
into a kind of vicious spiral. Against this background, the best both countries
could achieve together would be to prevent the worst outcomes, rather than to
think what they could do together for better regional and global security.
US military policy toward Taiwan serves as a master-switch that decisively
influences the direction, quality and process of China-US military interaction.
China-US military relations are in inverse proportion to US-Taiwan military
relations—the closer the US-Taiwan ties; the farther away the China-US military
relationship. Against such a background, minor problems in China-US military
relations raise significant issues which, in turn, can become big problems. And
big problems can become insurmountable ones. Issues of transparency, code of
conduct and reciprocity will continue to block the way if both sides fail to
establish stronger mutual trust about their strategic goals. Everyone knows that
preventing Taiwan from making reckless moves is the strategic bottom line for
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China—a line that has to be defended at any price, against any enemy. The
Chinese military has to prepare itself for this most difficult and complex situation.
This is the overwhelming mission for the Chinese military. It is therefore
unrealistic to expect a substantive increase of transparency about China’s core
military capabilities.
Some Americans think that China will handle its relations with other Asian
countries and the United States in the way China treats Taiwan. This is wrong.
There is a fundamental difference between the two. The nature of the Taiwan
issue is domestic and the rest are external. Thus, US-Taiwan military relations
should maintain a respectful distance from China’s bottom line. Richard Haass
is right in noting that ‘the governments of the world’s principal powers will
cooperate with the U.S. only if there is a context in which their fundamental
national interests are seen by their own publics to be protected’.33
As to America’s longer-term concerns, we know uncertainties exist since the
present generation cannot and should not make decisions for future generations.
However, how should we prepare ourselves for such future uncertainties and
what are we going to leave to succeeding generations? Are we leaving them
operational concepts and weapons platforms to fight wars or the habits and a
tradition of mutual trust and cooperation? Questions like this should be discussed
among all the parties. Unfortunately, the Taiwan issue is continually blocking
the way.
Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry and Assistant Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter have observed that China cannot be expected to fight
with bows and arrows.34  In other words, China’s military capabilities will
certainly develop along with its growing economy. Should Chinese military
development follow certain rules? What strategic understanding should be
reached with Asia-Pacific countries in general and the United States in particular?
What are rules of the road to maintain regional and global security? What
constitutes the legitimate use of force? We can and should discuss these issues.
After all, China does not have any intention to challenge other countries,
especially the United States, militarily. However, external factors relating to
Taiwan have stopped us from engaging in substantial discussion. The conclusion
is that the Taiwan question effectively pollutes the possibility of developing a
meaningful and workable security architecture for East Asia.
The defensive nature of China’s defence policy
There are many articles and books discussing, guessing or interpreting China’s
‘grand strategy’; and it is quite strange that the majority of these works do not
pay attention to or even mention the simple facts. In my analysis, the six
commonsense facts about China defence policy are as follows.
93
The Role of the United States
First, China takes it as national policy to oppose military alliances. It is
commonsense that any country, even one as powerful militarily as the United
States, that might want to launch strategic offensive operations towards another
country, must have military alliances. This national policy of China points clearly
to the fact that China has no intention of launching strategic offensive operations
against other countries. When China says it is a ‘peace-loving country’, it is
definitely not empty rhetoric.
Second, China takes it as national policy to keep the central role of the United
Nations in maintaining international peace and security. This means that it is
impossible for China to behave unilaterally on international security issues.
Third, China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear
weapons, no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or
nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China is the only nuclear weapon state
that has such a policy.
Fourth, China has called for an international pact to prohibit the weaponisation
of outer space. If the United States cares about the ‘future uncertainties’ of
China’s military development, it can address these in the domain of outer space
by joining China in negotiating such a pact. The US national space policy makes
it clear that it fully understands, perhaps better than any other country, how
important outer space is for future military operations.
Fifth, China honours its commitment to international arms control and
non-proliferation.35
Sixth, on the principles of the use of force, China is fully committed to the
UN Charter, which means that, beyond matters of self-defence, China will not
use force internationally unless authorised by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). Regarding self-defence, China will not use force unless facing utmost
provocation, when it is the last resort, and when an opposing country fires the
first shot.
Does China have ‘a grand strategy’? The answer is definitely ‘no’, if one has
a true understanding of China’s culture. What do the Chinese people want? For
thousands of years, what they have wanted is encapsulated in the saying ‘Good
weather for the crops, the country prospers and the people are at peace’ (Feng
Tiao yu shun, Guo Tai Min An).36  No more, no less. This has been the dream of
the Chinese historically. It is the dream of today’s Chinese, and it will be the
dream of future Chinese. The Chinese are defined by China’s culture. The key
to the continuation of Chinese civilisation is exactly this culture. The Chinese
do not aspire to be number one, but they do long for a harmonious domestic
and international society. This was well understood by Arnold Toynbee.37 To
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explain and predict China’s ‘strategy’ and future behaviour in US terms and in
the logic of so-called ‘realism’ is almost meaningless.
Conclusion: to start from commonsense
Chinese philosopher Xong Shili (1884–1968) said that ‘what remains unchanged
transcending all changes is benevolence. Knowing only what is changing without
knowing what remains unchanged, the humankind will never enjoy peace’.38
Albert Einstein said that ‘everything has changed except our manner of thinking’.
Both Xong Shili and Einstein are right. This has been, is and will be one of the
most important tenets of commonsense. The best way, and perhaps the only
viable way, to discuss the future security architecture for East Asia is to start
from commonsense.
A new world of closer and closer global interdependence is coming. With
increasing interdependence, the common interests of major countries are
enlarging and deepening. This is the objective and the true reality. The sources
of difference or conflict are either subordinate or subjective, and in most cases
they are merely distorted perceptions or opinions. In order to bridge the gap
between distorted perceptions and true reality, we need new definitions and
concepts regarding power and international relationships. If factors such as
global warming, and the outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
and the H5N1 and H1N1 influenzas tell us something or anything, it is that as
long as we breathe the same air, we have to share the same destiny. Nothing is
more important than this common destiny. The potential supply of global and
regional security exceeds our collective security requirements, thanks to the
asymmetry between the military expenditure of the only superpowers and of
major powers, and humanitarian assistance. The gap between global security
requirements and the capacity to supply this security is a matter of will rather
than of capacity—a matter of how to use force rather than of no use of force.
Nonetheless, the gap between supply and requirement is growing. People in
Africa, who have suffered so much for so long, are still suffering. Africans are
forgotten, even though the continent’s resources are not. Against this backdrop,
pretending to be ‘tough’ to other major powers under the guise of so called
‘realism’ is itself unreal, and so short-sighted. Realism is an anachronism in a
global era.
William Fulbright, former Chairman of the US Congress foreign relations
committee, said that we should see the world as others see it:
Today we need a leadership that recognizes that the fundamental
challenge in this nuclear hi-tech era is one of psychology and education
in the field of human relations. It is not the kind of problem that is likely
to be resolved by expertise—even the sophisticated expertise of our
most gifted military thinkers, who delight in exotic weapons systems
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and strategic doctrines that threaten the solvency of the richest nations
as well as their physical survival. The attributes upon which we must
draw are the human attributes of compassion and common sense, of
intellect and creative imagination, and of empathy and understanding
between cultures.39
It will be in everyone’s interest to jointly explore a shared vision based on
common interests. Mutual strategic confidence will flow from taking every
opportunity to maximise the common interest. It will also be in everyone’s
interest to explore positive scenarios to balance the established worst-case
scenario. We should and must be extremely cautious in applying the concepts
of worst-case scenario and hedging in military planning. These strategic planning
tools may be useful, but over-use of them may lead to unpalatable consequences.
Judging from the lessons of the US-Soviet arms race, the United States and the
Soviet Union needlessly wasted resources on a tremendous scale.
What is worse, the risks involved were much higher than the potential
benefits that were realistically on offer. Only by guiding military policies on the
base of common interests, and by exercising strong discipline to suppress the
dominance of worse-case scenarios, will we be able to avoid strategic
confrontation.
It is encouraging that some Americans have similar thinking. Ashton Carter
and William Perry put forward the term ‘responsible hedging’. They
point out that since Chinese military leaders cannot predict the future,
they will prepare for the worst even as they hope for the best. Hedging
is contagious. During the Cold War, hedging and worst-case-scenario
assumptions led to a dangerous and expensive arms race.40
The final report of the Princeton Project on National Security pointed out
that any new national security strategy ‘should be interest-based rather than
threat-based, and grounded in hope rather than in fear’.41  Richard Haass is
right in saying that ‘most global issues require global responses’. No single
country, no matter how powerful, can contend successfully on its own with
transnational challenges. An effective multilateralism is based on keeping a
respectful distance from the core interest of other major powers:
The goal of U.S. foreign policy should not simply be to maintain a world
defined by U.S. military superiority. … To have a chance of succeeding,
the U.S. will need to view other major powers less as rivals and more as
partners. The U.S. will have to accept some constraints on its freedom
of action.
All of which brings us to the fundamental argument about opportunity:
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The question is what Americans and others make of this moment. Time,
resources, and potential have already been squandered. A different
foreign policy, one based on promoting the world’s integration while
the opportunity to do so still exists, is urgently necessary.42
China’s President, Hu Jintao, instructed China’s military to regard making a
major contribution to the maintenance of global peace and the promotion of
common development as one of its historic missions. This is China’s historic offer
to the world and should not be refused. We Chinese are grateful to Australians
when something bad happens to overseas Chinese in the South Pacific region;
it has been Australia that has taken the lead and made a vital difference. We
understand that China has its share of responsibility for regional and international
affairs, and a duty to behave similarly. This is the commonsense approach for
China-Australia security relations. We can see no reason why China and Australia
cannot be closer security partners. If partnerships among all the major powers
in Asia-Pacific region can be forged in this spirit, a future security architecture
based on common interests and a shared vision will begin to take shape. In any
case, what matters is what is remembered and emulated, not what is hated and
resisted.43 What matters is not to be more powerful or to be number one. What
matters is what you do with your potential—create or destroy. What matters is
to give rather than to take. Benevolence is humanity, which truly decides the
greatness of any nation.
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Chapter 9
Potential Strategic Risks in China-US
Relations
Yuan Peng
There is no denying the fact that the current China-US relationship is enjoying
the best of times: reciprocal interests are deeply interwoven, a variety of
mechanisms have been set up in succession and a fine trend of constructive
cooperation is in progress. However, a cool-headed analysis reveals that, at
present, the stability in the China-US relationship is tactical rather than strategic.
The potential strategic risks should never be discounted considering the great
differences between the social systems and ideologies of the two nations, potential
clashes between the rising power and the status quo hegemon, growing collisions
between geopolitics and geo-economics, and the diametrically opposed stance
on the Taiwan issue which remains unsettled. Taking into consideration all these
factors, this chapter intends to make a brief evaluation of those risks that will
affect the strategic stability of China-US relations into the future.
From a holistic perspective, the most fundamental risk in China-US relations
consists in the overall collision of China’s rapid rise and all-round integration
into the international system with the global interests of the United States. A
primary feature of the China-US relationship is that it is comprehensive, strategic
and global. This feature determines that it is unlikely that the two nations will
wage war against each other given the compelling interests that each has at
stake. Nevertheless, since the relationship between the two nations involves
conflict of interest, the odds are extremely high for them to generate frictions
on all counts. China will achieve a sustainable momentum in its development
during the next decade, will become a member of the international community
in a more profound way and play its due role in the construction of the
international system. As a result, conflicts are bound to arise between China and
the United States as the leader of the existing system. If handled inappropriately
or not in time, these conflicts are prone to be turned into risks. Specifically
speaking, there are altogether seven potential risks.
1. From a geopolitical point of view, the frictions between China and the United
States during the next decade will mainly unfold in the Asia-Pacific region. The
influence that both nations exert in the Asia-Pacific region must undergo a
process of continuous checks and balances, in which risks may occur.
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China is an acknowledged Asia-Pacific nation, but the United States has also
always claimed itself to be an Asia-Pacific nation. There is an intense rivalry in
geopolitics between the two nations. For a fairly long period after the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, China remained a weak and destitute power.
Japan or the United States played a leading role in the order of the Asia-Pacific
region and, for a time, they alternated in that role. Viewed from objective
realities, competitiveness between China and the United States never took shape.
However, the rapid rising of China is gradually changing this pattern, for China’s
initial rise proceeded in the Asia-Pacific region—the central arena of China’s
diplomacy. Although China had no intention of expanding its influence across
the globe, it could not help but extend the rational development of economy
and trade, and promote benefits from its diplomatic relations. Recently, China
has made substantial headway in enhancing ties with member countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Middle Asia, Northeast Asia
and even South Asia, which is indicative of an irresistible natural and historical
trend for China to infiltrate its power into the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast,
the United States got entangled in counter-terrorism and Middle East issues.
Meanwhile, the misuse of strategy was undermining the dominant power of the
United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In Northeast Asia, the growing gravity
of the North Korean nuclear issue found the United States uncertain as to how
to proceed, and the stronger dissonant tendency of South Korea was a hard nut
for the United States to crack. On the surface, Japan showed a friendly gesture
of cooperation, but virtually intended to take advantage of the US assistance to
attain its own goal. The United States was fully aware of the real intention of
Japan but could do nothing about it. Simultaneously, economic integration in
the Northeast Asia region seemed to be in full swing without any hindrance
from the political divergences. The United States had already sensed the great
changes taking place in the historical pattern of the Northeast Asia region.
Moreover, it witnessed the rapid rising of a mightier and influential China in
the fact that China took the lead in the Six-Party Talks and facilitated its trade
and economic cooperation with Japan and South Korea by considerable strides.
In Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines shared a totally different goal
from their allied power—the United States—and their relationship with China
seemed to gain an upper hand over that with the United States. The ASEAN
influence represented by Islamic countries (such as Malaysia) was germinating
a strong public sentiment against the United States. After the 1997–98 Asian
financial crisis, ASEAN member countries were inclined to rely more on the
rising power of China than on the blueprint of free trade advocated by the United
States to revitalise their economies. A brand-new Southeast Asia was emerging
on the horizon. What worried the United States more was that the ‘China threat’
once prevalent in the ASEAN countries was being substituted by the ‘China
opportunity’.
102
The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific
Obviously, the United States could not be reconciled with the loss of its
dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, and spared no effort to consolidate, buttress
and reinforce its controlling power over the region. If China wanted to rise in a
smooth and steady way, it would be bound to further expand its influence in
the Asia-Pacific region. How can this situation of manifest strategic competition
be defused? For the time being, no effective solutions have emerged. On the
contrary, misjudgement in strategic moves by both nations has been on the
increase. The United States believes that China is now pursuing an Asian version
of the ‘Monroe doctrine’, which is aimed at constructing a ‘China in, America
out’ multilateral network to restore China as the Asian hegemon. On the part of
China, the United States is seen as overtly or covertly building up a ‘strategic
ring of encirclement’ in the hope of blocking China’s rise. This strategic
misjudgement is likely to touch off some sensitive issues and lead to antagonism
between the two nations. Cases in point include the East China Sea issue between
China and Japan, the China-US confrontation on the North Korean nuclear issue,
and the fierce contest over multilateral mechanisms in East Asia. For China, the
most testing policy challenge is how to continuously elevate its influence in the
Asia-Pacific region while meticulously avoiding a head-on collision with the
United States.
2. As regards resources and energy, a conflict is escalating between the increasing
resources and energy demand of China and the control of the United States over
the energy market. The risk in the energy conflict has become an inevitable
reality.
For two decades since China’s opening-up to the outside world, it has
succeeded in materialising the rapid development of a national economy mainly
dependent on its own resources and energy. Therefore, before entering into the
twenty-first century, the conflict in resources and energy between China and
the United States was not placed on the agenda. However, along with the
acceleration of China’s rise and the growing demand on resources and energy,
as well as the energy diplomacy actively promoted by China in recent years with
Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, the United States launched a sudden
propaganda campaign over the so-called ‘energy threat of China’ and made the
energy issue one of the primary concerns in the China-US strategic dialogues.
As far as long-term development in China is concerned, the energy issue is bound
to be a key factor affecting the China-US relationship over the longer term. In
concrete terms, this risk comprises the following four aspects.
First, as the top two energy-consuming nations, China and the United States
are on strategically competitive terms with each other. In order to strive for the
global market, companies from both nations are undergoing keen competition
which is liable to evoke potential friction. At the same time, the United States
shows great anxiety over the increase of the international oil price ensuing from
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China’s soaring demand on energy resources. As was projected by several
research institutions and financial service firms such as Morgan Stanley & Co.,
in 2020 China will have surpassed the United States and become the foremost
energy consuming nation. In addition, according to the prediction of the
International Energy Agency, China’s petroleum imports will account for 75 per
cent of the world’s total demand for oil in 2020. Nowadays, ‘energy threat of
China’ has turned out to be the most sonorous slogan in the West.
Second, there has been an upsurge of trade protectionism inside the United
States, which has led to an inimical attitude toward China-US energy cooperation.
Concerning the failure of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)’s
acquisition of UNOCAL, this move indicates that risks do exist for China-US
relations: the acquisition of strategic resources could trigger tension in the
political relationship.
Third, there is a clash in the energy diplomacy between China and the United
States. As is stated in the book China: the Balance Sheet—What the World Needs
to Know About the Emerging Superpower:
Beijing is endeavoring to develop diplomatic relations with almost all
countries who can export resources to China so as to help China ensure
a smooth and sound functioning of her economic machines. This, more
often than not, gives rise to the frequent friction between China and the
United States in their diplomatic field, for China has established a close
relationship with some unpopular regimes.1
Sudan’s Darfur crisis has become one of the leading issues affecting China-US
strategic relations. While this appears to be a collision of diplomatic principles
between the two nations, it actually reflects the fact that China, in the context
of its increasing demand for energy resources, is giving strategic priority to
developing energy cooperation with countries such as Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar,
and Nigeria, many of which have antagonistic relations with the United States.
On the other hand, the United States deems that the energy diplomacy adopted
by China will change the latter’s relationship with Russia, Middle Asia and Japan
in some measure, thus calling forth new variables in the international political
order.
Fourth, risks can be found in the safety of energy pathways. Since 90 per
cent of China’s imported petroleum is transported via offshore oil tankers, China
will develop its naval and marine policies accordingly. According to analysts
from the United States, China will take greater initiatives in protecting its own
energy supply, including the development of its ‘blue-water’ naval power and
the construction of overland pipelines spanning South Asia, Southeast Asia,
Middle Asia, and Northeast Asia. All these measures taken by the Chinese
Government are certain to impact on the strategic interests of the United States.
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In the absence of necessary strategic communication and cooperation between
the two nations, further suspicion and misunderstanding are prone to cause
risks.
3. From the perspective of diplomacy, the risk in China-US relations is mainly
focused on how China will treat those countries that the United States, under
the recent Bush Administration, characterised as so-called ‘rogue states’. Such
nations included North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Pakistan, Sudan, Myanmar,
Nepal, Nigeria, Syria and Cuba. Now that the basic strategy adopted by the
United States towards China has already steered from exaggerating the so-called
‘China threat’ to exhorting ‘China’s responsibility’, how China deals with ‘the
most irresponsible’ states or governments in the world will be regarded as the
touchstone to test whether China is willing to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ as
the United States has proposed. This poses a dual challenge or risk for China’s
diplomacy.
The first challenge or risk lies in forcing China to ‘choose one side on which
to stand’. The abovementioned nations, defined as ‘rogue states’ by the United
States, have always been treated as normal developing countries or even as
‘quasi-allies’ in China’s diplomatic framework. Over a long time, based on factors
such as ideology, historical tradition, social system and political interests, China
has been fostering friendly cooperation with them, and meanwhile seeking to
also develop trade and strategic relations with the United States. Nevertheless,
with China’s gradual integration with the Western world and the deepening of
the constructive and cooperative aspects of the China-US relationship, China’s
strategy of ‘considering both sides’ has outlived its usefulness and faces weightier
pressure, for the United States has already sent out an explicit signal for China
to ‘choose one side’. However, if China turns a cold shoulder to these countries
and facilitates China-US relations unreservedly, it will be caught up in a situation
of ‘easy to abandon, hard to resume’ and experience deteriorating relations with
those countries. If China sticks to its usual practice—developing a parallel
relationship with both the United States and those countries—China would
surely be subjected to powerful pressure from the interior politics of the United
States, thereby affecting the next move in the development of China-US relations.
This is therefore a dilemma for China’s diplomacy.
The second challenge or risk is in urging China to forsake the principle of
‘non-interference in others’ internal affairs’. The pressure from the United States
is not only confined to asking China to ‘choose one side’, but is also aimed at
urging China to make due intervention in the internal affairs of those nations.
As wished by the United States, the ‘peaceful collapse’ of Kim Jong-il’s regime
might materialise through China-US cooperation; while the Sudanese Government
could be overturned and the Burmese regime could be reformed with an active
role played by the Chinese Government. If China turns a deaf ear to these
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well-advised proposals, it will continue to encounter political pressures from
the United States and put its diplomacy at a disadvantage. If China did act, the
‘non-interference’ principle in its diplomatic relations would be shaken and
toppled. In the United States, the view is already widely held that China’s attitude
toward the North Korean nuclear issue can be considered as the embodiment of
‘interference in the internal affairs of other nations’.
The risks and dilemma mentioned above have obliged China’s foreign policy
community to assess carefully whether China should review its diplomatic
concepts or determine that retaining the primacy of ‘non-interference’ continues
to serve China’s interests.
4. From the aspect of society system and ideology, there is a risk of a ‘China
model’ shock on the ‘America model’. As noted American strategist Joseph
S. Nye, Jr. pointed out in ‘The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, ‘although China is
far from America’s equal in soft power, it would be foolish to ignore the gains
it is making’.2  Nye’s view represents a widespread concern in America that the
‘China model’ might in fact become competitive with the American one. In the
United States, the ‘China model’ is labelled as ‘totalitarianism + market economy
+ soft diplomacy’. The United States has two concerns. First, the ‘China model’
directly ‘shocks’ the American model. After the Cold War, the United States
spoke of ‘the end of history’, and considered the American liberal democracy
model as having triumphed over its main rival. But, in recent years, it has
gradually realised that the specific Chinese developing model not only has strong
vitality in China, but also holds a special attraction for a number of states further
afield. Especially at a time when the United States is in a broader strategic
predicament, the sudden rise of the China model is viewed as something of a
threat. Second, it indirectly ‘shocks’ the America model. It does so by providing
an ‘alternative choice’ to those countries at a strategic crossroads, thereby causing
some to incline to the China model, and to objectively block the US grand strategy
of propelling freedom and democracy. Thus, as can be seen, the ‘debate on the
model’ is fundamentally important to the United States. To counteract the shock
of the China model, the United States is certain to increase the global infiltration
of its soft power, or to choose to decry the expansion of Chinese culture so as
to elevate the issue to the level of the global expansion of Chinese ideology and
even of China’s strategic design, leading to new perceptions of a ‘China threat’
worldwide. Once this occurs, it will become more difficult for China to maintain
and extend its period of strategic opportunities.
5. From the aspect of domestic stability, China is faced with two risks: the
interference and even fluctuation of both its economic base and its social base.
At present, it seems that the risk of political confrontation and military conflict
taking place between China and the United States is relatively low, because of
a deep blending of China and the United States. The United States, however,
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although changing its strategies and areas of emphasis, has never given up on
transforming, guiding and modelling China; that is, from overturning China’s
political base to loosening China’s social base, and from direct military restraint
to undermining China’s economic base.
On the one hand, the United States enhances its influence over China’s social
fabric via concealed but legal channels such as non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and religious infiltration. A central idea of the so-called ‘Transformational
Diplomacy’ that former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice intimated in early
2006 was for US embassy staffs and NGO members to go deep inside the societies
of targeted countries, not least, China. Since China is in a period of social
transformation, there is an intricate array of social tensions that offer
opportunities for US infiltration. The United States has seized these opportunities
and is on its way toward a new ‘Peaceful Transformation’ in a planned and
systematic way. More and more think-tank scholars are putting their emphasis
on social fields such as local elections, community events, socially vulnerable
groups, environment destruction, health issues (e.g., Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome), immigration, the income gap, and state enterprise
reformation. Their research paves the way for the development of government
policy. Many NGO members with backgrounds in government have also shifted
their working emphasis to these fields; they ‘strive for people’s support with
the Communist Party’ and even visit the poor. Their activities have a very strong
influence among the Chinese at the grass-roots level. Meanwhile, religious groups
carry out infiltration of all forms, taking advantage of underground churches
and of any loosening up in China’s religious policy. The abovementioned methods
are not easy for the Chinese Government to deal with, since the United States
Government is not directly involved and because such groups and organisations
reach into every corner of Chinese society in the name of charity or research. If
China controls it too strictly, the government could be viewed as blocking NGO
activity; but if it lets such organisations do as they like, it could all too easily
cause ‘boiled frog syndrome’. And once such NGOs have enough effect at the
grass-roots level, they might potentially endanger China’s social superstructure.
On the other hand, the United States enhances its strength through
interference in China’s economic base. A prominent American economic target
has been the state enterprise, which is the lifeline and foundation of China’s
economic development. For example, in the author’s opinion, the 2006 acquisition
of Xugong Group by the Carlyle Group indicated that the United States was
ready to take a significant shareholding in China’s large state enterprises. From
the US standpoint, while it has coped reasonably well with the challenges
(especially intellectual property protection and an undervalued Yuan) from
China’s small and medium-sized enterprises, it does not seem to have found an
effective way to cope with the state enterprises. The United States is going to
make full use of two methods in the future. The first is to encourage market
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opening and further economic reform, followed by a gradual encroachment on
China’s large-sized state enterprises. The second method is via the financial
insurance industry, which is part of the so-called tertiary industry sector. Since
the reform and opening-up, the United States has focused on China’s economy
in three consecutive waves. The first wave came before China’s entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Its key objective was to exert pressure on
China’s primary industry (essentially its agricultural products)—a goal that the
United States considers it by and large achieved. The second wave came after
China’s entry into the WTO, when the focus shifted to China’s industry
(especially textile and manufacturing), and the instruments included criticising
China’s Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate, its mercantilist export-oriented economic
model, its failure to protect workers’ rights and interests and so on. At present,
the United States considers that it has made useful progress on this front. In the
future, it will concentrate on China’s tertiary industry, especially the financial
insurance industry, which is a highly specialised industry but one that touches
the entire economy. More importantly, it is America’s strength in international
competition and its time-tested ‘unique dagger’ which interferes so effectively
with the economic lifeline of developing countries. The United States Government
chose its then Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, to take the lead in
opening the China-US strategic economic dialogue, and placed the opening-up
of the financial sector at centre stage in this dialogue. It would be prudent for
China to be thoughtful and vigilant about US intentions.
In sum, the United States has focused on China’s two weak points (its social
base and its economic base) and has engaged in activities that, while seemingly
peaceful, actually have strategic intent. It is one of the most difficult risks for
China to deal with in the future.
6. From the aspect of crisis management, the Taiwan issue is still the highest
risk. Although the Taiwan issue is temporally in a controllable state, China-US
cooperation on avoiding a sprint to independence is limited. The structural
conflicts between China and the United States still reside in some fundamental
problems on this front. First, the basis of America’s ‘one China’ policy is not
reliable. Not only is the connotation different from the ‘one China principle’
that China sticks to, voices in both the US Congress and in conservative
think-tanks have often clamoured in recent times for the abandonment of the
‘one China’ position. If the Taiwan issue changes significantly, the United States
will probably make an issue of the ‘one China principle’ and demand more
concessions from China for its retention. Second, the ‘Dual Containment Policy’
policy of the United States, which keeps Taiwan from risking ‘instant
independence’ and restrains the Mainland from non-peaceful ways to resolve
the issue, has not changed. Thus, the United States can carry on its
counter-balancing policy, manipulating the ups and downs of the Taiwan issue.
If China ever endeavoured to resolve the Taiwan issue in its own way, it would
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inevitably lead to serious confrontation and conflict with the United States.
Third, the US policy on arms sales to Taiwan is becoming more dangerous. It
seems to the author that the United States has shown scant regard for the ‘8.17
Communiqué’, and US-Taiwan military transactions have become more open,
with the two sides even bargaining transparently in the presence of the Mainland.
If this trend is not curbed in time, the danger is obvious. Fourth, the United
States has not changed its strategy that positions Taiwan as a factor to contain
or influence the future direction of China. From the standpoint of containment,
US-Taiwan military cooperation has reached the equivalent of a ‘non-NATO
ally’—a relatively select category—and has transitioned from hardware to
software. In the arena of theatre missile defence, the basic US strategy is to treat
its regional partners as part of a trinity: the United States, as a command centre;
Japan, as a launching platform, and Taiwan as an intelligence-gathering outpost.
The US purpose is to deny the Mainland any option to use force against Taiwan
and to blunt Beijing’s capacity to bring China’s comprehensive national strength
to bear, thus preserving the status of the Taiwan Strait as one of ‘neither war
nor peace’, of ‘neither unification nor independence’. In broader terms, the
United States hopes Taiwan can play a role as a model of democracy, and
ultimately lead the Mainland towards democratisation.
The next two years constitute a high-risk period for the Taiwan issue. First,
there has been a notable increase in US arms sales to Taiwan. China’s reaction
to any such development will directly shape the direction of the current
China–US–Taiwan interaction. Second, the United States and Taiwan entered
their election countdowns in 2007, with changes in leadership by 2009.3 Taiwan
is likely to go on making an issue of reunification and independence. The
possibility of Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian exploiting the Mainland’s
pre-occupation with hosting the 2008 Summer Olympic Games and openly taking
risks for constitutional amendment could be ruled out.
7. From the aspect of military conflict, the West Pacific region and outer space
are potential high-risk areas for China-US military conflict. The risks should not
be ignored. Although China-US political ties gradually stabilised in 2007, the
lack of mutual trust in the military sphere is still evident and, in fact, may have
worsened in some respects. The response by the US Congress and the media to
China’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test was a case in point. The hearings of the
US–China Economic and Security Review Commission of Congress held on
1 February 2007, and commentary in the Washington Post and other mainstream
media supposedly decrying those ‘taken in’ by the notion of China’s peaceful
rise, was another.
In fact, China-US military relations, despite a great degree of recovery, have
to cope with very different perspectives and even contradictory objectives. In
the eyes of the United States, China’s military modernisation should be
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transparent and also limited. The desired limits preclude expansion onto the
high seas and into outer space. The United States regards sea power and air
power as the lifeline of its military strategy and any Chinese militarisation at sea
(especially into the West Pacific) or in space is taboo in US eyes. Contradictions
and even conflicts will be unavoidable in these circumstances. Therefore,
preventing confrontations between the armed forces in the West Pacific region
and in space constitutes a serious problem for China-US relations that will have
to be addressed in the near future.
In recent years, the United States has made it clear that it regards the West
Pacific region as its exclusive domain, and an arena in which China’s military
forces should not meddle. In 2006, China’s military authorities were invited to
observe the largest joint military exercises held in the region since the Vietnam
War. This invitation appeared to be intended as a warning. The United States
has repeatedly hinted that it does not care about China’s development of its
ground forces, but is resolutely opposed to the expansion of China’s naval power.
Therefore, ‘punitive actions’ directed at China’s military power, and the
generation of small-scale crises, led by the United States alone (or with Japan,
in the Western Pacific region, such as the ‘aircraft collision incident’ off Hainan
on 1 April 2001), cannot be ruled out.
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Chapter 10
Changes in China-Japan Relations and
East Asian Security
Zhang Tuosheng
China-Japan relations have been turbulent for over a decade and endured a
sustained deterioration in the political and security fields, especially from 2001
to 2006. The bilateral relationship finally made a major turn towards a new stage
of development, marked by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ice-breaking
visit to China and Premier Wen Jiabao’s ice-melting journey to Japan. Changes
and developments in China-Japan relations will exert a profound and far-reaching
influence over East Asian security.
China-Japan relations have actually witnessed remarkable growth since their
normalisation in 1972. However, due to deep changes in the international
situation and within both countries, China-Japan relations entered a prolonged
period of turbulence in the mid-1990s.1  During that period, frictions increased
and intensified continuously. With complete suspension of high-level contact
at the end of 2005, bilateral relations fell to rock bottom. Serious deterioration
of China-Japan relations not only directly undermined the strategic interests of
both countries, but also caused serious international concern.
With efforts from both sides, Abe visited China in October 2006. The two
sides reached important common understandings, including (1) working together
to overcome political barriers and comprehensively promoting bilateral relations;
(2) resuming exchanges and dialogue between leaders; (3) correctly appraising
the other’s path to development; (4) accelerating consultation on the joint
development of disputed territories in the East China Sea; and (5) constructing
a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests. The visit
served to break the political stalemate between the two countries, thus opening
the gate to further improvement and development of bilateral relations.
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007, the first visit by a Chinese
premier in seven years. The two sides agreed further on properly handling major
differences and reached a consensus on the basic spirit and content of a mutually
beneficial strategic relationship as well as on some measures to begin to develop
this new relationship. Premier Wen’s speech at the Japanese Diet was widely
welcomed. The visit also opened the 35th anniversary celebration of normalisation
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of relations and instituted the China-Japan Culture and Sports Exchange Year.
The successful visit by Premier Wen consolidated the improvements in bilateral
relations since October 2006, registering a solid step towards establishing strategic
mutually beneficial relations. The major turn in China-Japan relations is
manifested in three areas.
First, the two sides agreed on resolving the question of the Yasukuni Shrine
and found a pragmatic solution.2 This was a key step in breaking the political
stalemate that had been formed because of the then Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine during the previous five years. Many
people find the agreement still rather fragile. However, I believe it was a decision
made after careful thought on both sides rather than an act of expediency. Given
that differences over history are hard to resolve definitively in the short term,
it serves the interests of both sides to prevent them damaging the wider bilateral
relationship. Furthermore, China has already demonstrated to Japan, and
continues to show, that it has no intention of playing the history card. Facts will
gradually dispel misgivings on the part of the Japanese public.3 The possibility
that Abe would resume visits to the Shrine to reverse adverse political
developments ahead of lower House elections in July 2007 was remote.4
Improved relations with China represented one of Abe’s major achievements
and enjoyed extensive domestic support. Why would he have made such a
self-defeating move?
Second, the two sides agreed to resume and strengthen high-level exchanges,
and remarkable progress has been made in this regard. In today’s world,
particularly where major countries are concerned, high-level exchanges are a
basic condition for the development of normal state-to-state relations. On this
basis, certain mutual trust between major leaders may play a uniquely positive
role in facilitating the improvement and development of relations between their
countries. However, for quite some time, the steady worsening of China-Japan
relations seriously obstructed high-level contact, which became the weakest
link in bilateral ties. Remarkable changes took place after October 2006. Major
leaders met on three international occasions and realised the first exchange of
visits. Then an exchange of visits between Prime Minister Abe and President
Hu Jintao was placed on the agenda. Resumption and strengthening of high-level
contact is a substantive part of the major turn in the relationship and will play
a key role in consolidating improvements and preventing any reversal.
Third, the two sides reached common understandings on establishing a
mutually beneficial strategic relationship, which reset the baseline of bilateral
relations on common interest. About four years ago, this author analysed the
reasons for the worsening of relations between China and Japan and found that,
apart from the direct causes of disputes over history, Taiwan and the East China
Sea, this deterioration had more profound roots: the end of the Cold War and
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the appearance of a relationship between two major Asian powers. Neither side
was prepared or accustomed to such a situation, which led to increasing friction
and a relationship dominated by differences.5 The idea of jointly establishing
a mutually beneficial strategic relationship marked a major change in mindset
and a new starting point in establishing political mutual trust. It indicates the
determination of both sides to seek common ground while shelving differences
and placing common interests at the top of their agenda. By so doing, the two
major powers are abandoning the old idea of ‘no two rival tigers on the same
mountain’ and starting to work together for cooperation and a ‘win–win’
situation.
With these three changes, China-Japan exchanges and cooperation turned
warmer, growing and strengthening in many fields. The two sides strengthened
cooperation on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and maintaining stability
on the Korean Peninsula. China also expressed a willingness to offer possible
assistance to Japan on the kidnapping question, which was welcomed by Japan.
Negotiations on the joint development of the East China Sea sped up and entered
into the stage of discussing detailed schemes for joint development. Japan
expressed its understanding of China’s serious concern over the question of
Taiwan, reaffirmed its commitment to the three political documents, and to its
undertaking not to support Taiwan independence. A joint research program on
the history question, guided by both governments, was formally launched and
two workshops were held. Military relations achieved a new momentum with
the Chinese Defence Minister visiting Japan and an exchange of naval visits was
planned. Exchanges between political parties of the two countries as well as
between the Chinese National People’s Congress and the Japanese Diet became
more active. The two sides also launched high-level economic dialogue and
energy policy dialogue mechanisms. Together with the 35th anniversary
celebrations and the launch of a series of events under the Year of Cultural and
Sport Exchanges, non-governmental exchanges also gained momentum.
This major turning point in China-Japan relations has not been accidental,
but rather is driven by a sense of necessity.
First, the continued worsening of relations had seriously damaged the strategic
interests of both countries. Over the previous seven years, various disputes had
surfaced, public sentiments had become increasingly confrontational and mutual
strategic suspicions had grown strong.6 With the outbreak of large-scale
anti-Japan demonstrations in some Chinese cities in 2005, people began to worry
that the situation of ‘cold politics and warm economy’7  between China and
Japan could move towards ‘cold politics and cold economy’, which would lead
to unthinkable prospects. To break the political stalemate and to guide bilateral
relations towards stability and improvement gradually became a desire of both
countries.
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Furthermore, the worsening of China-Japan relations caused much concern
in the international community. Poor China-Japan relations not only weakened
their cooperation in establishing regional multilateral cooperation mechanisms
such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), but also
increased difficulty in reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
and led to a serious imbalance in the China–US–Japan triangle. No country in
East Asia wishes to be forced to make a choice between China and Japan.
Although the United States has never wanted to see the level of the China-Japan
relationship approaching or even exceeding that of the US-China or US-Japan
relationships, worsening China-Japan relations embody the danger of
confrontation between the US-Japan alliance and China and of increased difficulty
in coordination and cooperation between the US-South Korea alliance and the
US-Japan alliance, with both Koreas holding a historical view of Japan similar
to that of China. Moreover, although the United States Government has long
been reluctant to publicly criticise the revisionist historical view in Japan, the
growing salience of the Yasukuni Shrine problem and consequent rising criticism
from the US Congress and the strategic studies community pushed the Bush
Administration into an awkward position. The international community,
including the United States, had become eager to see stability and improvement
in China-Japan relations at an early date.
Additionally, ever since 2005, the two governments (China in particular) had
been attempting to break the political stalemate and improve bilateral relations.
A meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and the then Japanese Prime
Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, in Indonesia in April 2005,8  which led to the start
of strategic dialogue and the resumption of negotiations over the East China Sea
in the following month, had sparked hope. The Chinese Government gave a
positive comment on Koizumi’s statement in commemorating the sixtieth
anniversary of the Second World War. Even after the two sides’ efforts were
once again stalled by Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, contacts continued
in the most difficult circumstances in 2006, with exchanges between the two
ruling parties, a Foreign Ministers’ meeting, strategic dialogue,9  East China Sea
negotiations, people-to-people dialogue and Track 2 dialogue. At the same time,
China began to release positive signals10  towards future Japanese leaders. The
most likely next Prime Minster, Abe, then Chief Cabinet Minister, began to
adopt ambiguity over Yasukuni Shrine.11  Finally, the two sides seized the
opportunity of a Japanese leadership change and agreed (through arduous
negotiation) on overcoming political barriers and promoting healthy development
of friendly and cooperative relations, leading to the long-awaited turn in bilateral
relations.
However, the foundation for the turn is still rather fragile. The three major
friction points (Taiwan, history, and the East China Sea) remain. The serious
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confrontation in public sentiments that have formed during the continuous
worsening of bilateral relations will remain difficult to manage, and take time
to reverse. At a more profound level, the mutual strategic suspicion will not
disappear overnight.12
In this situation, in order that progress can be made in building a mutually
beneficial strategic relationship, it should be a paramount task for China and
Japan to fully consolidate and expand the opening that has been created and
strive to make the turn for the better irreversible. The two sides must stick
unswervingly to the common understanding of jointly eliminating political
barriers, and to properly handling the history issue and placing it appropriately
so as to prevent it from becoming, yet again, a major barrier to the development
of bilateral relations. At the same time, efforts should be made to maintain and
further develop high-level exchanges on a regular and institutionalised basis
and in diversified forms, making it among the most important mechanisms to
promote bilateral relations and to control and handle bilateral differences.
The two sides must be aware that it will not be smooth sailing in the quest
to improve bilateral relations. Problems may arise from time to time and frictions
may resurface in various forms. Some questions, if not properly handled, may
even incur serious damage to bilateral relations. With the March 2008
‘presidential’ election in Taiwan drawing near, the question of Taiwan may well
gain prominence and should attract serious attention from both sides.13  All in
all, at present and in the coming one to two years, it is essential to properly and
prudently handle various differences between the countries, including possible
new differences.14
While continuing to control and narrow differences and consolidate existing
gains and benefits, the two sides must seize the opportunity to rapidly expand
cooperation and promote development of mutually beneficial strategic relations.
This will be the key to whether China-Japan relations may have a new future.
Since October 2006, through repeated discussions, China and Japan have already
reached three very important points of common understanding in this regard.
First, the basic spirit of mutually beneficial strategic relations has been set;
that is, jointly making constructive contribution to peace, stability and
development in Asia and the whole world through bilateral, regional and
international cooperation, and in that process benefiting each other, expanding
common interest and pushing bilateral relations to a new high.15 This basic
spirit goes beyond differences and places mutual benefit and expanded common
interest in a paramount position. It also goes beyond bilateral cooperation and
expands the foundation of bilateral relations to broader areas of regional and
international cooperation. Such a spirit will be of long-term significance in
guiding the effort to construct a mutually beneficial strategic relationship.
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Second, the basic contents of a mutually beneficial strategic relationship have
been clarified. They include: (1) supporting each other’s peaceful development
and increasing mutual political trust; (2) deepening mutually beneficial
cooperation and realising common development; (3) strengthening defence
dialogue and exchanges and working together for regional stability; (4) increasing
cultural and personnel exchanges and promoting mutual understanding and
friendly sentiments between the two peoples; and (5) enhancing coordination
and cooperation in a joint effort to deal with regional and global issues.16 The
basic contents touch upon varying levels of China-Japan relations, provide a
clearly drawn blueprint for the construction of a mutually beneficial strategic
relationship and identify the direction in which the many dimensions of the
relationship must move. Among all these contents, the first one is of guiding
significance and constitutes a foundation for mutually beneficial strategic
relations.
Third, practical steps have been identified, such as comprehensively
improving and strengthening various bilateral dialogue and exchange mechanisms
including high-level contacts, strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation in
nine areas (including areas such as energy, environmental protection, information
and communication technology, and finance), and focusing on strengthened
cooperation on regional and international affairs (including, in particular, reform
of the United Nations and the Six-Party Talks).17  Many of these steps are in the
nature of recovering a badly depleted relationship. However, there are also
specific cooperation measures, such as the launch of high-level economic dialogue,
exchange of naval visits, strengthened defence liaison, increased energy and
intellectual property rights cooperation and more dialogue on UN reform, which
are of ground-breaking significance for bilateral relations. Furthermore, China
made it clear that it is ‘ready to see a greater and constructive role played by
Japan in international affairs’.18 This is another important sign, which will have
a far-reaching influence over future China-Japan cooperation in international
relations.
Constructing a mutually beneficial strategic relationship is an arduous task
that will take time to accomplish. The two sides need to translate their common
understanding into action. Culturally, China values the overall situation and
principles while Japan treasures details and tangible benefits. The two sides
should be aware of their cultural differences and make the effort to adapt to and
complement each other. They need to set their eyes on the long-term and overall
interests but start with minor actions and with a flexible and pragmatic attitude,
thereby promoting bilateral relations in a step-by-step and stable manner. So
long as the two sides honour their commitment, act in line with their common
understanding and work conscientiously together, the vision of a mutually
beneficial strategic relationship between China and Japan can finally be realised.
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Continued improvement and development of China-Japan relations will have
a positive influence on East Asian security. First of all, it facilitates cooperation
on the Six-Party Talks. With the continuous escalation of the North Korean
nuclear crisis in 2006, people were worried about greater difficulty in
coordination between China on the one hand and the United States and Japan
on the other due to poor China-Japan relations and the more intense situation
on the Korean Peninsula once North Korea carried out its first nuclear test.
However, major changes in China-Japan relations exerted a positive influence
over the development of the North Korean nuclear issue. After North Korea’s
nuclear test, the UNSC quickly adopted a resolution to impose sanctions on
North Korea and the Six-Party Talks resumed shortly thereafter to register
important progress. Admittedly, the positive developments on the North Korean
nuclear issue had multiple causes, but improved China-Japan relations and
strengthened cooperation between China, South Korea and Japan were certainly
among them. Some people even believed that Japan sought to improve its
relations with China partly out of its serious concern over the Korean Peninsula.
This analysis makes sense. In the future, with China and Japan giving priority
to the Six-Party Talks in their effort to develop regional and international
cooperation, the positive effects of improved China-Japan relations will become
more apparent.
Improved China-Japan relations have also helped to relax tensions over the
East China Sea and to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the outstanding territorial
and maritime disputes that are still widespread in East Asia. When state-to-state
relations worsen, disputes over territory or maritime interests are not only
difficult to resolve but may also trigger military conflict. In 2005, frictions over
rival claims in the East China Sea developed to a dangerous level, with a marked
increase in military surveillance by both China and Japan, more radical opinions
in the confrontational national sentiments, and the appearance of the view that
there would definitely be a war between China and Japan. Later, following
negotiations, the two sides reached initial understandings on the common
development of these disputed territories and the situation relaxed to some
extent. Nonetheless, against the backdrop of a generally tense bilateral
relationship, registering further progress will be very difficult and the risk of
reversal is ever-present. Improvement in bilateral relations has created the
necessary condition for common development of the East China Sea, allowing
the two governments to gradually dispel disruptive nationalistic sentiments and
find practical ways forward through sustained and serious dialogue and mutual
compromise. After late 2006, the two sides increased their contact over the East
China Sea issue. Their common understanding grew and they agreed to strive
for a specific scheme of common development to be reported to leaders of the
two countries in the fall of 2007.19  If China and Japan are successful in jointly
developing their claims in the East China Sea, they will not only create conditions
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for the two sides to resolve their maritime boundary dispute and the Diaoyutai
Islands dispute in the future, but also set a positive example for other countries
in the region in relaxing tension and resolving disputes over territory or maritime
interests.
Moreover, improved China-Japan relations are conducive to maintaining
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which serves the interests of the
Mainland, Taiwan and others in East Asia (including Japan), as well as those
nations outside the region (such as the United States). However, the development
of pro-independence forces in Taiwan constitutes a huge challenge to peace and
stability in the region. In recent years, with the sustained stable development
of China-US relations, their cooperation to prevent Taiwan-independence
sentiments disrupting the status quo has increased and their friction over the
Taiwan question has decreased. However, frictions between China and Japan
over Taiwan have been on the rise due to the worsening relationship. Pro-Taiwan
forces in Japan have gained influence, official contacts with Taiwan have
increased, and Japan’s Taiwan policy has moved from one of ambiguity to more
clarity.20 This has been exploited by Taiwan’s independence forces. They even
publicly called for the establishment of a quasi-military alliance with Japan
against China. The worsening of China-Japan relations added complexity and
risk to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Any improvement and development
in China-Japan relations may lead to increased cooperation between the two
countries in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, thus containing
the expansion of the Taiwan independence force and leaving China, the United
States and Japan more space in which to manoeuvre in the event that the
pro-independence forces provoke a crisis. The May 2007 US-Japan Security
Consultative Committee (2 plus 2) meeting did not again list the peace and
stability of the Taiwan Strait among its common strategic objectives, giving a
positive signal21  and helping to restrict the capacity of the pro-independence
forces to disrupt the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Further, improved China-Japan relations will facilitate the establishment and
development of a regional multilateral security cooperation mechanism. At
present, East Asian security mechanisms are mainly composed of two parts: the
US-led bilateral military alliances; and the rapidly developing bilateral and
multilateral security dialogues in which coordination and cooperation among
major powers play an important role. As time passes, the role of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), the APT, the EAS and the Six-Party Talks will increase
and that of bilateral military alliances will gradually decrease. In this process,
improvement and development of China-Japan relations and strengthened
military relations and defence dialogue will not only facilitate the formation of
a relatively stable and coordinated triangular relationship between China, the
United States and Japan; it will also create the conditions necessary for dialogue
between China and the US-Japan alliance. Continued development of China-Japan
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relations will inject vigour into, and lay down the foundation for, the
development of multilateral security mechanisms in East Asia. History will prove
that only once China and Japan achieve a genuine reconciliation, and are able
to cooperate comprehensively, can East Asia establish an effective multilateral
security cooperation mechanism.
Finally, the continued improvement and development of China-Japan relations
will also greatly enhance their cooperation in the fields of non-traditional
security, such as counter-terrorism, guarding against financial and energy crises,
treatment of environmental pollution and ecological destruction, prevention
and treatment of international infectious diseases, combating transnational crime,
and supplying international humanitarian assistance. Since the end of the Cold
War, an important trend in the international situation has been the rise of
non-traditional security challenges. Strengthened cooperation in this regard will
be a necessary choice for China, Japan and other East Asian countries.
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intense China-Japan dispute.
4  Shinzo Abe resigned on 12 September 2007, barely one year after becoming Japan’s Prime Minister.
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16  China–Japan Joint Press Communiqué, 11 April 2007.
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Strait, but firmly opposes armed intervention by the US-Japan alliance in a Taiwan Strait conflict on
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